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t..J~ VJ Question Presented 
lJ'~, L./.~"3 k.~. ZZ7 ~~J 
Whether the provision of supplemental instruction 
in nonpublic schools by public teachers, under the 
circumstances of these cases, violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment? 
2. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
(1) In Aguilar, the services furnished to students 
in nonpublic schools are authorized by Title I of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S .c. 
§2701, et seq., which declared it to be the policy of the 
United States to provide financial assistance to local 
educational institutions serving areas with concentrations 
of children from low-income families, in order to enable 
such 
-------------------
institutions to meet the needs of educationally 
deprived children. Section 2740(a) provides that 
To the extent consistent with the number of 
educationally deprived children in the school 
district who are enrolled in ~private 
elementary and secondary schools, [the local 
educational agency] shall make provision for 
including special educational services and 
arrangements (such as dual enrollment, educational 
radio and television, and mobile educational 
services and equipment) in which such children can 
participate. Expenditures for educational 
services and arrangements pursuant to this section 
shall be equal (taking into account the 
number of children to be served and the special 
educational needs of such children) to 
expenditures for children enrolled in the public 
schools of the local educational agency. 
Since 1966, New York City has been receiving federal funds 
under Title I to finance programs wherein it sends public 
school teachers and other professionals into religious and 
other nonpublic schools to provide remedial instruction and 
clinical and guidance services to students. The City's 
initial Title I program required the students to travel to 




public schools after regular school hours for th~ir remedial 
instruction; attendance lagged, however, and some programs 
were conducted in the nonpublic schools after hours. 
Attendance remained poor, and there was concern for the 
students' safety in travelling home after dark or in bad 
weather. A plan for students to participate in classes with 
public school students in public schools during the school 
day was rejected because of unspecified concerns about 
violating the New York Constitution. Consequently, the City 
devised the plan at issue here, of having public school 
--------===:::: 
teachers travel to the nonpublic schools during the school 
day to provide instruction. 
(2) I~ Mich. Comp. Laws §380.1282 and its 
predecessor prov~ ha::-authorized local public school 
districts to develop educational programs to meet local 
educational needs, and have authorized the payment of state 
school aid funds to local boards of education for provision 
of part-time instruction in supplementary subjects to 
students in nonpublic schools by public school teachers. 
Pursuant to this general authorization, the Grand Rapids 
School District ( "GRDS") set up the Shared Time and 
~
Community Education programs at issue in this case. Shared 
Time courses are offered in the nonpublic schools, during 
regular school hours, in classrooms leased to the GRDS. 
Although not required for graduation from the nonpublic 
schools, the courses were primarily remedial and enrichment 
4. 
/ 
instruction in core courses such as reading, i math, art, 
music, and physical education. Many of the teachers 
employed by the GRDS had previously taught in the nonpublic 
schools. The Community Education program consisted of 
voluntary, leisure time offerings, available to interested 
students on the leased premises after hours. Most of the 
instructors taught in the nonpublic school during the day, 
but were hired as part-time public school employees to teach 
the Community Education courses after hours. 
Below 
1) Aguilar: In 1976, the National Coalition for -
~--·~ucation and Religious Liberty sued the Secretary of 
HEW and the Chancellor of the New York City Board of 
Education to enjoin New York City's program under Title I 
providing instruction in nonpublic schools as violative of 
the Establishment Clause. An evidentiary hearing producing 
an extensive factual record was held before a three-judge -
court, which ruled that the program was constitutional. 
~tional Coalition for Public Education & Religious Liberty 
("PEARL") v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (SDNY 1980). This 
Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because 
it was untimely filed. 449 u.s. 808 (1980). Meanwhile, 
this action was brought by 6 federal taxpayers in DC in the 
EDNY, but was stayed pending final determination of PEARL. 
Four parents of children in nonpublic schools receiving 




stipulated that the case was to be tried on i the record 
developed in PEARL, with some supplementary affidavits. 
Judge Neaher agreed with the PEARL court's result, and 
dismissed the complaint. 
~~inberg, VFriendly, 
what is one of the best Court of 
& ~kes) reversed. In 
ever read, Judge Friendly thoroughly canvassed the 
circumstances of this case and the relevant Supreme Court 
case law, and concluded that the program violated the 
Establishment Clause on the excessive entanglement prong of 
the test established by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 
{1971), and its progeny. CA2 observed that although {1) New 
York City's program has been quite successful in achieving 
its goal of aiding educationally disadvantaged children, and 
{2) the record revealed little actual evidence that the 
teachers had been unable to remain religiously neutral, the 
program violated the Clause because the continuing 
surveillance required to be sure that Title I teachers did 
not advance or inhibit religion was "not significantly 
different" from that which this _S..Qll r t -held in Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 { 197 5) , would lead to excessive --entanglement. The court found the lack of evidence of -actual misconduct by Title I teachers in the past to be 
irrelevant to the serious potential for such problems posed 
by the structure of the program. 
6. 
,I 
(2) Ball: In August 1980, six I individual 
taxpayers sued GRDS, the State Board of Education, and 
others in DC, challenging the provision of Shared Time and 
Community Education services on premises leased from 
~
religiously-oriented nonpublic schools in the Grand Rapids 
community. A group of parents with children in the programs 
intervened, and an 8-day trial was conducted before Judge 
Gibson in May 1982. At the close of the case, but before 
rendering a decision, Judge Gibson recused himself: the case 
was reassigned to Judge Enslen, who decided the case based 
on the documentary evidence and transcripts of testimony. 
He ruled that most of the programs violated the 
Establishment Clause. (The Drownproofing, Outdoor Education, 
and Driver's Education programs were sustained.) 
v;6 (Edwards and Lively) affirmed-. 
-. > 
Judge 
Krupansky dissented on the ground that the majority 
improperly ignored the "successful and fully documented 
operational history" of the programs, concluding that 
because the record demonstrates no attempted or actual 
religious indoctrination of students by teachers in the 
p:-ograms, the majority's rule amounts to a per se 
prohibition of secular instruction at sectarian 
institutions, a result she does not find compelled either by 
the First Amendment or by the case law. 
7. 
c. Relevant Case Law 
There are several cases decided by this Court 
involving the validity under the Establishment Clause of 
state aid to primarily religious nonpublic schools. A brief 
summary of the most relevant of these follows, as their 
reasoning wil~ central to decision of the cases at bar. 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1971), the 
Court crystallized the now well-known three-part test that 
has been commonly used to analyse cases arising under the 
Establishment Clause; all parties in these two cases 
apparently agree that the test should be applied here. That 
test is that (i) the statute at issue must have a secular 
legislative purpose; (ii) the statute's primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 
(iii) the statute must not foster "an excessive government 
entanglement" with religion. Id., at 612-613. To determine 
whether an excessive entanglement exists, the Court must 
look at (i) the character and purposes of the benefitted 
institution; (ii) the nature of the State aid provided; and 
(iii) the resulting relationship between the government and 
the religious authority. 
Lemon also made some general observations about 
the Establishment Clause and its purposes. Observing that 
the language of the Clause forbids laws "respecting" an 
establishment of religion, the Court ruled that a law may be 
invalid that falls short of actually establishing religion, 




Id., at 613. The classic warning in Establishment Clause 
cases has been against 11 'programs, whose very nature is ~ 
to entangle the state in details of [religious] 
administration.' 11 Id., at 615 (quoting Justice Harlan's 
separate opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 
695 (1970) (emphasis added)). 
~ 
Lemon involved v{hode Island and Pennsylvania 
statutes authorizing state subsidization of religious 
schools in the form of supplements to the salaries of 
religious school teachers who taught secular subjects, and 
provision of textbooks and other instructional materials. 
'!he Court noted that the merits of the programs and their 
success in achieving the goals of improved education were 
not the issue; whether the programs were consistent with the 
First Amendment was the only important concern. Id. , at 
625. 
The Court ruled that supplementing teacher 
salaries violated the Establishment Clause. The Court 
reached this result even though teachers had testified that 
they had not injected religion into the secular subjects 
they taught. The Court noted that it need not assume that 
the teachers had been guilty of bad faith or conscious 
design to evade the statutory limitations implemented to 
accommodate the Establishment Clause; the potential for 
allowing religion to creep in was just too great. States 
are required to be certain that the teachers receiving 
salary supplements are not inculcating religion, and 
9. 
susceptible, like books, 
1) 
one-time teachers are not ot; ,) a 
inspection to be sure of their ideological character. (The 
teachers at issue in this case were religious school 
~achers, many of them nuns, although the Act required that 
the teacher agree to teach only secular subjects and not to 
teach any religious subjects as long as she received the 
salary supplements.) The Court considered that a 
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state 
surveillance [would] inevitably be required" to ensure that 
the statutory restrictions were obeyed. Id., at 619. Such 
surveillance would lead to an excessive government 
entanglement with the religious schools. 
finally, Lemon also considered that approving the 
~ograms would be likely to result in the sort of political 
divisiveness along religious lines that the Framers intended 
the First Amendment to prevent. Local elections would be 
permeated by the important issue of state aid to religious 
schools, and votes would be cast along religious lines. The 
situation would be aggravated by the need for continuing 
annual appropriations and larger demands as costs and 
populations grow. Id., at 622-623. 
Liberty 
Y-ommi t tee 
v. Nyquist, 413 
for Public Education & Religious 
u.s. 756 (1973), the Court concluded 
that public grants to nonpublic, primarily religious schools 
for maintenance and repair required to ensure student health 
and safety, and tuition reimbursement and tax deductions 
offered to parents of children in the nonpublic schools were 
.. 





invalid because they had a primary effect ~f advancing 
religi~ In analyising the case, 
Cburt reaffirmed the three-part test 
your opinion for the 
discussed in Lemon. 
Your opinion noted that it has never been thought either 
p:>ssible or desirable to enforce a regime of total 
~paration between Church and State, id., at 760; some forms 
of aid may be channeled to the secular function of religious 
schools without providing prohibited direct aid to the 
~ctarian, but "the channel is a narrow one," id., at 775. 
The Court concluded that the maintenance and repair 
--------------------------- ------------------------
provisions of the law were invalid as having an effect of 
------------------advancing religion, because the law did not limit the 
provision of funds to portions of the facilities that were 
used for secular purposes. The Court noted that "a mere 
statistical judgment will not suffice as a guarantee that 
state funds will not be used to finance religious 
education": after Lemon, the State must be certain that the 
funds will not be so used. !d., at 778-779. 
As to the tuition reimbursements and tax 
---------------~----
deductions, the Court noted that the fact that the aid was 
------------~----------------------~_) 
given to the parents and not directly to the school was not 
dispositive, but was only one factor to be conside ed. Id., 
at 781. It also observed that although the purposes of the 
program were admirable, this was only one factor to be 
weighed in determining whether the program violated 
cherished First Amendment values. !d., at 795. Finally, 
the Court considered the potential for political 
11. 
divisiveness also to be an issue, 
,; 
as did the ,.'(..emon Court. 
The pressure for enlargement of the program was predictable 
and would lead to the type of political strife over 
religious issues that the First Amendment was intended to 
prevent. ~ at 795-797. 
~~ler v. Barrera, 417 u.s. 402 (1974), involved 
the scope of a State's duty under the federal Title I 
~ogram (at issue in Aguilar, at bar) to provide services to 
nonpublic school children comparable to those provided 
public school children under the Act. The decision 
expressly left open the validity under the Establishment 
Clause of Title I aid provided on 
schools. ~concurrence stated, -----
the premises of religious 
however, that you nwould 
""'--'"'-
have serious misgivings about the constitutionality of a 
--~----------------------------~~ 
statute that required the utilization of public school 
---~------ ------------------~----------------------~ teachers in sec tar ian schools. See [Nyquist.]" Id. , at 
428. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that any aid 
to religious schools--direct or indirect--violated the First 
Amendment. He admonished that in failing to invalidate the 
program, the Court had been improperly "seduced" by the 
laudable purpose of Title I of helping educationally 
~ deprived children. Id., at 429-430. 
v ~eek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 (1975), provides 
~~the closest factual ana ogy to the cases at bar. There, the 
~,~ Court considered Pennsylvania laws authorizing loans of 
~ textbooks and instructional materials to religious sc ools 








therapy, and supplemental instruction for Qemedial and 
gifted students to students on the religious school 
premises, by public school employees. The loans of 
instructional materials were invalidated because unlike the 
loan of textbooks, which was upheld, the instructional 
materials were lent to the schools, not to the students. 
The schools• religious and secular educational functions 
were inextricably intertwined, and the loans therefore had 
the primary effect of advancing religion. 
The Court ruled that the auxiliary services were ~~ 
~~~ invalid because 
..; · ~ entanglement and 
they potentially would foster excessive 
political divisiveness. The Court held 
that the DC had erred in relying on the 11 good faith and 
professionalism.. of the auxiliary staff teachers and 
counselors to ensure that a nonideological posture was 
maintained. Id., at 369. The Court believed that the fact 
that the teachers and counselors were public employees did 
not 11 substantially eliminate the need for continuing 
surveillance .. noted in Lemon, which had involved religious 
s:::hool teachers. Id., at 371. The schools they were 
visiting were dedicated to religious, as well as secular 
education, and the atmosphere of advancement of religion was 
constantly maintained. The ..prophylactic contacts .. 
necessary to ensure that the auxiliary staff played a 
nonideolog ical role would lead to an in toler able degree of 
entanglement, because under Lemon, the State must be certain 
that impermissible conduct does not occur. Therefore, the 
13. 
fact that the danger of such conduct is less i~ a remedial 
ITBth class than in medieval history does not matter: "a 
diminished probability of impermissible conduct is not 
sufficient." ~ 
In~lman v. Walter, 433 u.s. 229 (1977), the 
Cburt upheld various provisions of Ohio law, drafted 
spe~fica=:y t, confor~ M~ek, which authorized loans of 
instructional materials and textbooks, provision of testing 
in which nonpublic school personnel were not involved, 
provision of diagnostic services by employees of the public 
school system on nonpublic school premises, and other 
services. The diagnostic services were distinguished from 
---------------~ 
the teachers and counselors in Meek on the ground that such 
services have li ,ttle or no educational content, the 
diagnostician has only limited contact with the children 
tested, and the nature of the relationship does not lend 
itself to the transmission of sectarian views. You wrote a ........____ 
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part 
~ 
!:rfo, 
in which you agreed that the diagnostic services should be ~ 
upheld. You noted that this area of the law does not len~~~ 
itself to "analytical tidiness," and that many of the 
Cburt's decisions must seem arbitrary. Id., at 262. You 
found merit in the "persistent desire of a number of States 
to find proper means of helping sectarian education to 
survive," and noted the benefit that parochial schools have 
provided. Id. You considered it important to note that the 
risk of religious control over the democratic process was no 
14. 
J 
longer as significant as it was in the days of ~he Framers, 
and you viewed the risk of "deep political division along 
religious lines" to be "remote." !d., at 263. Any such 
risk seemed tolerable to you, given the benefit of sectarian 
schools and the continuing oversight of the Court. Id. 
II. Discussion 
The question of secular purpose is not at issue in 
either case--all parties in both cases agree that the 
programs at issue had a legitimate secular purpose There 
is dispute in both cases about whether the programs have the 
effect of advancing religion; the fi imary iss t;e ) in both 9 ~ 
cases, however, is whether the programs can be invalidated ....____. 
) ~ ,, 
on entanglement grounds. Both cases involve schools that 
are primarily religious in nature; therefore, the 
entanglement issue turns largely on the nature of the aid -----. 
~----------------------------------~ 
provided and the resulting relationship between the 
government and I believe that this 
Court 1 s prior decisions, discussed above, demonstrate that 
the programs in both cases are invalid on entanglement 
grounds, and consequently, I devote most of my discussion to 
that issue. 
A. Aguilar 
I agree completely with Judge Friendly 1 s opinion 
in this case invalidating the Title I program on 
15. 
, 
entanglement grounds. If Lemon, Nyquist, and Me¢k are still 
good law--and I have no reason to believe they are not--they 
compel the conclusion that the Title I program at issue here 
is unconstitutional. Appellants and the SG make much of the 
fact that Meek was decided on a meager factual record, while 
the program at issue here had been in operation for 16 years 
and the extensive trial court record showed no evidence of 
improper behavior by the Title I teachers. Under Meek and 
~mon, however, these facts are unimportant. Although Meek 
may have been decided on a meager record, I find nothing in 
Justice Stewart's opinion that so limits the decision in 
that case. Rather, it held flatly that a court is not 
entitled to rely on the "good faith and professionalism" of 
the teachers involved to be sure that no impermissible 
conduct occurs. This was so even though the teachers were 
FUblic school employees rather than religious school 
reachers, as in Lemon. Moreover, the Lemon decision noted 
that the DC had made "extensive findings" on the 
entanglement issue, 403 u.s., at 615, and some teachers 
there had testified that they did not inject religion into 
their courses. Nonetheless, the Court held that it need 
not, and did not, assume that the teachers had been unable 
to remain neutral; the potential that they would be unable 
to do so was present, and the State was required by the 
First Amendment to be "certain" that no impermissible 
conduct occurred. Thus, although the lack of evidence in 




appealing case for not invalidating the Ti tle'1 I program, 
under the decisions of this Court, that is not nearly 
enough. ~, Nyquist, supra, at 778 ("a mere statistical 
judgment will not suffice"): Meek, supra, at 371 ("a 
diminished probability of impermissible conduct is not 
sufficient"). 
The e• s argumeliJ centers around what a highly 
effective and beneficial program Title I has been, and how 
ineffective alternatives to providing on-site instruction 
have proved to be. CA2 acknowledged the truth of this ~~ 
assertion and rightly stated that it was the overwhelming 
merit of the program that made this such a hard case. The 
~-----------------------~---------merits of the particular program at issue, however, have 
never been deemed to be dispositive factors in determining 
its First Amendment validity. ~, Lemon, supra, at 625 
(the "merit and benefits of these schools • . • are not the 
issue before us," although the schools' "contribution has 
been enormous"). See also Nyquist, supra, at 795 
(admirable purposes of program only one factor to be 
considered) • In your sepp.rate opinion in Wolman, you 
expressed the need to accommodate the government's laudable 
desire to aid nonpublic schools and what you viewed as the 
decreased risk of political divisiveness these days: 
oonetheless, the aid in Wolman was substantially different 
from the aid provided by New York's Title I program. The 
diagnosticians in Wolman were distinguished from teachers, 






contact with children, contact in a context ~·1 unlikely to 
permit transmission of religious values, and a relationship 
much different from that of the one shared by teacher and 
~ 
children. None of those distinctions ~ applicable here. 
The SG argues that the safeguards undertaken in 
the program--of hiring public school teachers, of using 
rooms devoid of religious artifacts, the lack of 
reimbursement for use of the classroom space, supervision by 
field supervisors and the Board of Education--all serve to 
ensure that no religious instruction will be given by the 
Title I teachers. He also argues that the Title I program 
is governed by detailed regulations that have the effect of 
"routinizing" the relationship between the religious schools 
and the Title I program, thereby minimizing the need to 
worry about excessive entanglement. I do not find the SG's 
argu~nts _Eersuasive. -
Meek ruled that the fact that the teachers 
involved there were public employees did not "substantially 
eliminate the need for continuing surveillance" that existed 
because the instruction was provided on the premises of the 
religious schools. 421 u.s., at 371. The "atmosphere 
dedicated to the advancement of religion" that the Meek 
Court found made continuing surveillance necessary seems to 
me to be no less present here just because certain rooms 
have been stripped of religious artifacts. Respondents 
argue--and it seems patently true--that occasional 





improper religious inculcation or detect whether it has 
occurred. Moreover, the fact that the relationship between 
the Title I program administrators and the religious schools 
has become "routine" does not eliminate the need for 
surveillance; if anything, it may have the effect of making 
the need more apparent, as everyone will be less on guard to 
prevent improper conduct once the relationship becomes 
comfortable. The short answer is that Meek teaches that 
having public school teachers teach on the premises of 
religious schools presents a potential for impermissible 
conduct that is more heightened than if the instruction took 
place on a neutral site; it also held that the State must be 
certain that no such conduct occurred, something that could 
only be achieved by continuing surveillance. I can discern 
no substantial difference between this case and that one, 
and I would therefore recommend that you vote to affirm. 
The only way to reverse, it seems to me, is to 
change your view from that of the Meek opinion, which you 
pined. Your separate opinion in Wolman could be read as 
leading toward that view, and certainly, in the abstract, it 
shame to invalidate what has been a very important 
and worthwhile program in New York City. (Indeed, in New 
Yo~k City, sending one's child to public school is not 
really an alternative in many areas, because many of the 
public schools are just not safe.) On the other hand, as 
noted above, the programs upheld in Wolman are substantially 
different from the program involved here. 




0~1 balance, I 
For much the same reasons as those discussed 
above, I believe this case should be affirmed, as well. As 
in Aguilar, appellants stress the fact that the programs at 
issue have been in operation for a long time, and the 
extensive factual record developed in the DC showed no 
evidence that teachers providing the supplemental 
instruction were anything but neutral as to religion. As 
discussed above, however, Lemon and Meek lead to the 
conclusion that such evidence does not diminish the 
potential for impermissible conduct, and that it is 
therefore not dispositive. 
BtJ.!:-- ./ If anything, the facts of this case present a 
~ ~ potential for improper conduct than do those in 
~~ Aguilar. Instead of public school teachers consistently 
~~ ~ing used, many of the teachers involved in the Shared Time 
r· }~ program, and almost all of those involved in the Community 
~~ Education program, are r ;,.ligiou;:_. ~oo:_.!.:!ch~rs who have 
~~__./'" been hired by the public school to implement the programs. 
Moreover, the religious schools are paid by the private 
schools to lease the classroom space used. Under Meek, I 
believe that the Grand Rapids programs must also be 





c. Effect of Advancing Religion 
Appellants in both cases emphasize the facts that 
the instruction offered is supplementary, that the courses 
are not required by the religious schools as a condition of 
graduation, and that the programs were offered to the 
students, not to the nonpublic schools. The argument that 
. 
the courses were offered -to the students is a transparent, 
but unsuccessful a~tempt to fit within Meek. The religious 
schools were required to authorize provision of the courses 
in any particular school, and those schools decided which 
students would receive the instruction (with the possible 
exception of the Community Education leisure time courses). 
Mbreover, in Meek, the DC had held that the auxiliary 
services were provided to the children, not to the schools: 
yet the Court invalidated provision of the services. 
That the courses were supplementary and were not 
required for graduation does not mean that the religious 
schools were no being advanced thereby: especially with 
respect to the remedial instruction, the public programs 
were fulfilling a function that was evidently needed in the 
religious schools. By providing it to those schools, the 
aid relieved the schools of an obligation they ---- -------- ...::::. 
otherwise would have had if they were going to educate t eir 
Therefore, it appears to me that the 




This Court has decided a long line of cases 
involving the validity under the Establishment Clause of 
public aid to nonpublic religious schools. Under the 
teachings of these cases, sending public school teachers to 
teach on the premises of religious schools has always been 
viewed as presenting the potential for improper incul?ation 
~ --
of religion by the teachers, prevention of which would 
require continuing surveillance of a degree that would 
amount to excessive government entanglement with the 
administration of the religious schools. In my view, the 
fact that there has been no evidence of past improper 
conduct by such teachers involved in these programs does not 
lessen the ·potential for it occurring in the future. The 
) cases have all held that the potential is as important as 
J the fact of improper conduct, for purposes of protecting 
First Amendment values, and the potential exists because of 
the structure of these progr_ams which requires the public 
instruction to be provided on the premises of religious 
schools. Consequently, surveillance leading to entan~ement 
would still be required in these cases to be "certain" that ........______. ----..) 
no impermissible conduct occurs, and the programs are 
therefore invalid under this Court's longstanding view of 
the Establishment Clause. I therefore recommend that you 








Lynda DATE: Dec. 3, 1984 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
~-237,84-238,84-239 Establishment Clause Cases 
from New York and Michigan 
Your bench memo is exellent and persuasive. I 
have not yet read Judge Friendly's long opinion, but have 
no doubt that it is a classic Friendly product that will 
be hard to disagree with. 
I would appreciate, however, your giving me a 
crief memo making the best arguments you can in favor of 
reversal. It is one thing to invalidate state 
legislation, particularly where in Catholic states one can 
be reasonably sure that the legislators are influenced by 
their constituents. It is something else to invalidate a 
major act of Congress that for a fifth of the century 
seems to be recognized widely as constructive. It has 
been before Congress more than once over this period, 
without substantial criticism. There is no evidence - at 
least in this record - that the Act has tended to promote 
religion. we have said, of course, that such evidence is 





again no findings were made in either of these cases of 
"entangelement" in the sense contemplated by the First 
Amendment. It is conceded apparently that the purpose of 
the Act was secular. 
As you know, I am not fond of per se rules -
except, perhaps, the need for bright lines in some types 
of criminal case. Change is inevitable, and 
mnstitutionalizing a per se rules prevents accommodation 
to change. 
Is there any authority for making a distinction 
between facial invalidity of the Act and invalidity as 
applied? In this case, apparently the attack is "facial" 
at least as the Act is read to permit public school 
teachers to go into non-public schools for instructional 
purposes. As the Act has been applied, at least on the 
basis of the records in these cases, there has been no 
showing of furthering religion or entanglement. 
Apart from this, identify our decisions that you 
think could support a holding that the Act is not invalid 
- facially or applied. 
I do not suggst, Lynda, that I am thinking of 
voting to Reverse. I am troubled by invalidating a 
4NJ 
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v 
Unlike Act 195, which provides only for the loan of 
teaching material and equipment, ~~auth<;!"izes the 
Sec~~ucation, through the intermediate units, 
to ~~p~~-s~~~ as well as supportive ma-
terials, eqmpment, and personnel, __ to the nonpublic .. ~ 
schools of the Commonwealth. The "auxiliary services" 
authorizeaoyA~remedial and accelerated instruc-
tion, guidance counseling and testing, speech and hearing 
services-are prov_ided directly to nonpublic school chil-
dren with the approprmte -special need: . But the services 
areprovi oil1y· on" the hon ublic schoo1ifrem~nd 
only w en requeste y nonpUb1ic -sc oo re enta-
tives." Department of Education, Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, Guidelines for the Administration of Acts 
194 and 195, § 1.3. 
The legislative findings accompanying Act 194 are 
virtually identical to those in Act 195: Act 194 is intended 
to assure full development of the intellectual capacities 
of the children of Pennsylvania by extending the bene-
961. The Marburger District Court invalidated as violating the 
constitutional prohibition against establishment of religion New Jer-
sey's provision of instructional materi;'l and equipment to nonpublic 
elementary and secondary schools. New Jersey's program did not 
differ in any material respect from the loan provisions of Act 195. 
See 358 F. Supp., at 36-37. After finding that the nonpublic schools 
aided, for the most part, were church-related or religiously affiliated 
educational institutions, id., at 34, the court held that the program had 
n. primary effect of advancing religion . /d., at 37. The court also 
held, as did the District Court in the case before us, that excessive en-
tanglement of church and state would result from attempts to police 
use of material and equipment that were readily divertible to religious 
uses. /d., at 38-39. This Court's affirmance of the result in Mar- j 
burger was a decision on the merits, entitled to precedential weight . 
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-671; cf. Cincinnati, N. 0. 
& T. P.R. Co. v. United States, 400 U.S. 932, 935 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting from summary affirmance). 
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fits of free auxiliary services to all students in the Com-
monwealth. Act 194, § 1 (a), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, § 9-
972 (a). The appellants concede the validity of this sec-
ular legislative purpose. Nonetheless, they argue that 
Act 194 constitutes an impermissible establishment of re-
ligion because the auxiliary services are provided on the 
premises of predominantly church-related schools!-r 
In rejecting the appellants' argument, the District 
Court emphasized that "auxiliary services" are provided 
directly to the children involved and are expressly limited 
to those services which are secular, neutral, and nonideo-
logical. The court also noted that the instruction and 
counseling in question served only to supplement the 
basic, normal educational offerings of the qualifying non-
public schools. Any benefits to church-related schools 
that may result from the provision of such services, the 
District Court concluded, are merely incidental and indi-
rect, and thus not impermissible. See 374 F. Supp., at 
656-657. The court also held that no continuing super-
vision of the persortnel providing auxiliary services would 
be necessary to establish that Act 194's secular limitations 
were observed or to guarantee that a member of the 
auxiliary services staff had not "succumb[ed] to sectari-
anization of his or her professional work." 374 F. 
Supp., at 657. 
17 The appellants do not challenge, and we do not question, the 
authority of the Pennsylvania General Assembly to make free 
auxiliary services available to all students in the Commonwe:1lth, 
including those who attend church-related schools. Contrary to the 
argument advanced in a separate opinion filed today, therefore, 
this case presents no question whether "the Constitution pennits 
the States to gh·e special assistance to some of its children whose 
handicaps preYent their deriving the benefit normally anticipated 
from the education required to become a productive member of 
society and, at the same time, to deny those benefits to other 
children only because they attend a Lutheran, Catholic, or other 
church-sponsored school .... " Post, at 386-387. 
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We need not decide whether substantial state expendi-
tures to enrich the curricula of church-related elementary 
and secondary schools/8 like the expenditure of state 
funds to support the basic educational program of those 
schools, necessarily result in the direct and substantial 
advancement of religious activity.19 For decisions of this 
Court make clear that the District Court erred in relying 
entirely on the good faith and professionalism of the sec-
ular teachers and counselors functioning in church-re-
lated schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological pos-
ture is maintained. 
In Earley v. DiCenso, a companion case to Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, the Court invalidated a Rhode Island 
statute authorizing salary supplements for teachers of 
secular subjects in nonpublic schools. The Court ex-
pressly rejected the proposition, relied upon by the Dis-
trict Court in the case before us, that it was sufficient for 
the State to assume that teachers in church-related schools 
would succeed in segregatirf'g their religious beliefs from 
their secular educational duties. 
"We need not and do not assume that teachers in 
parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any 
conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by 
the statute and the First Amendment .... 
" ... But the potential for impermissible fostering 
of religion is present. . . . The State must be certain 
' given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers 
do not inculcate religion .... 
18 Because Acts 194 and 195 impose identical qualification require-
ments, compare Act 194, § 1 (c), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, § 9-972 (c), 
with Act 195, §§ 1 (c) , (e), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, §§ 9-972 (c), (e), 
the same schools are eligible for .aid under each Act. 
19 More than $14 million was appropriated in the 1972-1973 
school year to provide auxiliary services for nonpublic school students 
pursuant to Act 194. The amount was increased to $17,880,000 for 
the 1973-1974 school year. 
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"A comprehensive, discriminating, and continu-
ing state surveillance will inevitably be required to 
ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First 
Amendment otherwise respected .... " 403 U.S., at 
618-619. 
The prophylactic contacts required to ensure that 
teachers play a strictly nonideological role, the Court 
held, necessarily give rise to a constitutionally intolerable 
degree of entanglement between church and state. Id., 
at 619. The same excessive entanglement would be re-
quired for Pennsylvania to be "certain," as it must be, 
that Act 194 personnel do not advance the religious mis-
sion of the church-related schools in which they serve. 
Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. 
Supp. 29,40-41, aff'd, •17 U.S. 961.20 
That Act 194 authorizes state funding of teachers only 
for remedial and exceptional students, and not for normal 
students participating in the core curriculum, does not 
distinguish this case from Earley v. DiCenso and Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra. Whether the subject is "remedial 
reading," "advanced reading," or simply "reading," a 
teacher remains a teacher, and the danger that religious 
doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction 
persists. The likelihood of inadvertent fostering of re-
20 In addition to invalidating New Jersey's provision of instructional 
material and equipment to nonpublic schools, see n. 16, supra, the 
District Court in Marburger struck down the State's program to 
supply nonpublic schools with "auxiliary services." New Jers'ey de-
fined "auxiliary services" in substantially the same manner as Penn-
sylvania, and the administration of the New Jersey program did not 
differ significantly from the administration of Act 194. See 358 F. 
Supp., at 39. The District Court held that the auxiliary services 
program "is unconstitutional by reason of the church-state admin-
istrative entanglement it would produce." /d., at 40. This Court's 
affirmance of Marburger is a decision on the merits as to the consti-
tutionality of New Jersey's auxiliary-services program, and is en-
titled to precedential weight. 
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ligion may be less in a remedial arithmetic class than in a 
medieval history seminar, but a diminished probability 
of impermissible conduct is not sufficient: "The State 
must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that sub-
sidized teachers do not inculcate religion." 403 U. S., at 
619. And a state-subsidized guidance counselor is surely 
as likely as a state-subsidized chemistry teacher to fail on 
occasion to separate religious instruction and the advance-
ment of religious beliefs from his secular educational 
responsibilities. 21 
The fact that the teachers and counselors providing 
auxiliary services are employees of the public intermedi-
ate unit, rather than of the church-related schools in 
which they work, does not substantially eliminate the 
need for continuing surveillance. To be sure, auxiliary-
services personnel, because not employed by the non-
public schools, are not directly subject to the discipline 
of a religious authority. ~f. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U. S., at 618. But they are performing important educa-
tional services in schools in which education is an integral 
part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an 
atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious 
belief is consta.ntly maintained. See id., at 618-619. 
21 The "speech nnd hearing services" authorized b~· Act 194, nt lcnst 
t.o the extent such services nrc diagnostic, seem to fnll within that 
clAss of general welfare services for children that may be provided 
by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues to 
church-related schools. See, e. g., Everson v. Hoard of b'ducuttun, ~3U 
U. S.l. Although the Act contains a severability clause, Act 194, § 2, 
in view of the fact that speech and hearing services constitute a minor 
portion of the "auxiliary services" authorized by the Act , we cannot 
assume that the Pennsylvania General Assembly would haYe passed 
the law solely to provide such aid . Sec Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S., 
at 833-834. Indeed, none of the appellees has suggested that the sever-
ability clause be utilized to save any portion of Act 194 in the event 
this Court finds the major substance of the Act constitutionally 
invalid. 
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The potential for impermissible fostering of religion 
under these circumstances, although somewhat reduced, 
is nonetheless present. To be certain that auxiliary 
teachers remain religiously neutral, as the Constitution 
demands, the State would have to impose limitations on 
the activities of auxiliary personnel and then engage in 
some form of continuing surveillance to ensure that those 
restrictions were being followed. 22 
In addition, Act 194, like the statutes considered in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, and Committee for Public 
Education&: Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, creates 
a serious potential for divi:::ive conflict over the issue of 
aid to religion-"entanglement in the broader sense of con-
tinuing political strife." Committee for Public Education 
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S., at 794. There-
current nature of the appropriation process guarantees 
annual reconsideration of Act 194 and the prospect of 
repeated confrontatioP! between proponents and oppo-
nents of the auxiliary-services program. The Act thus 
provides successive opportunities for political fragmenta-
tion and division along religious lines, one of the principal 
evils against which the Establishment Clause was in-
tended to protect. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 
622-623. This potential for political entanglement, to-
gether with the administrative entanglement which would 
be necessary to ensure that auxiliary-services personnel 
remain strictly neutral and nonideological when function-
ing in church-related schools, compels the conclusion that 
Act 194 violates the constitutional prohibition against 
laws "respecting an establishment of religion." 
~ 2 The presence of auxiliary teachers in church-related schools, 
moreover, has the potential for provoking controversy be-
tween the Commonwealth and religious authorities over the extent 
of the teachers' responsibilities and the meaning of the legislative and 
administrative restrictions on the content of their instruction. See 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 619. 
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Dear Justice Powell: 
I'm certain even a brief law review reprint can scarcely be 
welcome at this time, but I did wish to share the enclosed 
Comment, nonetheless. It expresses my misgivings re Lynch v. 
Donnelly, from last term. 
All my best wishes. 
Sincerely, 
~-v~~ 
William Van Alstyne 
COMMENT 
TRENDS IN THE SUPREME COURT: MR. 
JEFFERSON'S CRUMBLING WALL - A 
COMMENT ON LYNCH v. 
DONNELLY 
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE* 
17Iis comment is based upon an .address by Professor Van Alstyne 
to tire Annual Conference o.f the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District o.f Columbia Circuit, delivered on May 17, 1984, at Williams-
burg, Virginia. · 
Although the first amendment belongs to all the states, it especially 
belongs to Virginia.• The most notable antecedent debates occurred 
here. The seminal contributions by James Madison and Thomas Jef-
ferson originated here. The strongest resolves to protect religious lib-
erty from political interference were memorialized here. My 
immediate ·purpose is to comment on one particular case decided last 
term in the Supreme Court, Lynch v. Donne!ly,2 which sustained a mu-
nicipality's nativity display against a constitutional challenge. I mean 
• Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
I. The Supreme Court wrote in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947): 
No one locality and no one group throughout the Colonies can rightly be given entire 
credit for having aroused the sentiment that culminated in the Bill of Rights' provisions 
embracing religious liberty. But Virginia, where the established church had achieved a 
dominant influence in political affairs and where many excesses attracted wide public 
attention, provided a . gre~t stimulus and able leadership for the movement. The people . 
there, as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could be 
achieved best under a goverrime.at which was stripped of all power to t:tx, to support, or 
otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious 
· individual or group. 
See also JEFFERSON, An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF · 
THO!\IAS J EFFERSON 300-03 (A. Bergh ed. 1905); J. MADISOX,.JI./em(Jrial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JA!\HoS MADISON 298-306 (1973). See genertl!l)' T. 
BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIO:--IARY YIRGINtA 1776-1737 (1977); H. ECKENRODE, 
.THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH A!'D STATE 1:--1 VIRGIN!." (1910); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, 
CHURCH AND STATE IN n ·IE UNITED. STATES 366-97 (1954) (one-vol. rev. of A. STOKES, CHURCH 
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950)). 
2. 104 S. Ct. 135~ (1934). The case furthers the trend represented in the prcccdi.ng term by 
M:u;h v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1933). a decision upholding the conduct in a stale legislature 
of regular seclarian prayer, led by mlnis:ers p:>. id from t.ax revenues. 
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briefly to examine the case by the light of an understanding pf the first 
amendment that Jefferson and Madison ·may h~ve shared. My broader. 
purpose is to suggest the extent to which Lynch v . .Donnelly may serve 
as a synecdoche of a larger drift that now appears to be winning accept- · 
ance in the Supreme Court. 
This trend can ·be summed up as a movement from one national 
epigram to another; it is the movement from "E Pluribus Unum" to "In 
God \Ve Trust," from the ideal expressed. by our original Latin 
mott()-{)ne nation out of highly diverse but equally welcome states 
and people-to <m increasingly pressing enthusiasm in which govern-
ment re-establishes itself under distinctly religious auspices. Lynch v . 
.Donnelly IS the dearest expression to date thai acts affiliating govern-
. ment and religion may be deemed consistent with the first amendment, 
at least if accomplished gradually, that is, incrementally .. A constitu-
tional neologism bas nearly displaced. the much different figure of 
speech, that of a "wall of separation" between church and state, which 
Th9mas Jefferson once ·used in commemorating the ratification of the 
first amendment.3 The !leologism is that insofar as most persons are 
religious, it is altogether natural that government should itself reflect 
that .fact in its 'own practices. Thus, according to this neologism, it is 
not helpful to regard the· first amendment as having emplaced a wall 
.. separating th~ practices of !eligion from the practices of government, 
for it is not \Valls, but bndges, that the first amendment contemplates. 
Even the absorption of a dominant religion \Vithin government itself 
may be deemed altogether unexceptionable-as though it were but' a 
part of natural history. It is thus symbiosis, not separation, that the first 
am~ndment may be interprete~ to accommodate. At le.ast I cannot un-
derstand Lynch v. Donnelly otherwise, although I think it very far re-
3. Jefferson wrote of a "wall of separation'" in replying to an address from a rommittee of 
the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut: · 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between nian and his God, 
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers 
of g.:>vemro<!nt reach a'tions onlr, and not opinions, I conteropl<!te with sovereign rever-
ence that act ofthe wpole Aroencan people which declared thatt!leii: legislature should 
'make no·Jaw respecting 2.n establislunent of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise . 
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and State. 
T. JEFFERSO:-:, Letter of Jan. ), 1802, in 16 THE WRITII'!GS OF THO~!AS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A. 
Bergh ed. 1905). In L;nch, lo.i S. Ct. at 1359, Chief Justice Burger writes of Jefferson's ••wall": 
The concept of a 'wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech probably deriving from 
\·iews of ThomJ.s Jefferson. The· roet3phor has served as a reminder th3t the Establish· 
roent Cbu5e forbids an established church or :mything approaching it. But the meta-
phor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the rebtionship 
th3t in fact exists between church and St:!te. . 
He goes o~ to say that far from requirinl; "romplctc separation of church and staic," the Consti· 
t~tion "affirmatively mandates acoommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids· 
hostility toward any:: Id 
\ 
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moved from the interpretation of the first amendment originally ~greed 
upon by all nine Justices of the Supreme Court when the issue was first 
comprehensively addressed, in Everson v. Board of Education,4 nearly 
forty years ago. 
I. 
Although there is of course very substantial controversy over t.he 
"right" meaning of the religion clauses of the first amendment,$ there 
is nonetheless considerable agreement that they originally met with . 
broad support from at least three distinct sources. The disagreement 
has been not so much whether there were not at least these three sepa-
4. 330 u.s. 1 (1947). 
5. As a sampler of academic books and articles on the rdigion clauses of the first amend-
ment, the following may be helpful: R. CORD, SEPARATION Of CHURCH AND STATE 5, 15 (1982) 
(first amendment was not intended to preclude federal aid to reEgion "on a nondiscrimination 
basis"); M. HOWE, THE G ,\RDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-31 (1965) (discussing federalism and 
the first amendment); W. KATZ, RELIGION Al':D AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 12-13 (1964) (sup-
porting a theory of "full neutrality, ... requiring the government to be neutral not only between 
sects but also between believers and nonbelievers"); P. K.AUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 45-51 (1964) (arguing that historical sources are inconclusiv.: and that "it is mor.: useful [in 
construing the religion clauses] to look at what actual r.:sults have been reached in [their] applica-
tion''); P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 112 (1962) (also supporting the neutrality theory; 
"democratic society cannot survive if these elements of the rule of law ar.: rejected"); M. MAL!Il:-1, 
REJ.JGION AND PoLITICS 1-17 (American Enterprise Institute Studies in Legal Policy, 1978) (argu-
ing that Madison compro~ised with those in the first Congress who believed that Congre:;.s should . 
be free to prefer religion over irreligion); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE A::-0 FREEDO~I (rev. ed. 
1967) (a cornpendious history); TUE ·WALL BETWEEN CHURCH ASD STATE (0. Oaks, cd . 1963) 
(collecting articles); Chop.:r, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling rlre Conflict, 
41 U. PITT. L. Rev. 673, 675 (1980} (arguing that "the establishment clause should forbid only 
government action whose purpose is solely religious and that is likely to impair religious free-
dom"); Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental l!:terference .. -r"th Religious Organi:a-
tions, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 349 (1984) (arguing that the establishment clause "does not 
disassociate religion from government" but acts as "a limitation on any mutual dependence"); 
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal De1·e/opment: Pari I. The Religious 
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1384-85 (l967) (proposing "a rather simple scheme of 
the elementary factors weighed by the court in evaluating religious liberty claims"); GianneUa, 
Religious Liberty, Nonestablislrment, end Docm'nal Development: Part /l The Nonestablishment 
Principle, ·8l HARV. !.,. REv. 513 (1968) (continuing Part I); Moore, The Supreme Court and the 
Rtdationship Between the 'Establishment' and 'Free E_xercise' Clauses, 42 Tex. L. Rev. 142 (1963) 
(supporting a neutrality theory); Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separarion: The Constitutional Dr'lemma 
of!he First Amendment, 64 MI~N. L. REv. 561 (1980) (examining conflict between the two religion 
clauses); Schwarz, No Imposition ·of Religion: The Establislrmi!nf Clause Va!ue, 77 YALE· L.J. 692, 
693 (1968) (arguing that the cm.blisnmem clause "prohibit[s] 0;1ly aid which has as its motiv~ or 
substantial effect the imposition of reli0ious belief or practic.:"); Van Alstyne, Constitutional S t!pa· 
ration of Church and Srate: 17ze Quest for a Coherl!nt Position. 57 :\~1. PoL. Scr. REv. 865 (1963); 
Note, Rebuilding the WaiL· 17re Case for a Return to the S:rict I r.terprt!tclion of the Establishment 
Clause, 81 COLUM. L. Rev. 1463, 1463 (19Sl) (proposing "a standard that erects an impregnable 
wall between church and state"); Note, Towcrd a Consti~utiot;al Dcjinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. 
REv. 1056, 1056 (1978) (proposing a "narrower" dt:linitio:1 of religion under the establishment 
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rate sets of politica~ interest, each of which could be well served by the 
· proposed clauses; it was rather whether on~ or another was so domi-
nant that acts of government consistent with that set of interests, albeit 
not necessarily equally consistent with one of the other sets of interests, 
should be de~med consistent with the clauses as ratified. Up to a point, 
however, the Supreme Court treated them as converging on a single 
legal principle and thus felt rio compulsion to treat those interests as 
rivals among which it need choose. Rather, the matter was seen as 
yielding a single legal principle, quite robust by itself, and suhstantially 
consistent with all three sets. 
These diverse inputs were the concerns of voluntarism, separatism, 
and federalism. The first, . voluntarism, was derived largely from the 
moderate spirit of rdigious toleration associated with the Quaker tradi- . 
tion of Pennsylvania.6 The second; s·eparatism, was derived principally 
from the successful efforts of Madison and Jefferson in Virginia to dis-
entangle the affairs of government from religious establishments, espe-
cially in respect to taxes and. levies for religious assistance.7 The third, 
federalism, was derived "from the preferences of other states that-in 
contrast with Virginia- maintained particular religious establishments, 
which they were concerned to keep free from the interference of the 
national government. 8 It was quite consistent with all three concerns 
that they would converge on a single proposition: Congress should be 
. disabled from legislating on religion.9 The final form of agreement in-
6. Maryland, Rhode Island, and Pennsylva nia have been grouped together -as "the most 
successful colonial experiments ·in religious freedom which the transformers of colonies into sta tes 
and the framers of our American Constitution had before them." 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND 
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 364 (1950). Of these, Penn's colony was "the most consistent." /d. 
Penn's influential Frame of Government (1682) provided that all persons otherwise qualified who 
.. possess faith in Jesus Christ" we're eligible to serve in legislative and executive capacities. 2 
FEDERAL AND STATE Co:o;STITUTIONS, COLO:-<IAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1526 (B. Poore ed. 1877). This toleration of aU Protestant sects and of Ca-
tholicism was remarkable in its day, though, as Stokes writes, Penn was "no modern secula ri st." 1 
A. STOKES, supra, at 207; if. P. KAuPER, supra note 5, at 48 (crediting Roger Williams a nd other 
religious leaders who corllributed to "the American experiment in religious liberty"). 
7. Su supra no.te 1. 
8. SeeM. HowE, supra note 5, at 1-31. At the time that the first amendment was adop:ed, 
five states.had established churches- Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, M:~ryland, 
and South Carolina. I A. STOKES, supra note 6, at 559; see also Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separa- · 
tion: The Constitutional Dilemina of the First Amendment, 64 Mtl'N. L. REV. 561, 562-63 (19 SO). 
Madison attempted to write a guaran.tee of religious liberty for all citizens into the Bill of 
Rights, which would h:~ve overridden those states that had not yet guaranteed their citizens such 
rights. He faikd. S ee I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATH ER OF THE CO!"STITUTIO>I 1:787-1800, at 
273 ( 1950). Not until 1833 did all states abandon established rdigion. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 
5. at 126. 
9. "To lea\·e the thorny matter of religion to each state, and at the same time to clearly 
guara ntee no jurisdiction in the matter by the national government, was the expedient compro-
mise." Esbeck, supra note 5, at 364; see also injrtJ text accompanying note 18. 
\ 
) · 
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traduces the first amendment itself: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof." 
Accepted at face value, the concerns of voluntarism. separatism, 
and federalism were not at odds with one another. They framed no 
tension; rather, they mutually reinforced a single proposition: Ques- · 
tions. of religious choice were not to be the business of the national 
goverrunent. 10 Article VI of the Constitution had already provided that 
"no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office 
·or public trust under the United States,"'' a provision meant to make it 
quite clear that "unbelievers or Mohammedans" were ·not excludable. 12 
The motto of the new nation, proposed in a Continental Congress com-
·mittee report by Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson, and adopted for use 
in the Great Seal of the United States in 1782, was "E Pluribus 
Unum." 13 The original legend on new coins, first on continental dol-
lars, then on the fugio cent minted in Philadelphia, in 1787, was "Mind 
Your Business." 14 The inscription on the obverse side of the Great Seal 
was "Novus Ordo Seclorum," a New Order of the Ages. 15 The secular 
separation assured each individual that none need feel alien to this 
government, whatever his own religion or personal philosophy, for it 
vias to be a temporal government not commingled with a clergy, a the-
ism, or a· church. At the same time, this wall of separation-in Jeffer-
son's terminology 16-assured the several states that they would be 
immune from attempts by the national government to influence or limit 
their own religious establishments in any respect. 
The resolve to forbid this national government from adopting a 
·religion or reserving its offices for only the religious carried over to the 
field of international affairs . . Whatever the disposition of other nations, 
each might expect a relationship of amity with the United States, which 
10. SeeM. HowE, supra note 5, at 17-23 . .But if. R. CoRD, supra note 5 (concluding that the 
first amendment does not absolutely bJr government from religious involvement). See generally 
P. KURLAND, S'.tpra note 5; L. PFEFFER. supra note 5. 
11. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3 . . 
12. See l A. STOKES, supra note 6, at 603; see also J. STORY, Co:-t).IENTARIES 0:-1 THE Cossn-
TUTION § 1871 (Boston 1833) (referrbg to the article VI gu:uantee that "the Catholic and the 
Protestant, the Calvinist and the Armenian, the infidel and the Jew, may sit down at the common 
tab-le of the national councils, without any inquisition into their faith or mode of worship"·). 
13. See G. HUNT, THE HISTORY OF THE SEAL OF THE UNITED STATES 7. 41 (1909); A. 
STOKES, supra note 6, at 467-68 .. · 
14. THE COMPREHENSIVE CATALOGUE AND ENCYCLOPEDIA Of UNITED STATES COINS 53, 
201 (J. Rose & H. H:uelcom eds. 1976). 
15. G. HUNT, supra note 13, at 41. 
16. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 3. 
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itself incorporated no religious predisposition against any nation. This · 
obserVation is illustrated in article XI of our 1797 treaty with Tripoli: 
As the government of the United States of America is not in any 
sense founded on the Christian religion-as it has in itself no charac-
ter of emnity [sic] against the laws, religion, or tranquillity of Mus-
. selmen-and as the said states never have entered into any war or act 
of hostility against any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the par-
ties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce 
an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries. 17 
So strongly was the principle respected by some that they were to 
risk quite substantial political opprobrium in its behalf, even where lhe 
risk may have seemed unnecessary to undex:take. Thus, when Cortgress . 
resolved to request merely precatory presidential statements of annual 
thanksgiving, themselves seemingly harmless and altogether uncon-
troversial gestures unlikely to offend anyone, Washington and Adams 
easily acquiesced-but Jefferson could not. The practice was doubtless 
well intentioned, he admitted, but the principle was careless and un-
s·ound. "I do not think lllyself authorized to comply," Jefferson wrote, 
I consider the government of the U.nited States as interdicted by the 
Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their 
doctrines, discipline, or exercises. This results not only from the pro-
vision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment or free 
exercise of religion, but from that also which reserves to the States 
the powers not delegated to the United States. Certainly, no power 
to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious 
discipline, has been delegated to the General Government .... I do 
not believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the civil magis-
trate to d~rect its exercises, its discipline, or its doctrines; nor of the 
· religious societies, that the General Government should be invested 
with the power of effecting any uniformity of time or matter among 
them .... 
· I am aware that the practice of my pr~decessors may be quoted. 
But I have ever believed, that the example of State executives led to 
the assumption of that authority by the General Government, with-
out due exa~ination, which would have discovered that what might 
be a right in a State government, was a violation of that right when 
asst1med by another. Be this as it may, every one must act a·ccording 
to the dictates of his own reason, and mine tells me that civil powers 
alone have been given to the President of the United States, and no 
authority to direct the religious exercises of his constituents. 18 · 
17. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nov. 4, 1796-Jan. 3, 1797, United States-Tripoli, art. XI, 
8 Stat. 154. 155,· T .S. No. 358. But see I STOKES, supra note 6, at <:97-98 (claiming that the lan-
guage '"the government of the United States is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion 
.. . " was "virtual(ly) repudiat(ed)" by its omission less than a decade later from the extended 
Tripoli Treaty). 
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in II THE WRtT-
tSGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428-30 (A. Bergh ed. 1905). For further discussion on Jcfferson·s 
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Madison, as president, did not adhere to Jefferson's example but, 
even after he had discounted such ceremonial utterances for fasts and 
festivals as "me'rely recommendatory" and "absolutely indiscriminate," 
he acknowledged that in fact they constituted a "deviation from the 
strict principle" he shared with Jefferson.' 9 Similarly, Madison ac-
knowledged that he had been quite mistaken in approving-as a mem-
ber of the House, in 1789-bills for the payment of, congressional 
chaplains.20 "Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two Hous~s of 
Congress," he asked, 
consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure principles of reli- . 
gious freedom? .. .. In strictness the answer on both points must be 
in the negative. The Constitution of the U.S. forbids everything like 
an establishment of a national religion. The law appointing .Chap-
lains establishes· a religious worship for the national representatives, 
to be performed by Ministers of religion, elected by a majority of 
them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes . ... If Reli· 
gion consists in .voluntary acts of individuals, singly, or voluntarily 
associated, and [if] it be proper that public functionaries, as well as 
their Constituents should discharge their religious duties, let them 
like their Constituents, do so at their own expense.21 
The feature of tax subsidy was especially offensive to Madison- unsur-
prisingly, since it was that very practice that he and Jefferson had suc-
cessfully <?Prosed in Virginia. There, Madison had written that not 
even "three pence" should be coerced of any person, through taxes, for 
the propagation of religious views with which he disagrced. 2 2 The 
view of the proper relationship between government and religion see L. LEVY, JEFFERSON MW 
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1963). . 
19. I A. STOKES, mpra note 6, at 491. 
20. fd. · at 456. Robert Cord has suggested that these reflections by Madison sho uld ~ dis-
missed for the: same reason, he says, that it would be "absurd"' for 'any serious analyst or histo'rian 
to give the slightest credence to equivalent statements by Mr. Nixon respecting the wrongness or 
unconstitutionality or'surreptitious tape recordings in which he participated when h~ was presi· 
dent. R. CoRD, mpra note 5, at 36. But even supposing one accepted his compa rison of James 
Madison with Richard Nixon, his idea of what the serious analyst or historian should do seems 
odd. If, indeed, Mr. Nixon were even now to suggest that he may have been quite wrong, and that 
he now does regard what he did as president as having been inconsistent with the fourth amend · 
ment, is it the case that every serious analyst or historian should: (a) dismiss such a st a tement as 
wholly unworthy of credence, and (b) record Mr. Nixon as necessarily having held the! \·ie w that 
what he did as president was wholly consistent with the fourth amendment? Why would the 
serious an alyst or historian do so? 
21. Madison,AspectsofMonopo!y·One J!undred Years Ago, HARPER's MAG. 489.493 (1 9 14), 
quoted in 1 A. STOKES, supra note 6, at 346·47; cf Marsh y. Cha mbers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336-37 
(1983) ("Remuneration [of a state legislature's chaplaincy] is grounded in histo ri c practice ir.iti-
ated ... by the same Congress that adopted the Establi~hme nt Claus~ .. . . "). 
22. J. MADISON, supra note 1, at 300. The puticular applica tion of the e.stab1 ishment clause 
as 2. use restriction on congressipnal appropriations drawn ·from taxes is a source of t ::~x payer 
standing that has thus far been unique to the ftrst amendm::nt. Su F1 ast v. Cohen , 392 U.S. 83, 
101 -06 (196S) (two-part test: taxpayer has standing only where he alkges (a) exe rci se of congrcs· 
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point, reflecting Madison's broader, Virginian, perspective went be-
yond the abuse of the tax power as such. Thus, although no taxes were 
involved, and although the matter was obviously not one he needed to 
interfere with, Madison, as president, vetoed a grant of land made by 
Congress for what Congress thought a beni~n use by a Baptist church 
[bjecause the bill in reserving a certain parcel of land of the United 
· · States for the use of said Baptist Church, comp~ises a prindple and 
precedent, for the appropriation of funds of the United States, for the . 
use and support of religious societies; contrary to the article of the 
Constitution which declares that Congress shall make no law respect-
ing a religious establishment.23 
The separation principle, ~oreove~, operated in both directions; it 
was meant to keep religion from entangling the state as well as to keep 
the churches free from the state influence that would have been the 
inevitable concomitant of state financial support. The /1-femoria/ and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, of 1785, inveighed against 
the risk that "the Civil Magistrate . : .. may employ Religion as an en-
gine of Civil policy," a,nd equally against the infusion of any particular' 
religion within government "because it will have a like tendency to 
banish our Citizens," i.e., to make them aliens to their own govern-
ment.24 Competition among religions for position within government 
must be avoided so thatnone need fear any other, as each might other-
wise seek its own establishment through gov.ernment or within 
sional taxing and spending power and (b) violation of a "specific constitutional limitation" upon 
that power). Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476-82 (1982) (first prong of Fla.rttest not satisfied where complaint 
was based on agency, ~ot cangressional, action and congressional authorization of agency action 
was not derived from taxing and spending power); Frothingham v. Mellon, 26i U.S. 447, 488 
(1923) (taxpayer, failing to show "direct injury," denied standing to challenge constitutionality of 
federal. statute). 
For examples of how the free exercise clause may appropriately permit exemption from gov-
ernment regulation, as distinct from either requiring or permitting a tax subsidy for a religious 
practice, see discussion and cases infra notes 30, 31; su also Choper, The Religion Clauses of rite 
Firs/ Amendment: Reconciling the Conjlicl, 41 U. PtTT. L REv. 673, 690-93 (1980) (disapproving 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), insofar as "compulsorily raised tax funds" paid to plain-
tiff to enable her to practice her religion were improper as a forbidden levy on others). In a 
passage reminiscent of Madison, see supra texi accompanying note 21, Choper writes: . 
(T]he Establishment Clause should be held to forbid the government's paying chaplains 
to mi..'lister to the religious needs of prisoners and miltary personnel. It may be that, 
under a Free Exercise Clause balancing test, the state could not exclude chaplains who 
volunteer for these purposes. But the Establishment Clause makes it the financial re-
sponsibility of the church and ·not the state to atten<;l to its members' religious needs. 
Choper, .r-.~pra, at 693-94. 
23. President's Message of Feb. 28, 1811, to the House· of Representatives, Returning a Bill, 
22 A:-INAI...S oF Cosc. 1098 (1811). 
24. J. MADISO!'I, wpra note I, at 30i-02. 
.. 
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Voluntarism, then, was the pri.ficiple of personal choice. Separa-
tism was the principle of non-entanglement. Federalism was the prin- · 
ciple of pure state autonomy, immune from national power, respecting 
policies that affect religion. Laws favoring religious establishments, 
like laws prohibiting the .free exercise of religion, were thus altogether 
disallowed. The contributing streams of the first amendment were not, 
in this view, jostling and competitive. Rather, they converged on a si.n-
gle proposition thought eminently suitable for the national govern-
ment. Citizens from all states, regardle~s of each state's own internal 
practices, would be assured of being able to meet on c'ommon secular 
ground to conduct the civil business of a purely civil gove~ment. The 
authority of that government was of enumerated civil powers that in-
corporated none of a religious provenance or cast, and was constrained 
from directing or otherwise influencing the voluntarism of private 
choice. No religious tests of any kind were to be associated with that 
government, for no sort of favored religion or "national" religion 
would be appropriate for Congress even to consider. Laws tending to 
finance religion, like laws tending to prohibit particular religions or to 
favor preferred religions, were prohibited to the national government 
in order to. leave room for such diverse and separate policies as each 
state might individually elect. The motto of the country, "E Pluribus 
Unum," was significant: One nation, a civil and neutral polity, from 
many states of highly diverse people and practices. 
Then, with the abandonment, circa 1834, of the last state-estab-
lished religions and the subsequent enactment, in 1868,. of the four-
teenth amendment, a principle originally felt suitable to apply to 
Congress partly on behalf of the states ultimately became. applicable to 
the states as well.26 The detachment ofgovernment from religion that 
. 25. See Curry: James Madison and th~ Burger Court: Converging Views of Church-State Sepr.z-
ration, 56 IND. L.J. 615 (1981) (discussing Madison's concern with the political divisiveness of 
factions, reflected in his conception of the sc;paration of church and state). .· 
· 26. The Court, in Everson, regarded the fourteenth amendment as incorporating the estab-
lishment clause, 330 U.S. at 14-15, and its analysis in Lynch, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358 (1984). main-
tains the consistency of that interpretation. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 
215-17 (1963), the Court chastised those for whom this . issue. seems kss clear cut than it has 
seemed to the Court for engaging in practices "of value only as academic exercises." /d. at 217. 
For recent scholarly debate on the issue of ihe incorporation of the Bill of Rights, sec R. BERGER, 
GoVERNMENT Bv J uoictARY 134-5~ (1977) (stating that the fourteenth amendment was simply 
designed to prevent discrimination against blacks in those rights guaranteed ~)' the Civil Rights 
Bill of 1866 and was not intended to make the Bill of Rights binding on the states); Curtis, The Bitt 
of Rights as o Limitation on State Authority: A Rt'pf)• to Professor Berger, 16 \V AKE FoREST L. 
REV. 45 (1980) (arguing that legislative history shows that the pri\·ileges and immuniti.es clause of. 
the fourteenth amendment was designed to apply the Dill of Rights to the states); Berger, Incorpo-
ration of the Bi/1 of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A /l'ine-Lired Cat, 42 01110 ST. L.J. 435 
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Jeff~rson and Madison had .originally fought to achieve in Virginia l).dd 
become a general obligation. 
II. 
In their first full address to the subject, in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cd_iion,r: all nine Justices of'the Supreme Court agreed in this view. · 
Indeed, the following summary by Justice Black was faulted by no one 
on the Court: . · 
The "establishment of religion., clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: ·Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither carl' pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his 
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No 
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious be-
liefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax 
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever 
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in 
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa . . In · 
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by 
law was inten~ed to erect "a wall of separation between church and 
.State ... 28 
Rather, four of the nine Justices, agreeing entirely with Black's view, . 
di~sented solely on the separate basis that they, unlike the majority, 
believed it had not been honored, that is, that the particular law in 
question29. was defective. Indeed, it was on the basis of Justice Black's 
description of the first amendment, rather than on the basis of some 
different description, that the dissent itself also relied.30 
Fourteen years later, Justice Frankfurter, who had concurred in 
Everson with Justice Black's sentiments even while dissenting in the 
particular case, returned to the same theme. "The Establishment 
Clause," he declared, · · 
(1981); Curtis, Further Ad•·tntures of the Nir.e-Lired Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on /ncorpora-
. tion ofth; Btl! of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982); Berger,/ncorporotion ofth~ Bill of Rights: A 
Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983); Curtis, Sri// Further Ad1·entures ofth~ 
Nine-Li1·ed Cot: A Rebuuallo Raoul Berger's Reply on Application of rl:e Bill of Rights, 62 N.C.L. 
REv. 517 (1984). For more dated examples, see L. PFEFFER, supra note 5, at 142-49; Van Alstyne, 
supra note 5, at 866-67. · 
27. 330 u.s. 1 (1947). 
28. /d. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. Uci t.:d States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1 878)). 
29. S ee id. at 46 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The particular law at issue in Ererson was a local 
law providing for bus fare reimbursement for sums spent by parochial as well as by public school 
childr.en to ride municipal buses. · 
30. See id. at 31-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
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withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative coilce.rn and com-
petence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man·s 
belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and 
man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief. Congress may 
not make these matters, as such, the subject of legislation, nor, now, · 
may any legislature in this country. Neither the National .Govern-
. ment nor, under. the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a State may, by any device, support belief or the expression of 
belief for its own sake, whether from conviction of the truth of that 
belief, or from conviction that by the propagation of that belief the · 
.civil welfare of the State is served, or because a majority of its citi-
zens, holding that belief, are offended when all do not hold .it.31 
Difficult cases still arise, of course, 'even under the Black-Frank-
furter view ·or the establishment clause. Generally, however, the diffi-
culty of such cases has been limited to circumstances in' which the 
good-faith conduct of civic business has imposed a hard choice on indi-
viduals whose personal religion has instructed them in opposition to 
the law. In such cases, there is a fair question whether th~ relevant 
public policy . is so pressing that, whatever the strength of the relig-
iously-grounded opposition to it, exceptions will not be tolera.ble, or . 
whether, to .the contrary, respect for religious pluralism counsels .a 
measure of state self-restraint. 
•, 
At one extreme, criminal prohibitions of homicide, mutilation, or 
child abu.se cannot yield regardless of the intensity of the religious pas-
sion that demands such exceptional forms of "free" exercise. At the 
other extreme, hO\vever, the civil polity is not seriously distressed if it 
excuses those for whom ritual forms of respect for the state are acts of 
blasphemy. In the latter circumstance, the doubtfulness of the state's 
policy, the meanness of di.sallowing conscientious abstention, and the 
gratuitousness of the .damage to the sincerely pious weigh in favor of 
accommodating sincerely held religious beliefs.32 The establishment 
clause as described by Jefferson or Madison and summarized in the . 
quoted excerpts from opinions by Justices Black and Frankfurter is not 
necessarily hostile to such an accommodation. Therefore the occa-
sional wisdom of accommodation does not constitute an objection to 
traditional establishment clause doctrine. To the · contrary, respect for 
so modest an accommodation as would be required in these circum-
31. McGowan v. Maryland, 356 U.S. 420,465-66 (1 961). 
32. See West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639·42 (1943). For a more 
n:cent example, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972} (compulsory school att.:ndanc.: 
law not applied to Amish) and compare Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 15S, 165 (1944) (s~lling 
of religious literature not exempted fram state prohibition of sale of literature by minors on .the: 
streets). S ee also Choper, JUpra note 5, at 673. 
... 
j 
Vol. 1984:770] LYNCHv. DONNELLY 
i 
781 
stances would be strongly · counselled by the free exercise clause. 33 In 
between these extreme and thus rather obvious cases, the closer arid 
.more difficult issues must continue to be addressed without inconsis-
. tency with the prinCiples of neutrality and separation: · 
In sharp contrast to those closer issu.es and presenting a paradig-
matic disregard of the establishment clause· in virtually every dimen-
) sion of its. concerns would be a case involving all of the following 
· d7liberate acts of government: 
1. The overt alignment of government with the particular theology 
of one, politically dorrtinant, religious sect; 
2. The collaboration of government with commercial interests · to 
stimulate consumer purchases by the government's own promotional 
use of a particular religion's artifacts and mysteries; 
3. The propagation :under government sponsorship of distinctly· 
religious symbols uniquely associated with one sect's most holy 
event-the. miracle of divine birth of its particular prophet and 
messiah; 
4. The purchase and maintenance through tax levies, and promo-
tional display in outdoor public location each year, of sectarian ob-
jects, during the season designated for the Mass or eucharist of one 
religion's principal sacrament. 
The facts of Lynch v. Donnelly34 fit this.paradigm exactly. Accordingly, 
when appropriate~y petitioned by a natural coalition of plaintiffs, a fed-
eral district court enjoined the governmental practice.35 Th~ state had 
not merely aided "alP' religions but rather had promoted emphatically 
and exclusively one religion. It had not only broken with a general 
neutrality regarding purdy religious doctrine, it had also p-referred one 
religion over others. It had used ta" money in support of a religious 
activity and encouraged belief in, and endorsed, the particular holy 
day-Christ's Mass~f one sect. It openly participated in the affairs of 
one church by dupiicating ·in wood and plastic .the imagery of a sacred 
event in order to encourage a general secular, commercial .enthusiasm 
to intensify its holy day. The wall of separation between church and 
state had clearly been breached by" a clear governmental, politicized, 
symbio~ic embrace of one faith's preferred holy day. 3 6 
33. See West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (freedom of 
worship "may not be infringed on . .. slender gro!Jnds."). 
34. HM S. Ct. 1355, 1358 (1984). . . 
35. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp; 1150. 118l(D.R.I. i9Sl), a.iJ'd, 691 F.2d 1029(1st Cir. 
1982) (2-1 decision), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355(19S4). The plaintiffs in Lynch included an objecting 
taxpayer, o!r~ndcd members of minority religions. and aggrieved residents alienated by the ab-
sorption by government of a partisan religious observance that the government had adopted and 
sponsored . 525 F. Supp. zt 1153-57. 
36. See id a·t 1173 (concluding that the municipality had "tried to endorse and promulgate 
religious beliefs by including a nativity scene in its display"') . 
• i 
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In its examination of this obtuse collaboration: the district ~ourt 
had little problem. The entanglement with religious controversy, the 
identification of the state with one favored theology, the alienation of 
many of its own residents embittered by the hubris of local government 
enlisting the tax pow~r and regulatory authority to identify itself with 
the creed of one religion's martyred prophet, the objectively communi-
cated support and endorsement of that religion's siri.gular claims, all 
ought to have made the case easy. 
In Lynch v. Donnel!y,37 a divided panel in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. · The Supreme Court, in an· 
opinion by the Chief Justice, with four justices dissenting; reversed 
both lower court ·holdings that the municipal purchase, maintenance, 
and periodic illuminated Christmas display of a purely Christian nativ-
ity scene Was unconstitutional. The opinion perfunctorily acknowl-
edged the "three-prong" test of the Co\1rt's earlier cases, which 
demands that a challenged statute have a "secular legislative purpose;" 
that its "primary effect" neither "a~vance nor inhibit" religion; and 
that it not promote "an excessive entanglement" with religion.38 · Pur-
porting to apply the "primary effect" prong of this tes~ the Chief Justice 
observed: · · 
Of course the creche is identified with one religious faith but no 
more ~o than the examples we have set out from prior cas~s . . . . . 39 · · 
We can assume, arguendo, that the display advances religion .. . ; 
. [but] whatever [the] benefit to one faith ... {,] display of the creche is 
no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the Con-
gressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the holiday it-
self as ''Christ's Mass" .... 4o 
[T]o conclude that the primary effect . of including the creche is to 
advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would re-
quire that we view it as more beneficial to and more an endorsement 
· of religion ... than •.. [specific forms of assistance previously al-
lowed such as textbook loans to parochial schools and bus fare reim-
bursements, or] more of an endo~sement of religion than the Sunday 
Closing Laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland . .. [or the payment 
of chaplain salaries sustained in Marsh v. Chambers].41 
37. 691 F .2d 1029 (lst Cir. 1982): 
38. Lync/1, 104 S. Ct. at 1362, (paraphras ing Lemon v. Kurtunan. 403 U .S. 602, 612-13 
(1 971)). . 
39. ld at 1365 (c;:mphasis add.:d). 
40. ld at 1364 (emphasis added) . 
· 41. Jd at 1363 (emphasis .added) (cit ing. for c:<ample, Marsh v. Chambers. 103 S. Ct. 3330 
(I<JS3); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. ·236 (1968) (permitting e ~ re nditure of publlc funds for 
te~tbooks for studc:nts attending church-sponsored schools): McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961); Everson v. lloard of Educ., 330 U.S. 1.(1947)). 
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We are unable to discern a ·greater aid to religion deriving from in-
clusion of the creche than from these benefits and endorsements pre-
viously held not violative ..... 42 
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Such was the tenor of the analysis under the purported "three-
·prong" approach; but, given the Chief Justice's warning that the Court 
would not be "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive 
· area"43 we should assuredly be alert to the possibility that an aitogether. 
new test was aborning. What is that test? ·Apparently it is an "any 
more tlzan" test. Here, in one possible summary, are its parts.44 
First, the court must determine whether the government acts 
that have been questioned plainly spo~sor, assist, promote, or ad-
vance a particular religion, its specific practices, its distinctive theol-
ogy, or its establishment. . 
Second, assuming that the acts complained of plainly do spon- . 
sor, assist, . promote; and advance a particular religion, its specific 
practices, its distinctive theology, and its establishment, the court 
must then nonetheless also determine wheth.er in doing so, the gov- · 
ernment has merely acted in a manner consistent with what it has 
regularly done-or with what Congress has regularly done-in the 
past. · · · · · 
Third, unless the court finds that the additional acts are more 
egregious than other acts of government of a like kind-that is, un-
less the new acts advance this religion "any more than" government 
has generally advanced a preferred religion- the court shall sustain 
the acts in question.45 · 
42. Jd at 1364 (emphasis added). 
43. /d. at 1362. 
44. Actually, if one pays very close attention to the cases: it appears that in fact a majority of 
the Court has been applying a "scarcely any more than" test; the question is whether what govern- · 
· ment has done in the instant case is scarcely any more than what a majority of the Court has 
acquiesced in in the recent past. Thus, from the five-to-four decision in E•·erso~ one may trace 
forward through Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,241-49 (1968); Walz v. Tax Corrun'n, 
397 U.S. 664, 674-80 {1970) (upholding property tax exemptions for religious property); Hunt v. 
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-49 (1973) (upholding ·state revenue bonds to finance a Baptist college; 
approximating the phraseology of the "any more than" test); Roemer v .. Board of Pub. Works, 426 
U.S. 736, 745-70 (1976) (upholding public grants to private colleges and religious institutions); 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-55 (1977) (providing .textbooks, standardized testing and 
scoring, diagnostic services and career guidance for parochial students constitutional, but provid-
ing instructional materials and equipment and field trip services unconstitutional); Committee for 
Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653-62 (1980) (upholding use of public funds to reimburse 
non public schools for performing state-required testing and reporting); Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. · 
Ct. 3062, 3065-71 (1983) (upholding tax deductions for expenses of sending child to nonpublic 
school); and Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3332-37 (1983). To be sure, even now not every 
gross practice will be sustained. For example, mandatory posting of the Ten Commandments in 
public schools was held invalid in Stone v. Graham', 449 U.S. 39, 39-43 (1980) and legislative 
delegation to churches of an absolute veto. over neighborhood liquor licenses was held invalid in 
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 120-27 (1982). 
45. This summary is of course my own and certainly would not be useful if recited to the 
Court in any actual case. Even so, thl.s mere ·parody of a test was at once applied by a lower 
784 DUKE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 1934:770 
I 
I 
.. In an artless sense-but in no sense that will withs~and even the 
mildest scrutiny-the Lynch case can also be fitted within the literal 
wording of the "three-prong" test a majority of the 'Court has declared 
that it will usually apply to establishment clause claims.46 The first 
prong, we recall, is that the law or governmental practice must possess · 
a "secular" purpose. If "secular;' is taken merely descriptively, simply 
as a ·synonym for whatever things temporal or civil government thinks . 
appropriate to undertake as a temporal and civil governrnen~, then the 
facts of the Lynch case do indeed fit a "secular" purpose. That purpose 
is the government's own decision to identify its own conduct, and the 
uses of its tax revenues, with the events, values, mysteries, customs, and 
monotheism of a particular religion-the religiori, hardly .coinciden-
tally, that is most widely subscribed to nationally as well as locally. 
The municipal purchase and annual, public, illuminated, tax-supported 
. Christmas display of a nativity scene fit within that purpose exceed-
ingly well. By the same gesture, the "primary effect" of the city's prac-
tice is without' doubt to bring about that secular, that is, governmental, 
objective. Moreover, because the locaJ government pursues its policy 
strictly through the uses of its own monies and its own property and 
does not engage any church to provide the place for its illuminated 
display, there are obviously no "entan'glements" with any church ot 
religious body as such.47 
federal court, in Fausto v. Diamond, No. 80-0520S (D.R.I. June 19, 1984) (available Sept. 12, 
1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The case rejects a.taxpaycr's suit to enjotn' city tax 
funding and maintenance of an anti-abonion memorial, dedicated to the "unknown child," which 
was located on city-owned property and was the object of an ovenly rcigious dedication cere-
mony. /d. Although the court acknowledged. the affiliating linkages with the locally dominant 
religion-remarking that "two .. · .commissioners declaimed, in effect, that their church required 
them to vote in suppon of the (religiously inscrib:d, anti-abortion) plaques," id., and that '•it .is 
'impossible to ignore the imposing backdrop of the cathedral," id.- it turned aside !he complaint 
on the basis that "this court is unable to discern that the memorial is a greater aid to the Roman 
Catholic faith than was the creche in L;nch," id. (emphasis added). 
See also Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). which sustained congres-
sional appropriations of $84 million per year for military chaplain salaries. :md related religious 
programs.· The c.Ourt held that in light of the Supr¢me Coun's ac;ccptance of a state legislature:s 
use of tax funds to pay its own in-house chaplains-in Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3335-
37 (\983}-it could see no sufficient distinction from the case b:fore it even though the sums v•ere 
vastly greater, the chaplains many times more i.Jumerous, and the programs much more pervasive. 
Kaicojf, 582 F. Supp. at 474; see a/so supra note 44 and cases cited therein. . 
46. L;nch, \04 S. Ct. at \362; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971). 
47_ Concurring i:l the Court's decision in Abington School Di st. v. Scherr.pp. 37~ · U.S. 203 
(1963), Justice Brennan wrote: 
\Vhat the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under. the Estab!i:;hm;.:m 
Clause ha~e forbidden, are those involvements with secu!ar institution :> which (:>.l ser\'e 
the essentially religious activities of religious institt:tion;; (b) empk'Y th.: organs of gov-
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Viewed this way, the decision need not have been compromised bY 
the majority opinion's ineffectual attempt to compare the city's illumi-
.nate~, commercially-manufactured, outdoor nativity scene to the mere 
inclusion of historic religious paintings in a public museum.48 Neither 
need the opinion have been hedged by suggesting that had the nativity 
scene been unaccompanied· by additional Christmas to~ens such as 
Santa and reindeer-additions, incidentally, that .embarrass the sugges-
tion that the entire display was otherwise similar to the collection of a 
public art museum-it might have been unconstitutional.49 Rather, a 
5quare logical fit can be made to the conventio~al three-prong test, al-
. beit a fit that is at once self-validating and ironic. · I;:ssentially, it is the 
·following, · as, regretfully, I ·believe was the real case~ 
. Insofar as .the theology, artifacts, and liturgy of a particular reli-
gion have already form:;tlly been adopted into government itself and 
made a regular feature of.government's own practice, th~ religion has 
itself been partly secularized. · That is, it has be~n ·assimilated into and 
ernment for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use usentialty religious means to sen·e 
gol'ernmenta/ ends. . . • . 
/d. at 294-95 (emphasL~ added). The last point, that government may not "use essentially reli-
gious means to serve governmental ends," meant, in the context of Schempp, that even supposing 
the sole reason for Bible readings at the opening of each class day were \itlerly secular-that is, 
not at all to induce belief in the Bible but solely as a cle\·er device to get students to quiet down-
they were nonetheless unconstitutional because the religion clauses meant to forbid government 
from exploiting religious forms as a deliberate tool of secular poli.cy. The license of the state, t.o 
appropriate the forms of religion as instruments of state policy, may subject each such religion to 
degraded uses over which it can exercise no controL Avoidance of that hazard was a principal 
theme of Madison's .Memorial and Remonstrance. See J. MADISON, supra note 7. In L)'nch, how-
ever, the Chief Justice virtually stood the Brennan crit.:ria upside down. First, he declared that it 
is enough that there be any discernible secular purpose, no matter how minor; he explicitly de-
clares that it need not be exclusive or even dominant. L)'nch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363 n.6. Then, insofar 
as any secular purpose is present, he declares that even assuming essentially religious means have 
been appropriated by government" as the means of effectuating that secular objective, it is "irrele-
vant." ld. at 1363 n.7. •· · 
But wh;• it is "irrelevant" is not explained, nor is it clear why anyone would not think it 
relevant. If the object were purely to build military morale, and the principal effect were indeed to 
build such morale rather than, for example, to assist a particular church, would it be similarly 
''irrelevant" that the means chosen to build such morale involved the government in producing 
and dist.ributing crosses, copies of.militant hymns such as "Onward Christian Soldiers" and the 
·. like, in preparing troops for the capture of oil fields in Iran? The majority's failure to see "rele-
vance" in such a matter is dismaying. 
48. See L;'llch, IM S. Ct. at 1369. 
49:· /d. at 1358, 1362-63. Justice Brennan's dissent sought to narrow the decision accordingly, · 
id. at 1370, and a later district court decision limiting the:: damage wrougJll by L)'nCh has enjoined 
a city's funding of a nativity scene wh.ere "no Santa Clauses or trees" outf.tted the display, ACLU 
v. City of Birmingham, No. 83-CV3348DT (E.D. Mich. July 23, i984) (available Sept. 12, 1984, 
on LEX IS, Genfed library, Dist file). But see McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(holding that L)'r.ch was not "based upon the physical context ... of the creche" but rather upon 
the context of the "holiday season"), cerl. grantPd sub nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 53 
U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1984) (No. 84-277). . 
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made a part of the state temporal, and not simply left to the ch.urch 
spiritual. To whatever additional extent other incidents of that religion 
are similarly annexed and identically made a part of official state prac-
tice, the acts that are nec~ssary to do so obviously do serve a "secular" : 
purpose, namely, the appropriation of a particular religion or faith as a 
practice of government. The events that do this may be individually 
modest, discrete, and extremely gradual, as has happened "in the United· 
States. 5° 
This movement, a movement of gradual, secularized Christian eth-
nocentrism, has tended to elude the establishment clause itself. Origi-
nally, in merdy marginal, seemingly trivial, and obviously 
nonjtisticiab}eSl ways, Statesmen and politicians easily COmmingled re-
ligiously colored habits of personal conduct with their deportment iri · 
public office. Some no doubt did so naturally, without thinking about 
it. Others, perhaps somewhat crassly, doubtless saw strong political ad-
vantage in making great public display of their piety. The common-. 
place personal tendency, to identify preferred "religious truths" with 
national policy, is institutionally irresistible in times of greatest sacri-
fice, such as war time. Thus, it is scarcely surprising. given the religious 
antecedents of the abolitionist movement, that the Union cause in the 
Civil War would be mingled with the assimilation of Christian symbol-
ism, and that Christian theology thus \Vould itself become part of the · 
cause. Recall, for instance, the Battle Hymm of the Republic. That "In 
God \Ve Trust" was first authorized for use on American coins in 1864, · 
therefore, is scarcely remarkable. 52 That the fuller transition \vas made 
during the 1950's, with the alteration of the national motto,53 the inser-
tion of a common monotheism in the Pledge of Allegiance,54 and the 
mandatory insertion of "In God We Trust" on all United States cur-
rency and money,55 is equally unsurprising. Jingoistic desires to paint 
a vivid contrast in the Cold War, separating ourselves, claiming "God" 
within "our" goverru:I)ent, for sanctimonious contrast with "Godless 
atheistic" Communism, made the deliberate appropriation of a perva-
sive religiosity an irresistibly useful instrument of state policy.56 
50. Se.:, e.g., the Chief Justice's own pres~ntation in Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360-62 (reciting 
government's official acknowledgements since 1789 of religion's roi<: in American life). 
51. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Collrt. 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947) (discussing the Co~n·s 
"policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitu!ional issues"). : 
52. A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra no:e I, at 568. 
53. H.R. REP. No. 1~59, 84th Cong., 2d Scss. 2, r.cprir:ted in 1956 U.S. CoDE Coso. & AD. 
NEWS 3720, 3720-21. 
54. A. STOKES & L . PFEFFER, supra note I. at 570. 
55. ld 
56. /d at 570-71. · See~/so \V. MILLER, PI ETY ALONG TH E PoTO~.!AC 41-46 (1964) (discussing 
religion and anti-Communism du6ng the 1950"s). · 
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In these marginal, gradual, ordinary ways, then, virtually from the 
beginning the nation has drifted, reidentified itself, and become, like so 
many others, accustomed to the political appropriation of religion for 
its P.wn official uses. In ex<:hange; it now purchases religious support. 
Late arrivals to America may suppose they can take the gove.rnment's 
religiosity or leave it, but they are stuck with the reality that clashes so. 
clearly with the first amendment: Ours is basically a ·Christian-
pretending government where they will be made to feel ungrateful 
should they coin plain. The gradual but increasingly pervasive install-
ment of comproinised religious ritual within government itself thus 
draws that which was formerly outside to the inside; the prevailing 
monotheism has been made a commonplace exhibition in state prac-
tice, and put to service and supported by the state when felt useful. 
Additional appropriations from sectarianism may then become logi-
. cally fitted as part of this "secular" but sectarian state. Distinctly reli-
gious practices, insofar as they serve the state, thus by definition have 
virtually succeeded in satisfying a secular purpose and promoting a sec-
ular interest. In this gradual absorptive fashion, then, satisfying the 
Court's current "test" can scarcely ever be a problem. 
Ill. 
Not so long ago, Justice Powell said that he believed we w~re now 
far removed from · the dangers that so troubled Jefferson and 
Madison.57 It is difficult to agree that that is so and, in. any event, the 
supposition seems scarcely sufficient ground for the Court to modify 
the first amendment simply to accord with its own confidence. "E 
Pluribus Unum" should mean something to us all, aspirationally, ·that 
we ought not abandon although Congress itself has seen fit to do so. 
The idea of a civil nation of free people, diverse in their thoughts, equal 
in their .citizenship, and with none to feel alien, outcast, or stranger in 
relation to civil authority, remains powerful and compelling. The in-
stallation of a s.tate theism has not been worthy of the United States. 
L;'nch v. Donnelly was itself not a credit to an able and distinguished . 
Court. Both the case and the tendency it represents are disappointing 
rem_inders that religious ethnocentrism, as well as religious insensitiv-
ity, are still with us. I do not know whether Mr. Jefferson would have 
been surprised, but I believe he would have been disappointed. 
57. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1971) (Powdl, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
p3rt). 
•. 
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Dear Professor Van Alstyne: 
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with special interest 
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Profeqsor William Van Alstyne 
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1. SUMMARY: Petrs challenge the CA2's holding that New 
i 
York City's provi~ ion of remedial teaching services to church-
------~---------
affiliated schools, pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, violates the Establishment Clause. 
--------------------------2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Title I of the ESEA provides 
Jh.L_ 
!3&EA 
federal funds to local education agencies to improve the 
education of economically and educationally deprived children. 1 
I ( 1..\ 
The Act specifically requires that remedial education services be ..___ ____ _ 
provided to children in private and public schools on an equal 
basis. The New York City Board of Education administers the 
largest Title I program in the country. After trying various 
alternative methods of providing Title I services to private 
schools, the Board decided in 1966 to send teachers employed by 
the public schools onto the premises of private schools, 
including religious sch~ols, to teach Title I classes during 
regular school hours. Under this program, peripatetic public 
school employees go from ~ne school to another during the school 
day to teach ~emedial readin~remedial arithmetic, ~eech 
therapy, and to provide guidance counseling. 
In 1976, the National Coalition for Public Education and 
1Ef~tive July 1, 1982, Title I was superseded by Chapter 1 of 
the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981. The 
parties and the courts below agree that its provisions concerning 
the participation of private school students in programs funded 
under the Act are virt a identical to those of Title I. The 
CA2 does not seem o have consi ere e e possi ility that the 
passage of the new Act has mooted this case, and that does not 
seem to be something that should trouble this Court. The parties 
and the CA2 continue to refer to the Act as "Title I," and I 
shall do likewise. 
f Religious Liberty brought an action against federal and local 
( 
( 
officials to enjoin this program as violative of the ~ 
Establishment Clause. See National Coalition for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 
dismissed for want of 'urisdiction, 449 u.s. 
808 (198 
district eluded th t the program did not violate the UAA..~­
[PEARL]. Aft~evidentiary hearing, a three-judge t;J;;::r 
~ 
Establishment Clause and dismr sed the complaint. This Court 
dismissed the appeal, because of untimeliness. See 
Joint App. at 9a. 
Meanwhile, in 1978, the ~~~~~s present suit, six 
·~ 
federal taxpayers, filed~suit in the 
~ c:2..-> 
raising the same~




schools in NYC and receive Title I education 1 assistance 
intervened as defendants. The suit was stayed 
be t7 ?EA~L outcome of PEARL, and the parties stipulated that it 
decided on the basis of the record in that case, along with some 
supplementary affidavits. In 1983, the DC (Neaher, OJ) entered 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, relying on the 
reasoning in PEARL. 
The PEARL court (Van Graafeiland, Tenney, Broderick) had 
examined NYC's Title I program in detail, rotin~ thae.1 parochial 
school official~ve no voice in the initial assignment of a 
Title I teacher~~ligious affiliation has no bearing on 
assignment of teachers; a~ch Title I teacher assigned to a 
private school is instructed not to engage in team teaching, not 
to introduce religious subjects, and not to allow Title I 
( supplies to be used by the private school. In addition, Title I 
( 
( 
teachers occupy classrooms that are specifically desi4nated 
solely for that purpose and that are free from any religious 
-------~ ---
symbols or artifacts. -------
The court analyzed this program under the three-part test of 
Lemon v. Kurtzmann, 403 u.s. 602 (1971), finding initially that 
Title I had a secular legislative purpose. Turning to the 
"primary effect" prong of the test, the court observed that Title 
I services were comparable to the off-premises therapeutic and 
remedial services that this Court approved in Wolman v. Walter, 
433 U.S. 229 (1977). In that case, however, the Court relied on 
the ground that the use of a religiously neutral site negated the 
danger of religious advancement inherent in the nature of 
student-teacher interaction. But despite this seemingly crucial ? 
distinction, the on-premises instruction at issue here did not 
have a primary effect of advancing religion because: (1) the 
parochial schools in this case were not "pervasively sectarian:" 
(2) the regulations governing the program ensured a separation 
between Title I instruction and that provided by the parochial 
schools, and the evidence demonstrated that the regulations had 
been strictly observed: and (3) the extensive record, covering ------- 14 I!/ n years of the program's operation, distinguished this case from ------~ 
Supreme Court cases involving challenges to statutes or programs 
shortly after their enactment. 
As for the third prong of the Lemon test, the court rejected 
the argument that a finding of "excessive entanglement" was 
mandated by the decision in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 
( 
( 
(1975). Meek addressed the constitutionality of a state program 
similar to Title I, under which public school employe~s provided 
auxiliary services to nonpublic school children on the premises 
of nonpublic schools. The Court held that "[t]he prophylactic 
contacts required to ensure that teachers play a strictly 
nonideological role .•. necessarily give rise to a 
constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between 
church and state." 421 u.s. at 370. The Court based this 
holding on two grounds: first, that the state would have to 
engage in continuing surveillance to ensure the neutrality of the 
auxiliary teachers~ and second, that the issue of state aid to 
religious schools presented a serious potential for divisive 
political conflict. 
The PEARL court found that neither of these considerations 
applied to NYC's Title I program. Because the NYC parochial 
schools were not "pervasively sectarian," the need for continuing 
surveillance of publicly ~mployed teachers was minimized, and the 
record indicated that such surveillance was not necessary to 
ensure compliance with the Board's regulations. The court 
identified two types of contact between the government and 
religious authorities under the program -- supervision of Title I 
teachers by public administrators, and routine administrative 
contact between Title I personnel and nonpublic school 
administrators. The first of these had been found to create 
excessive entanglement in Meek, but in this case the Title I 
classes were sufficiently separate from the rest of the parochial 
school that the case was more analogous to the "off-premises" 
(' instruction sanctioned in Wolman. The minor administrative 




"neither [gave] the parochial school officials any control over 
the program nor involve[d] Title I personnel in the affairs of 
the parochial schools." Joint App. at lOOa. 
As for the danger of political divisiveness, Title I, unlike 
other statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court, did not target 
its benefits at a narrow class of church-related schools. 
Rather, Title I benefitted a nationwide class of students, only -4% of whom attended private schools. The history of 
appropriations under Title I since 1965 revealed no signs of 
religious strife. 
In conclusion, the PEARL court stated that "[w]hile Title I 
could conceivably engender a program that did not satisfy 
Establishment Clause standards, this Court will not rule on the 
basis of abstract propositions. No constitutional infirmity has 
been revealed on the fact·s of this case."Joint App. at 103a. 
On appeal of the instant case, the CA2 disagreed with the ~~ ~ 
analysis of the PEARL court and reversed the DC's~anting ~­
sum~a~~ judgment to the defendants on the basis of PEARL. After~ 
canvassing the Supreme Court's opinions in this area, 
particularly Meek and Wolman, the CA2 concluded "that public 
funds can be used to afford remedial instruction . . . to 
students in religious elementary and secondary schools only if 
such instruction or services are afforded at a 1heutral sit~ ' off 
the premises of the religious school." Joint App. at 36a. 
Teachers might be subtly influenced by a sectarian milieu, and 
( the constant state surveillance necessary to guard against this 
was itself a constitutionally excessive entanglement df church 
~ 
and state. The evidence contained in the extensive record went 
principally to the defendants' contention that the NYC plan did 
not have a primary effect of advancing religion, whereas Meek was 
premised on the "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. 
The CA also focused on the inevitable potential for entanglement 
under the program and the "symbolic significance of the regular 
appearance of public school teachers in religious schools." 
Joint App. at 43a. The CA found "means and averages" irrelevant; 
even if the risk of entanglement existed in only a small 
proportion of the schools involved, the program ran afoul of the 
Establishment Clause. 
( In a footnote, the CA disposed of the defendants' attempt to 
distinguish Meek on the ground that the risk of political 
divisiveness was much lower under Title I than under the state 
statute at issue in Meek: ' "as we read Meek, the political strife 
argument was simply an additional consideration to bolster a 
conclusion already reached on other grounds." Joint App. at Sla 
n.24. In another footnote, the CA recognized that "there are 
deep divisions within the [Supreme] Court with respect to -such as those here presented and, as appellees have strongly 
suggested to us, that the composition of the Court has changed 
since Meek." Id. at 53a n.25. But theCA declined to disregard --established precedent on the basis of speculation as to what the 
( 
Court would do today: "Our task is to analyze the precedents and 
{ · apply them as best we can: The responsibility for mod~ying or 




Qaks-~: ·. ' 3. CONTENTIONS: ~
Aguilar, et al: This case falls within the Court's 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C §1252 because the CA2 held 
unconstitutional a common application of an Act of Congress. 
Appellees did not challenge the facial validity of Title I, but 
they sought to enjoin~ expenditure of federal funds to provide 
education services in religious schools during school hours. The 
CA2's decision, therefore, casts doubt on the constitutionality 
of Title I programs across the country. In an analogous context, 
this Court has held that similar allegations concerning Title I 
were sufficient to justify the convening of a three-judge court 
under 28 u.s.c. §2282. Flast v. Cohen, 392 u.s. 83 (1968). 
On the merits, the CA erred in interpreting this Court's 
decisions as creating a per se rule prohibiting public school 
teachers from offering any form of instruction at church-
affiliated schools. This approach is out of harmony with more 
recent Establishment Clause decisions of this Court that reject 
an "absolutist" interpretation of prior cases. See, e.g., Lynch 
v. Donnelly, 104 s. Ct. 1355 (1984). Meek is distinguishable 
because the program challenged there, while quite similar to 
Title I, had only recently been enacted. The Court therefore 
focused on potential problems, none of which have arisen under 
NYC's well-established program. 
The CA2's disregard of the record conflicts with Wheeler v. 
Barrera, 417 u.s. 402 (1974), in which this Court declined to 
~ rule on the constitutionality of an on-premises Title I program 
( 
( 
for the very reason that no evidentiary record of such a program 
I 
I 
was before it. Clearly, the Court was inviting parties 
litigating the constitutionality of such a program to develop 
such a record -- with the implication that a court should rely on 
this record in deciding the case. 
The CA2's ruling has a nationwide impact. Other suits 
challenging Title I have revealed that programs such as NYC's are 
common. See Wamble v. Bell, C.A. No. 77-0254-CV-W-8 (W.D. Mo., 
argued and submitted March 30, 1983); Barnes v. Bell, C.A. No. c-
8 0-0 50 1-L (B) ( W • D • K y . , f i 1 e d Oct • 2 , 19 8 0 ) . 
The Court has granted cert in School District of the City of 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, No. 83-990 (cert. granted 2/27/84). While 
the program at issue in that case differs from Title I in some 
respects, it also involves instruction by public school teachers 
in church-affiliated schools. Appellants suggest that the two 
cases be set for argument together. 
The SG agrees that this case falls within the 
jurisdiction as a holding that a federal 
statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular 
circumstance. Although the CA2 did not explicitly state that it 
determination was a "necessary predicate to the relief" that it 
granted. See United States v. Clark, 445 u.s. 23, 26 n.2 (1980). 
In addition, Flast v. Cohen held that an Establishment Clause 
challenge to Title I was properly brought before a three-judge 
court under 28 u.s.c. §2282. This holding sheds light on the 
( ' meaning of 28 u.s.c. §1252, because both provisions were enacted 
as part of the same statute. 
( 
( 
On the merits, the NYC program does not constitute excessive ~~ 
entanglement between church and state. The requirements imposed 
on participating private schools are unambiguous, resembling fire 
and building safety codes: The school must maintain a classroom 
in a certain condition [i.e., free of religious symbols] and must 
allow supervisors on the premises for unannounced inspections. 
The City must supervise Title I teachers to guard against the 
injection of religious material into their classes, but public 
school authorities routinely supervise all of their teachers 
partly for this purpose. The mere fact that classes are 
conducted on the premises of religious schools does not 
inevitably mean "entanglement" will result. 
Meek does not control this case, because its holding rested 
in significant part on the potential for political divisiveness 
presented by the statutory scheme there at issue. Appropriations 
for private and public schools were addressed by separate 
statutes. Title I, by contrast, is a single statutory scheme 
that provides aid to students in both public and nonpublic 
schools according to a fixed rule of per-student parity. More 
important, the Court did not have an evidentiary record before it 
in Meek, as it does here. 
This case should be heard together with Grand Rapids. ----------------
Because there are important differences between the two cases, a 
---------------decision that the Grand Rapids program is unconstitutional 
not necessarily resolve the constitutionality of Title I. 
( · Important considerations militate in favor of plenary review of 
( 
( 
this case. The CA2 has struck down an integral aspect of a large 
I 
and very important federal education program, and the issue 
presented by this case recurs frequently. This case is a 
particularly appropriate one for the Court to review because the 
NYC Title I program is the largest in the nation, and the record 
provides a detailed portrait of the operation of the program for 
over 15 years. Moreover, Establishment Clause cases such as this 
one tend to be fact-specific. By considering this case and Grand 
Rapids together, the Court "will be able to make its decision on 
the basis of wider information and will be able to provide more 
complete guidance to lower courts." The SG and the other 
appellants are prepared to file briefs by October 15. 
NYC Board of Education: The NYC Title I program passes all 
three prongs of the Lemon test. Entanglement is "a question of 
kind and degree," Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1364, and the 
state has a substantial interest in assuring that students 
receive an adequate secular education. Meek is distinguishable 
for the reasons cited by the other appellants. Apart from 
Establishment Clause concerns, the CA2's decision will frustrate 
the statutory rights of children from "the lower classes" to 
receive Title I instruction at parochial as well as public 
schools. 
Grand Rapids involves two local programs under which the 
school district leases classrooms from parochial schools and 
provides various classes at the leased facilities during school 
hours. Many of the teachers employed in the publicly funded 
( · programs are either former or present teachers at the parochial 
( 
school to which they are assigned. This case present~ "a less , 
extreme factual situation for determination under the 
Establishment Clause," and probable jurisdiction should be noted. 
Appellees: Meek controls this case, and other Supreme Court 
decisions bolster its holding. As the CA2 concluded, Meek did 
not rest on the potential for political divisiveness posed by the 
statutory scheme at issue there. Nor did the decision rest on 
the "sectarian" nature of the parochial schools in that case. 
Meek merely described the schools as "schools in which education 
is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in 
which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious 
belief is constantly maintained." 421 u.s. at 371. The 
parochial schools in this case fit that description. 
The SG's argument that the only surveillance is that of 
public employees EY public employees must fail because it could 
easily have been made in Meek. Moreover, the argument is untrue: 
the Board must also conduct "surveillance" of church school 
classrooms and church school students. Even more significant is 
that the Board has not and cannot engage in surveillance of the 
constant daily communication between public school teachers and 
their church school counterparts. 
The extensive record that appellants contend distinguishes 
this case from Meek and others does not disprove excessive 
entanglement. The precedents envisage a surveillance that is all 
but impossible to acheive, and the appellants' surveillance is in 




surveillance is one visit per month to each church school in the 
program by a supervisor employed by the Board. Moreover, Wheeler 
' 
v. Barrera does not constitute an invitation by this Court to 
litigate this issue on the basis of a record. Meek, which was 
decided after Wheeler, struck down the state statute at issue on 
the basis of its facial unconstitutionality. 
4. DISCUSSION: This is a case that the Court should almost 
certainly review, especially in the lig~t of its grant of cert in 
Grand Rapids. The~cts of Grand Rapids are quite similar, but I 
think the SG is right that a decision in that case will not 
necessarily dispose of this one. On the one hand, the Grand 
Rapids program ~~~~s" the classrooms from the parochial 
-schools, arguably making the program less objectionable under the 
Establishment Clause. On the other hand, the teachers in the 
Grand Rapids program are in some cases simultaneously employed by 
the parochial school at which they teach -- or were so employed 
before joining the public payroll -- and that feature seems to 
present a much greater threat of entanglement. ~ 
A somewhat more difficult question is whether this case 
arises under the Court's appellate jurisdiction, although -----appellees don't challenge appellants' assertions that it does. 
The CA2 did not explicitly state that it was holding Title I 
unconstitutional as applied, and the case cited by the SG as 
authority for the proposition that such a holding was implicit is 
arguably distinguishable. 2 However, this Court has previously 




held that Title I authorizes programs such as the one at issue 
here, see Wheeler v. Barrera, and their adoption unde r the 
I 
statute is apparently widespread. Moreover, Flast v. Cohen is 
fairly strong authority that an appeal will lie. The claims 
raised in Flast were almost identical. This Court held that a 
three-judge court was properly convened under 28 U.S.C. §2282, 
which provided that an injunction restraining enforcement of any 
Act of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality should not be 
granted unless the application had been heard and determined by a 
three-judge district court. The Court observed that the purpose 
of §2282 was "to prevent a single federal judge from being able 
to paralyze totally the operation of an entire regulatory scheme 
... by issuance of a broad injunctive order." 392 U.S. at 89 
(quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 u.s. 144, 154 (1963)). 
If §1252 is similarly concerned with preventing widespread 
disruption as the result of one court's holding albeit a CA 
rather than a DC -- it sh6uld apply in this case. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend NPJ and consolidation 
for argument with School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball, No. 83-990. 
A response has been filed for ~11 three cases. 
September 24, 1984 Wexler Opins in petn. 
2united States v. Clark, 445 u.s. 23, 26 n.2 (1980). In Clark, 
the Ct. Cl. had granted relief on the basis of its holding in a 
previous case that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional. This 
Court rejected the argument that an appeal would lie only if the 




~r(/Uea ..•••••••••••••••.• , 111 ••• ABStgned .................. , 19 . . . No. 















ABSENT NOT YOTI:\ G 
FOR 
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
v 
Burger, Ch. J. .. .. .. .. .. ..j' . .. . ~~ ... 
1
. ;:z . ~ ~ .!' .. 
Brennan, J.. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. ..J .. . ~X/.;. .. ~ . 
White, J ............................ ~· ........... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 
. . . . . ..... . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
/ 
~·············· 
············ / ···· 
Stevens, J............................ . . . . . . . . . ...... . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
. ..................... . 
O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. . 
I 
( ( 
Court .................. . ·roted on........... .. .. , 19 .. . octobe r 5, 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 














ABSENT NOT \"OTIX G BOLD 
FOR 
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFf G D 
/ 
Burger, Ch. J ........... " / ' ... ~; .. ·i· ;;:z ·~~~ .. . 
Brennan, J.. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . ..J .. . J".r. /. :-:.. ~ . 
White, J . . .......................... v · ..... ...... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 
. . . . . ..... . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
/ 
~·············· 
············ 7 ···· 
Stevens, J............................ . . . . . . . . . ...... . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. . 
( 
( ( 
Court .................. . 'Voted on........... .. .. , 19 .. ?ctober 5, 1984 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . Argued ................... , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . 
No. 
84-238 Announced ................ , 19. : . 
SEC., U.S. DEPT. OF ED. 
Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
HOLD 
FOR 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
CERT. 
G D 
Stevens, J ........................... . 















October 5, 1984 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 84-238 
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPT. 
OF EDUCATION 
v. 
FELTON, ET AL. 
Cert. to CA2 (Feinberg, 
Friendly, Oakes) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
This case is curve-lined with No. 84-237. Please see the 
memo in that case. 






October 5, 1984 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 84-239 
CHANCELLOR, BOARD OF EDUCATION 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
v. 
FELTON, ET AL. 
Cert. to CA2 (Feinberg, 
Friendly, Sr. CJ, Oakes) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
This case is curve-lined with No. 84-237. Please see the 
memo in that case. 




October 5, 1984 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 84-239 
CHANCELLOR, BOARD OF EDUCATION 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
v. 
FELTON, ET AL. 
Cert. to CA2 (Feinberg, 
Friendly, Sr. CJ, Oakes) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
This case is curve-lined with No. 84-237. Please see the 
memo in that case. 





October 5, 1984 
C011.rt .................. . l-•oted on............ . .. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
No. 84-239 
Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
CHANCELLOR, BD. OF ED. OF NY 
Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
HOLD 
FOR 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
CERT. 
G D 
Stevens, J ........................... . 






N POST DIS AFF REV AFI' G D 
ABSENT NOT \"OTI!\G 
CJIJ :< - 5.-




To: The Chief Justice ../ j . · JJ 
Justice White /rv -;{ .(/· 
Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun 
Justic~ Powell · 
Justice Rehnquist 
Justice Stevens ' 
Justice O'Connor 
From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: _A_P_R __ 2____,1.>i.l98...,5.___ _ 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
·SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES w J 4 ~ 
. \).. 
Nos. 84-237, 84-238 AND 84-239 
t/-YL ~~-~~-
YOLANDA AGUILAR, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
M-~7 u 
BETTY-LOUISE FELTON ET AL. 
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT 
M-238 v. 
BETTY-LOUISE FELTON ET AL. 
~-~-~' 
CHANCELLOR OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, APPELLANT 
M-239 v. 
BETTY-LOUISE FELTON ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[April - , 1985] 
~1/Vt.- .... 1 ( ~ f~.:;~) 
- JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
~ ...... g' 1 q The City of New York uses federal funds to pay the sala-
___. ----ries of public employees who teach in parochial schools. In 
this companion case to School District of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball, -- U.S. - (1985), we determine whether this 




The program at issue in this case, originally enacted as 
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-23~0PINION 
2 AGUILAR v. FELTON 
1965,1 authorizes the Secretary of Education to distribute 
financial assista ce to local educational institutions to meet 
the needs o educational y de rived children from ow inCome 
families. e funds are to be appropriated in accordance 
With p rograms proposed by local educational agencies and ap-
proved by state educational agencies. § 3805(a). 2 "To the 
extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived 
children in the school district of the local e ucatwna age cy 
who' are enrolled in private elementary and secondary 
~
schools, such agency shall make provisions for including spe-
cial educational services and arrangements ... in which such 
1 Title I was codified at 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. Section 2701 
provided: 
"In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income 
families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on 
the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational 
programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United 
States to provide financial assistance (as set forth in the following parts of 
this subchapter) to local educational agencies serving areas with concentra-
tions of children from low-income families to expand ana improve their edu-
cational programs by various means (including preschool programs) which 
contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educa-
tionally deprived children." 
Effective July 1, 1982, Title I was superseded by Chapter I of the Educa-
tion Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 20 U. S. C. § 3801 et seq. 
See 20 U. S. C. § 3801 (current Chapter I analogue of§ 2701). The provi-
sions concerning the participation of children in private schools under 
Chapter I are virtually identical to those in Title I. Compare 20 U. S. C. 
§ 2740 (former Title I provision) with 20 U. S. C. § 3806 (current Chapter I 
provision). For the sake of convenience, we will refer adopt the usage of 
the parties and continue to refer to the program as "Title I." 
2 The statute provides: 
"A local educational agency may receive a grant under this subchapter for 
any fiscal year if it has on file with the State educational agency an applica-
tion which describes the programs and projects to be conducted with such 
assistance for a period of not more than three years, and such application 
has been approved by the State educational agency." 
See also 20 U. S. C. § 2731 (former Title I analogue). 
·. 
) 
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children can participate." § 3806(a). 3 The proposed pro-
grams must also meet the followin tat o uirements: 
the children 1 volve in aucationally 
deprived, § 3804(a), 4 the children mu reside in areas 
~
comprising a ~concentration of low-income families, 
§3805(b), 5 and t~ograms must su lement, not supplant, 
programs that would exist absent funding under Titl~ I. 
§ 3807(b). 6 
3 In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U. S. 402 (197 4), we addressed the ques-
tion whether this provision requires the ass~ment of publicly employed 
teachers to provide instruction during regular school hours in parochial 
schools. We held that Title I mandated that private school students 
receive services comparable to, but not identical to, the Title I services 
received by public school students. I d., at 420-421. Therefore, the stat-
ute would permit, but not require, that on-site services be provided in the 
parochial schools. In reaching this conclusion as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, we explicitly noted that "we intimate n~w ~to the 
Establishment Clause effect of an icular ro . ' Id., at 426. 
Whee er us pro vi es no author1ty for the constitutionality of the program 
before us today. 
• The statute provides: 
"Each State and local educational agency shall use the payments under this 
subchapter for programs and projects (including the acquisition of equip-
ment and, where necessary, the construction of school facilities) which are 
designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived 
children." 
5 The statute provides: 
"The application described in subsection (a) of this section shall be 
approved if .. . the programs and projects described-
(1)(A) are conducted in attendance areas of such agency having the highest 
concentration of low-income children .... " 
8 The statute provides: 
"A local educational agency may use funds receive under this subchapter 
only so as to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of 
funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds , be made available 
from non-Federal sources for the education of pupils participating in pro-
grams and projects assisted under this subchapter, and in no case may such 
funds be so used as to supplant such funds from such non-Federal sources. 
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Since 1966, the City of New York has provided ins true- .P7-t- -. 
tional services funded 'tle I to parochial s~nts ~ ~
on t e remises f arochial sch ols. Ol those students eligi- . 
ble to receive funds in 1981-1982, 13.2% were enrolled in pri- ~ ~
vate schools. Of that group, 84% were enrolled in schools  
affiliated with the Roman Catho 1c c iocese of ew York k~ 
an e 1oc. se o roo lyn an 8 o were enrolled in Hebrew 
day schools. With respect to the religious atmosphere of 
these schools, the C~oncluded that "the pic- C: /? -z_, 
ture that emerges is of a system in which religious consider-
ations play a keYJ:Q!.e ~ selection of stud en s an teachers 
and WfiTclriiaS as i ts substantial purpose the inculcation of 
religious values." 739 F. 2d 48, 68 (1984). 
The pr~ed at these schools inclu_9.e remedial 
v reading, reading skills,:femedial mathematics,~nglish as a 
second language, and 1Uidance services. These programs 
are carried out b regular em loyees of the u lie s ools 
(teac rs, guidance counse ors, psyc o og~s s, psychiatrists 
and social workers) who have volunteered to teach in the pa-
rochial schools. The ~ach professional 
spends in the parochial school is determined by the number of 
students in the particular program and the needs of these 
students. 
The City's Bureau of Nonpublic School Reimbursement 
makes teacher assignments, and the instructors are super-
vised by field personnel, who attempt to pay at least one 
unannounced visit per month. The field supervisors, in 
turn, report to program coordinators, who also pay occasional 
unannounced supervisory visits to monitor Title I classes in 
the parochial schools. The professionals involved in the pro-
gram are directed to avoid involvement with religious activi-
ties that are conducted within the private schools and to bar 
religious materials in their classrooms. All materil!l and 
equipment used in the programs funded unaer Title I are 
agency shall not be required to provide services under this subchapter out-
side the regular classroom or school program." 
'• 
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supplied by the Government and are used only in those pro-
grams. The professional personnel are solely responsible for 
the selection of the students. Additionally, the professionals 
are informed that contact with private school personnel 
should be kept to a minimum. Finally, the administrators of 
the parochial schools are required to clear the classrooms 
used by the. public school personnel of all religious symbols. 
B 
In 1978, six taxpayers commenced this action in the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging 
that the Title I program administered by the City of New 
York violates the Establishment Clause. These taxpayers, 
appellees in today's case, sought to enjoin the further dis-
tribution of funds to programs involving teaching on the 
premises of parochial schools. Initially the case was held for 
the outcome of National Coalition for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Harris ("PEARL"), 489 F. Supp. 1248 
(SDNY 1980), which involved an identical challenge to the 
Title I program. When the District Court in PEARL af-
firmed the constitutionality of the Title I program, ibid., and 
this Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, 449 
U. S. 808 (1980), the challenge of the present appellees was 
renewed. The District Court granted the appellants' motion 
for summary judgment based upon the evidentiary record de-
velo ed in PEARL. - ~
A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed, holding that 
"[t]he Establishment Clause, as it has been interpreted 
by the Supreme Court in Public Funds for Public 
Schools v. '1v!arburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D. N.J. 1973), 
aff'd mem., 417 U. S. 961 (1974); Meek v.""Pittenger, 421 
U. S. 349 (1975) (particularly Part V, pp. 367-372); and 
v/ Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977), constitutes an 
insurmountable barrier to the use o federal funds to 
sen ublic sc oo teachers and other professionals into 
6 
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reli · ous on instruction, remedial or 
otherwise, or o provide clmical and guidance services of 
the sort at issue here." 739 F. 2d, at 50. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to decide whether the pro-
gram administered by the City of New York and funded 
under Title I violates the Establishment Clause. -- U. S. 
- (1984). · We affirm. 
II 
In Cit Grand Ra ids v. Ball, ante, the Court has today 
held unconstitutiona under the Establishment Clause two 
remedial an enhancement programs operated by the Grand 
Rapids Public c ool istr1c , m w ich classes were provided 
to private school children at public expense in classrooms 
located in and leased from the local private schools. The 
New York programs challenged in this case are very similar 
to the programs we examined in Ball. In both ca~s, ~b­
licly funded instructors teach classes composed exclusively of 
p~s in pr1va e sc oo m mgs. In both 
cases, a o e e mmg num er o e p 1cipating private 
schools are religiously affiliated. In both cases, the publicly 
funded programs provide not only professional personnel, but 
also all materials and supp 1es cessary or e operation of 
the programs. ma y, t e mstructors in both cases are told 
that they are public school employees under the sole control 
of the public school system. 
The appellants attempt to distinguish this case on the 
ground that the City of New York, unlike the Grand Rapids 
Public School District, has adopted a system for monitoring 
the religious content of publicly funded Title I classes in the 
religious schools. At best, the supervision in this case would 
assist in preventing the Title I program from being used, 
intentionally or unwittingly, to inculcate the religious beliefs 
of the surrounding parochial school. But appellants' argu-
ment fails in any event, because the supervisory system es-
tablished by the City of New York inevitably results in the 
' . 
... 
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excessive entanglement of church and state, an Establish-
m~distinct from that addressed by the 
effects doctrine. Even where state aid to parochial institu-
tions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, 
the provision of such aid may nonetheless violate the Estab-
lishment Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of 
church and state in the administration of that aid. 
The principle that the state should not become too closely ~ /-~  
entangle With e church in the a mmis a Ion o assis ance 
is ~rns. When the state becomes too 
closely enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of 
religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those 
who are not adherents o enomma Ion s ers, even 
w en t e governmen a se un e ymg e mvolvement 
is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the 
adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental 
intrusion into sacred matters. "[T]he First Amendment 
rests upon the premise that both religion and government 
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free 
from the other within its respective sphere." McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948). 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the Court 
held th~n necessary to ensure that teachers in 
parochial schools were not conveying religious messages to 
their students would constitute the excessive entanglement 
of church and state: 
"A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state 
surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that 
these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment 
otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot 
be inspected once so as to determine the extent and in-
tent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective accept-
ance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendemt. 
These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and 
enduring entanglement between state and church." 403 
U. S., at 619 . 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-239-0PINION 
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Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), we 1 ,., ,_,_ J "_ ·? 
invalidated a ~m that offered, inter alia, guid- '--V ......., ~
ance, tes mg reme 1al an there eutic services performed 
by public emp oyees on t e premises of the parochia sc ools. 
I d., at 352-353. ~e observed that though a 
comprehensive system of supervision might conceivably pre-
vent teachers from having the primary effect of advancing 
religion, such a system would inevitably lead to an uncon-
stitutional administrative entanglement between church and 
state. 
"The prophylactic contacts required to ensure that 
teachers play a strictly nonideological role, the Court 
held [in Lemon], necessarily give rise to a constitution-
ally intolerable degree of entanglement between church 
and state. Ibid., at 619. The same excessive entangle-
ment would be required for Pennsylvania to be 'certain,' 
as it must be, that ... personnel do not advance the reli-
gious mission of the church-related schools in which they 
serve. Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 
358 F. Supp. 29, 40-41, aff'<!, 417 U. S. 961." 421 U. S., 
at 370. -
In Roemer v. Maryland Public Wor s Board, 426 U. S. 
736 (1976), t e o sustaine s a:li pr~a~ of aid to reli-
giously affiliated institutions of hig er learning. The state 
allowed the grants to be used for any nonsectarian r pose. 
The o p e the grants- on tne groun that the institu-
tions were not "pervasively sectarian," id., at 758-759, and 
therefore a system of supervision was unnecessary to ensure 
that the grants were no bemg use o e ect a religious end. 
In so holding, the C~fied "what is crucial to 
nonentangling aid programs: the ability of the State to iden-
ti~te secular functions carried out at 
the school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary to 
prevent diversion of the funds ectarian purposes." 426 
U. S., at 765. Similarly, i ilto . Richardson, 403 U. S. 
672 (1971), the Court u he one-time grants to sectarian 
? 
'· 
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institutions because ongo~~ervision was not required. 
See also Hunt v. McNatr; 413-u :-s:--73""4(19 . 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, the elementary and 
secondary schools here are far dif~erent from~ c~~s at 
iss~e in Roemer, Hunt, and Tilton~F. 2d, at 68-70. 
Unlike the colleges,. which were found not to be "pervasively 
sectarian," many of the schools involved in this case are the 
same sectarian schools which had "as a substantial purpose 
the inculcation of religious values" in Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 768 (1973). Moreover, 
our holdin in Meek invalidating instructional services much 
like thos a Iss e m IS case reste on the ground that the 
publici funded teach rs "were pe ormm e ucationa serv-
ices in chools in which education IS an inte al art of the 
dominant sectarian mission an m which an atmosphere dedi-
cate to t e a vancement of religious belief is constantly 
maintained." Meek, supra, at 371. The court below found 
that the schools involved in this case were "well within this 
characterization." 739 F. 2d, at 70. 7 Unlike the schools in 
Roemer, many of the schools here receive funds andre ort 
back to their a e c urc , reqmre attendance at church 
r ~the school ·oay or class period with 
prayer, and grant preference in admission to members of the 
sponsoring denominations. I d., at 70. In addition, the 
7 Appellants suggest that the degree of sectarianism differs from school 
to school. This has little bearing on our analysis. As J~dly, 
writing for the court below, noted: "It may well be thattlle degree or sec-
tarianism in Catholic schools in, for example, black neighborhoods, with 
considerable proportions of non-Catholic pupils and teachers, is relatively 
low; by the same token, in other schools it may be relatively high. Yet 
... enforcement of the Establishment Clause does not rest on means or 
medians. ~f significant number of the Title I schools create the risks 
described i Mee , Meek applies. It would be simply incredible, and the 
affidavits aver, that all, or almost all, New York City's parochial 
schools receiving Title I aid have ... abandoned 'the religious mission that 
is the only reason for the schools' existence." 739 F. 2d, at 70 (quoting 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 650 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 
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Catholic schools at issue here, which constitute the vast ma-
jority of the aided schools, are under the general supervision 
and control of the local parish. Ibid. 
The critical elements of the entanglement proscribed in ~ ~~ ~ 
Lemon and Meek are thus present in this case. ~, as 
noted above, the aid~asively sectarian 
environment. ~· because assistanceis provmea in the 
form-otteachers, ongoing inspection is required to ensure the 
absence of a religious message. Compare Lemon, supra, at 
619, with Tilton, supra, at 668, and Roemer, supra, at 765. 
In short, the scope and duration of New York's Title I pro-
gram would require a permanent and pervasive State pres-
en e in the sectarian schoo s receivmg ai • 
T · s pe as1ve monitoring y pu ic authorities in the sec-
tarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause 
values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entangle-
ment. Agents of the State must visit and inspect the reli-
gious school regularly, alert for the subtle or overt presence 
of religious matter in Title I classes. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U. S., at 619 ("What would appear to some to be 
essential to good citizenship might well for others border on 
or constitute instruction in religion"). In addition, the reli-
gious school must obey these same agents when they make 
determinations as to what is and what is not a "religious sym-
bol," and thus off limits in a Title I classroom. In short, the 
religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advance-
ment and preservation of a particular religion must endure 
the ongoing presence of Staj;e personnel whose primary pur-
pose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to 
guard against the infiltration of religious thought. 
The administrative cooperation that is required to maintain 
the educational program at issue here entangles Church and 
State in another way that infringes interests at the heart of 
the Establishment Clause. Administrative personnel of the 
public and parochial school systems must work together in 
resolving matters related to schedules, classroom assign-
84-237, 84-238 & 84-239--0PINION 
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ments, problems that arise in the implementation of the pro-
gram, requests for additional services, and the dissemination 
of information regarding the program. Furthermore, the 
program necessitates "frequent contacts between the regular 
and the remedial teachers (or other professionals), in which 
each side reports on individual student needs, problems en-
countered, and results achieved." 739 F. 2d, at 65. 
We have long recognized that underlying the Establish-
ment Clause is "the objective ... to prevent, as far as possi-
ble, the intrusion of either [Church or State] into the pre-
cincts of the other." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 614. 
See also McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 
212 (1948). Although "[s]eparation in this context cannot 
mean absence of all contact," Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 
U. S. 664, 676 (1970), the detailed monitoring and close 
administrative contact required to maintain New York's Title 
I program can only produce "a kind of continuing day-to-day 
relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize." 
Id., at 674. The numerous judgments that must be made by 
agents of the state concern matters that may be subtle and 
controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to 
the controlling denominations. As government agents must 
make these judgments, the dangers of political divisiveness 
along religious lines increase. At the same time, "[t]he pic-
ture of state inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools 
and auditing classroom instruction surely raises more than 
an imagined specter of governmental 'secularization of a 
creed."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 650 (1971) 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 
III 
Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City 
of New York, the program remains constitutionally flawed 
owing to the nature or£f1e"'""ai0, to the institution receiving the 
aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate-
that neither the state nor federal government shall promote 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-23~0PINION 
12 AGUILAR v. FELTON 
or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through the ad-
vancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement 
of church and state in the administration of those benefits. 
Affirmed. 
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LLYNDA GINA-POW 
MEMO TO Lynda 
FROM: LFP, JR. 
RE: 84-237 - 239: and 83-990 School District 
of Grand Rapids v. Ball 
I have in mind generally a concurring opinion of 
perhaps half a dozen pages. In view of your more intimate 
familiarity with our prior cases (I have not reread any of 
them) , and your facility in drafting, I would appreciate 
your undertaking this when you have given me a draft in 
the Securities Act cases. 
Random thoughts include the following: 
1. As we have discussed, I think Aguilar involves 
essentially the same "subsidy" rationale very well stated 
in Ball, pp. 18-23. 
2. I also agree that "entanglement .. is involved in 
both cases, and would quote Harlan's opinion in Waltz. 
3. In several of our cases (Lemon, Nyquist, and 
Meek, we emphasized the risk of npoli tical devisi veness ... 
I do not believe that WJB has emphasized this. I consider 
it quite important, as one can be certain that politics 
will enter into decisions as to aid to parochial schools 
2. 
in states that have large sectarian population - e.gG New 
York. 
4. Perhaps we could include a quote or two from 
relevant things that I said in Nyquist. 
5. Your bench memo quoted in part from my separare 
cpinion in Wolman. I would like in a footnote to repeat 
rome of that, quoting Wolman. There is no danger in my 
opinion of a state religion, and so we are talking about 
aid to religion as such - whatever the faith may be. A 
high percentage of the population do not belong to any 
religion. I know from my own experience in education that 
private schools often are helpful to public schools 
(perhaps not so in major cities such as New York). 
Certainly in Virginia the Espiscopal schools - with which 
you are familiar - provide quality education that is fully 
competitive, and often better, than that provided in the 
public schools. They provide an option for parents who 
can afford to use them. 
6. What worries me most about these cases, as you 
and I have discussed, is that both Title I and the 
Michigan Program probably are beneficial as presently 
operated. There is no evidence to the contrary, though 
the absence of such evidence has been viewed as irrelevant 
Jo 
in prior cases. I do not think WJB has closed the door to 
possible types of state aid. I do not read his opinion as 
holding that Title I is facially invalid. Rather, the 
entanglement results are potential because of the way New 
York City has structured the program. I believe Judge 
Friendly refer to the structure of the New York program. 
To the extent we can do so properly, I would like to 
emphasize that even-handed asssi tance to all schools -
absent the entanglement structure in Aguilar would 
tresent a different situation. In Nyquist I emphasized 
that some types of assistance are appropriate. What if 
Congress simply appropriated funds to supplement education 
for children in deprived areas and made the funds - and 
only the funds available to the appropriate school 
authorities? The only supervision would be federal, and 
would see that both pub! ic and private schools used the 
funds properly. This would require the parochial 
schools to provide these programs with their own teachers 
and on their own premises with no participation by public 
school teachers or oversight by personnel of the public 
schools? See the Minnesota case we decided - last Term, I 
believe. 
4. 
7. I agree that Judge Friendly's opinion is 
excellent. WJB has mentioned it. Perhaps we could use a 




TO: Lynda DATE: May 2, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-237 Aguilar, et al 
J , 
~1 
On a first reading, your draft of May 1 is quite 
close to what I suggested in my memo and we have discussed. 
Although I may have some further thoughts, my initial reac-
tion and suggestions are as follows: 
1. Footnote 1 should be expanded, and possibly 
relocated. The reader will not understand it in its present 
position and form. The point is that the Court's opinion is 
based solely on entanglement, and we suggest that in addi-
tion to entanglement - as important as that is - the effect 
prong of Lemon is violated where there is a government sub-
sidy of parochial schools through the combined use of feder-
al funding and direct public school assistance in parochial 
schools. 
2. I do not understand the sentence in the middle 
of page 9. See my question in the margin. 
3. On page 10, either in the text or in the note, 
I would like to try to be somewhat more specific than the 
present draft. I have suggested a minor change in the lan-
guage of the first sentence following citation of the cases. 
In lieu of the next sentence, try something along the 
following lines: 
J 2 • 
~1 
"In the cases cited there were assistance programs 
that made funds available equally to public and nonpublic 
schools without entanglement. The constitutional defect in 
Title I, as indicated above, is that it provides a financial 
subsidy to be administered in major part by public school 
teachers within parochial schools - resulting almost inev-
itably in forbidden entanglement. If, for example, Congress 
could fashion an even-handed financial assistance program to 
both public and nonpublic schools for the laudable purposes 
of Title I, leaving it to each category of schools to admin-
ister the federal funds without the entangelement identified 
in this case, we would be presented with a different ques-
tion." 
4. I like the quote as to value of parochial 
schools beginning on page 10, but this seems misplaced at 
the end of the opinion. Try finding a better location for 
it - perhaps where you first speak of the laudable purpose 
of Title I. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
~' . . 
I• . ~ 
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FROM: Lewis F. Powell , Jr . 
~4-237 Aquilar, et al 
On a first reading, your draft of May 1 is quite 
close to \'-'hat I suggested in my memo and we have discussed. 
Although I may have some further thoughts , my initial reac-
tion and suggestions are as follows: 
1. Footnote 1 should be expanded, and possibly 
relocated. The reader will not understand it in its present 
position and form. The point is that the Court's opinion is 
based solely on entanglement, and we suqqest that in addi-
tion to entanglement - as important as that is - the effect 
pronq of Lemon is violated where there is a government sub-
sidy of parochial schools through the combine~ use of feder-
al funding and direct public school assistance in parochial 
schools. 
2. I do not understand the sentence in the middle 
of page 9 . See my question in the margin . 
3 . On page 10, either in the text or in the note , 
I would like to try to be somewhat more specific than th~ 
present draft. I have suggested a minor change in the lan-
guaqe of the first sentence follm.ring citation of the cases . 





"In the cases cited there were assistance orograms 
! 
'I 
that made fund8 available equally to public and 1 nonpuhlic 
schools without entanglement . The constitutional defect in 
Title I, as indicated above, is that it provi~es a financial . 
subsidy to be administered in major part by public school 
teachers within parochial schools - resulting almost inev-
itably in forbiiklen entanglement. If, for example , Congress 
could fashion an even-handed financial assistance proqr~m to 
both public and nonpublic schools for the laudable purposes 
of Title I, leaving it to each category of schools to admin-
ister the federal funds without the entangelement identified 
in this case, we would be presented with a different ques-
tion . " 
4. I like the quote as to value of parochial 
schools beginning on page 10, but this ~eems misPlaced at 
t"l)e enn of the opinion. Try fi.ndinq a better location for 
it - perhaos where you first speak of the laudable purpose 
of Title I. 
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lgs May 4, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 84-237 Aguilar v. Felton 
Attached is a redraft of your concurrence in this case. 
As you will see, I have incorporated your changes and made some 
other minor alterations. The one suggestion with which I had 
some difficulty was the proposal that we be more specific in 
'suggesting what type of program might pass Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. The import of your suggested language was that if 
Congress could fashion a program that was evenhanded and that 
could be administered by the parochial schools on their own, it 
would be valid. This is true only if the program would not 
constitute direct aid to the parochial schools. The Court's 
cases that have approved aid to parochial schools have all 
involved evenhanded indirect aid: it is not only because the aid 
is evenhanded that it is valid: it is also because the aid is 
indirect and needs no surveillance. If it is direct, it 
constitutes an impermissible subsidy that advances religion 
unless there is some way to be "certain," Meek v. Pittenger, 421 
u.s., at 371, that the aid is not being used to foster religious 
goals. The only way to be certain that it is not so used, of 
course, requires surveillance in most cases: surveillance, of 
course, leads to excessive entanglement. 
In sum, I think it would be incorrect to suggest that 
aid would be permissible as long as it was evenhanded and 
structured so that entanglement would not ensue. We must be sure 
not to leave out the fact that the aid may not have the effect of 
advancing religion. Our cases have sugg~ed, therefore, that -the aid must also be indirect, such as tlie tax deductions in 
Mueller, t~~visi~ of textbooks to children in Allen, and the 
~ reimbursements for bus fare in Everson. 
This all gets quite complicated to explain in capsule~ 
form, and explains why I was deliberately vague in my first 
draft. I have given it another shot in the new draft, but am 
inclined to think it is better to be vague than to give r governments and schools false hopes that a certain type of 
program may be found constitutional in the future. 
I have attached a copy of my first draft and your memo 
to me for reference. 
lgs May 7, 1985 Lt_.._._.u.. -~ ~ 
~~0- ~1-k-r­
{~r~·.J) 
Re Aguilar concurrence 
It strikes me that the next to last sentence in the opinion, 
on p. 5, needs work. Although I think it does the job 
substantively, it is much too long and graceless. Following is a 
proposed substitute that is at least a little shorter. 
If, for example, Congress could fashion a program of 
evenhanded financial assistance to both public and private 
schools that could be administered, without governmental 
supervision in the private schools, so as to prevent the 
diversion of the aid from secular purposes, we would be presented 
with a different question. 
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of City of New York v. Felton 
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Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Recirculated: ______ _ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 84-237, 84-238 AND 84-239 
YOLANDA AGUILAR, ET AL., APPELLANTS 
~-~7 u 
BETTY-LOUISE FELTON ET AL. 
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT 
~-238 v. 
BETTY-LOUISE FELTON ET AL. 
CHANCELLOR OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, APPELLANT 
~-~9 u 
BETTY-LOUISE FELTON ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1985] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
Today the Court affirms the holding of the Court of Ap-
peals that public schoolteachers can offer remedial instruc-
tion to disadvantaged students who attend religious schools 
"only if such instruction ... [is] afforded at a neutral site off 
the premises of the religious school." 739 F. 2d 48, 64 (CA2 
19~). This holding rests on the theory, enunciated in Part 
V of the Court's opinion in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 
367-373 (1975), that public schoolteachers who set foot on pa-
rochial school premises are likely to bring religion into their 
classes, and that the supervision necessary to prevent reli-
gious teaching would unduly entangle church and state. 
Even if this theory were valid in the abstract,__it cannot 
validly be applied to New York City's year old Title I 
"'1: .r. L.: (_Q_ D 1 ColtU\..1r'l' ·~ 
No-kd. - ""' I.A.Z> n 
\A-0 ~ ~ fov tUA W ~a I d_o y~ ~ 
~~~-fa~~~ 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-239-DISSENT 
2 AGUILAR v. FELTON 
gram. The Court greatly exaggerates the degree of supervi-
sion necessary to prevent public school teachers from incul-
cating religion, and thereby demonstrates the flaws of a test 
that condemns benign cooperation between church and state. 
I would uphold Congress's efforts to afford remedial instruc-
tion to disadvantaged schoolchildren in both public and paro-
chial schools. 
I 
As in Wallace v. Jaffree, -- U. S. -- (1985) and Thorn-
ton v. Caldor, Inc.,-- U. S. -- (1985), the Court in this 
litigation adheres to the three part Establishment Clause test 
enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). To survive the Lemon test, a statute must have both 
a secular legislative purpose and a principal or primary effect 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Under Lemon 
and its progeny, direct state aid to parochial schools that has 
the purpose or effect of furthering the religious mission of the 
schools is unconstitutional. I agree with that principle. Ac-
cording to the Court, however, the New York Title I pro-
gram is defective not because of any improper purpose or 
effect, but rather because it fails the third part of the Lemon 
test: the Title I program allegedly fosters excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion. I disagree with the 
Court's analysis of entanglement and I question the utility of 
entanglement as a separate Establishment Clause standard 
in most cases. Before discussing entanglement, however, it 
is worthwhile to explore the purpose and effect of the New 
York Title I program in greater depth than does the majority 
opinion. 
The purpose of Title I is to provide special educational as-
sistance to disadvantaged children who would not otherwise 
receive it. Congress recognized that poor academic per-
formance by disadvantaged children is part of the cycle of 
poverty. S. Rep. 89-146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965). 
Congress sought to break the cycle by providing classes in re-
medial reading, mathematics, and English to disadvantaged 
. .. 
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children in parochial as well as public schools, for public 
schopls enjoy no monopoly on education in low income areas. 
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U. S. 402, 405-406 (1974). See 20 
U. S. C. §§ 2740(a), 3806(a). Congress permitted remedial 
instruction by public school teachers on parochial school 
premises only if such instruction is "not normally provided by 
the nonpublic school" and "would contribute particularly to 
meeting the special educational needs of educationally de-
prived children." S. Rep. 89-146, supra, at 12. See 34 
CFR 200.73 (1984) (Department of Education Regulations 
implementing Title I and precluding instruction on parochial 
school premises except where necessary and where such in-
struction is not normally provided by the school). 
After reviewing the text of the statute and its legislative 
history, the District Court concluded that Title I serves a 
secular purpose of aiding needy children regardless of where 
they attend school. Juris Statement App. in No. 84-238, 
p. 56a, incorporating findings of the district court inN ational 
Coalition for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Har-
ris, 489 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (SDNY 1980) ("PEARL"). The 
Court of Appeals did not dispute this finding, and no party in 
this Court contends that the purpose of the statute or of the 
New York City Title I program is to advance or endorse reli-
gion. Indeed, the record demonstrates that New York City 
public schoolteachers offer Title I classes on the premises of 
parochial schools solely because alternative means to reach 
the disadvantaged parochial school students-such as in-
struction for parochial school students at the nearest public 
school, either after or during regular school hours-were un-
successful. PEARL, 489 F. Supp., at 1255. As the Court 
of Appeals acknowledged, New York City "could reasonably 
have regarded [Title I instruction on parochial school 
premises] as the most effective way to carry out the purposes 
of the Act." 739 F. 2d, at 49. Whether one looks to the face 
of the statute or to its implementation, the Title I program is 
undeniably animated by a legitimate secular purpose . 
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The Court's discussion of the effect of the New York City 
Title I program is even more perfunctory than its analysis of 
the program's purpose. The Court's opinion today in Grand 
Rapids v. Ball,-- U. S. -- (1985), which strikes down a 
Grand Rapids scheme that the Court asserts is very similar 
to the New York program, identifies three ways in which 
public instruction on parochial school premises may have the 
impermissible effect of advancing religion. First, "state-
paid instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian 
nature of the religious schools in which they work, may sub-
tly or overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious 
tenets at public expense." Second, "state-provided instruc-
tion in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a 
message of state support for religion to students and to the 
general public." Third, "the programs in effect subsidize the 
religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a 
substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular 
subjects." I d., at -- - --. While addressing the effect 
of the Grand Rapids program at such length, the Court over-
looks the effect of Title I in New York City. 
One need not delve too deeply in the record to understand 
why the Court does not belabor the effect of the Title I pro-
gram. The abstract theories explaining why on-premises in-
struction might possibly advance religion dissolve in the face 
of experience in New York. As the District Court found in 
1980, 
"New York City has been providing Title I services in 
nonpublic schools for fourteen years. The evidence pre-
sented in this action includes: extensive background in-
formation on Title I; an in-depth description of New 
York City's program; a detailed review of Title I rules 
and regulations and the ways in which they are enforced; 
and the testimony and affidavits of federal officials, state 
officers, school administrators, Title I teachers and 
supervisors, and parents of children receiving Title I 
services. The evidence establishes that the result 
. . 
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feared in other cases has not materialized in the City's 
Title I program. The presumption-that the 'religious 
mission' will be advanced by providing educational serv-
ices on parochial school premises-is not supported by 
the facts of this case." PEARL, 489 F. Supp, at 1265. 
Indeed, in nineteen years there has never been a single in-
cident in which a Title I instructor "subtly or overtly" 
attempted to "indoctrinate the students in particular reli-
gious tenets at public expense." Grand Rapids,-- U. S., 
at--. 
Common sense suggests a plausible explanation for this un-
blemished record. New York City's public Title I instruc-
tors are professional educators who can and do follow instruc-
tions not to inculcate religion in their classes. They are 
unlikely to be influenced by the sectarian nature of the paro-
chial schools where they teach, not only because they are 
carefully supervised by public officials, but also because the 
vast majority of them visit several different schools each 
week and are not of the same religion as their parochial stu-
dents.* In light of the ample record, an objective observer 
of the implementation of the Title I program in New York 
would hardly view it as endorsing the tenets of the participat-
ing parochial schools. To the contrary, the actual and per-
ceived effect of the program is precisely the effect intended 
by Congress: impoverished school children are being helped 
to overcome learning deficits, improving their test scores, 
and receiving a significant boost in their struggle to obtain 
both a thorough education and the opportunities that :flow 
from it. 
The only type of impermissible effect that arguably could 
carry over from the Grand Rapids decision to this litigation, 
then, is the effect of subsidizing "the religious functions of the 
*It is undisputed that 78% of Title I instructors who teach in/\ parochial "' 
schools visit more than one school each week. Almost three quarters of 
the instructors do not share the religious affiliation of any school they teach 
in. App. 49 . 
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parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their 
responsibility for teaching secular subjects." -- U. S., at 
--. That effect is tenuous', however, in light of the statu-
tory directive that Title I funds may be used only to provide 
services that otherwise would not be available to the partici-
pating students. 20 U. S. C. § 3807(b). The Secretary of 
Education has vigorously enforced the requirement that Title 
I funds supplement rather than supplant the services of local 
education agencies. See Bennett v. Kentucky, -- U. S. 
-- (1985); Bennett v. New Jersey,-- U. S. -- (1985). 
Even if we were to assume that Title I remedial classes in 
New York may have duplicated to some extent.instruction 
parochial schools would have offered in the absence of Title I, 
the Court's delineation of this third type of effect proscribed 
by the Establishment Clause would be seriously flawed. 
Our Establishment Clause decisions have not barred reme-
dial assistance to parochial school children, but rather reme-
dial assistance on the premises of the parochial school. 
Under Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 244-248 (1977), the 
New York City classes prohibited by the Court today would 
have survived Establishment Clause scrutiny if they had 
been offered in a neutral setting off the property of the pri-
vate school. Yet it is difficult to understand why a remedial 
reading class offered on parochial school premises is any 
more likely to supplant the secular course offerings of the 
parochial school than the same class offered in a portable 
classroom next door to the school. Unless Wolman was 
wrongly decided, the defect in,._Title I program cannot lie in -r he. 
the risk that it will supplant secular course offerings. 
II 
Recognizing the weakness of any claim of an improper pur-
pose or effect, the Court today relies entirely on the entan-
glement prong ·of Lemon to invalidate the New York City 
Title I program. The Court holds that the occasional pres-
ence of peripatetic public schoolteachers on parochial school 
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grounds threatens undue entanglement of church and state 
because (1) the remedial instruction is afforded in a perva-
sively sectarian environment; (2) ongoing supervision is 
required to assure that the public schoolteachers do not at-
tempt to inculcate religion; (3) the administrative personnel 
of the parochial and public school systems must work to-
gether in resolving administrative and scheduling problems; 
and (4) the instruction is likely to result in political divisive-
ness over the propriety of direct aid. Ante, at-----; 
I d., at----- (concurring opinion of POWELL J.). !} 
This analysis of entanglement, I acknowledge, ~nds sup-
port in some of this Court's precedents. In Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U. S. 349, 369 (1975), the Court asserted that it 
could not rely "on the good faith and professionalism of the 
secular teachers and counselors functioning in church related 
schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological posture is 
maintained." Because "a teacher remains a teacher," the 
Court stated, there remains a risk that teachers will inter-
twine religious doctrine with secular instruction. The con-
tinuing state surveillance necessary to prevent this from 
occurring would produce undue entanglement of church and 
state. I d., at 370-372. The Court's opinion in Meek further 
asserted that public instruction on parochial school premises 
creates a serious risk of divisive political conflict over the 
issue of aid to religion. Ibid. Meek's analysis of entangle-
ment was reaffirmed in Wolman two terms later. 
I would accord these decisions the appropriate deference 
commanded by the doctrine of stare decisis if I could discern 
logical support for their analysis. But experience has dem-
onstrated that the analysis in Part V of the Meek opinion is 
flawed. At the time Meek was decided, thoughtful dissents 
pointed out the absence of any record support for the notion 
that public school teachers would attempt to inculcate reli-
gion simply because they temporarily occupied a parochial 
school classroom, or that such instruction would produce po-
litical divisiveness. 421 U. S., at 385 (opinion of BURGER, 
I I 
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C. J.); Id., at 387 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). Experience 
h~s given greater force to the arguments of the dissenting 
opinions in Meek. It is not intuitively obvious that a dedi-
cated public school teacher will tend to disobey instructions 
and commence proselytizing students at public expense 
merely because the classroom is within a parochial school. 
Meek is correct in asserting that a teacher of remedial read-
ing "remains a teacher," but surely it is significant that the 
teacher involved is a professional, full-time public school em-
ployee who is unaccustomed to bringing religion into the 
classroom. Given that not a single incident of religious in-
doctrination has been identified as occurring in the thousands 
of classes offered in Grand Rapids and New York over the 
past two decades, it is time to acknowledge that the risk iden-
tified in Meek was greatly exaggerated. 
Just as the risk that public schoolteachers in parochial 
classrooms will inculcate religion has been exaggerated, so 
has the degree of supervision required to manage that risk. 
In this respect the New York Title I progam is instructive. 
What supervision has been necessary in New York to enable 
public school teachers to help disadvantaged children for 19 
years without once proselytizing? Public officials have pre-
pared careful instructions warning public schoolteachers of 
their exclusively secular mission, and have required Title I 
teachers to study and observe them. App. 50-51. Under 
the rules, Title I teachers are not accountable to parochial or 
private school officials; they have sole responsibility for 
selecting the students who participate in their class, must ad-
minister their own tests for determining eligibility, cannot 
engage in team teaching or cooperative activities with paro-
chial school teachers, must make sure that all materials and 
equipment they use are not otherwise used by the parochial 
school, and must not participate in religious activities in the 
schools or introduce any religious matter into their teaching. 
To ensure compliance with the rules, a field supervisor and a 
program coordinator, who are full-time public school employ-
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ees, make unannounced visits to each teacher's classroom at 
least once a month. I d., at 53. 
The Court concludes that this degree of supervision of pub-
lic school employees by other public school employees consti-
tutes excessive entanglement of church and state. I cannot .L 
agree. The supervision that occurs in New York's Title I v-PI 
program does not differ significantly from the supervision we J~ _. ~ 
any public schoolteacher receives, regardless of th · n ,, ~qe=:-+'' ~k 
of .the classro~~· ~USTICE .PowELL rsuggests that the re- ~ -.+:- v::>WJ' ~ 
qmred supervisiOn Is extensive because- e State must be _ r ~ ~ ~ r 
certain that public schoolteachers do not inculcate religion. ~ ~ 
Ante, at--. That reasoning would require us to close our ~ ~ 
public schools, for there is always some chance that a public 
schoolteacher will bring religion into the classroom, regard-
less of its location. See Wallace v. J affree, -- U. S. --, 
-- n. 23 (1985). Even if I remained confident of the use-
fulness of entanglement as an Establishment Clause test, I 
would conclude that New York's efforts to prevent religious 
indoctrination in Title I classes have been adequate and have 
not caused excessive institutional entanglement of church 
and state. 
The Court's reliance on the potential for political divisive-
ness as evidence of undue entanglement is also unpersuasive. 
There is little record support for the proposition that New 
York's admirable Title I program has ignited any controversy 
other than this litigation. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 
388, 403-404, n. 11 (1983), the Court cautioned that the "elu-
sive inquiry" into political diviseness should be confined to a 
narrow category of parochial aid cases. The concurring 
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,-- U.S.--,-- (1984), 
went further, suggesting that establishment clause analysis 
should focus solely on character of the government activity 
that might cause political divisiveness, and that "the entan-
glement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to insti-
tutional entanglement." 
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I adhere to the doubts about the entanglement test that 
were expressed in Lynch. It is curious indeed to base our 
interpretation of the Constitution on speculation as to the 
likelihood of a phenomenon which the parties may create 
merely by prosecuting a lawsuit. My reservations about the 
entanglement test, however, have come to encompass its in-
stitutional aspects as well. As JUSTICE REHNQUIST has 
pointed out, many of the inconsistencies in our Establishment 
Clause decisions can be ascribed to our insistence that paro-
chial aid programs with a valid purpose and effect may still 
be invalid by virtue of undue entanglement. Wallace v. 
Jaffree, -- U. S., at-----. For example, we permit 
a State to pay for bus transportation to a parochial school, 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), but pre-
clude States from providing buses for parochial school field 
trips, on the theory such trips involve excessive state super-
vision of the parochial officials who lead them. Wolman, 433 
U. S., at 254. To a great extent, the anomalous results in 
our Establishment Clause cases are "attributable to [the] 'en-
tanglement' prong." Choper, The Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 673, 681 (1980). 
Pervasive institutional involvement of church and state 
may remain relevant in deciding the effect of a statute which 
is alleged to violate the Establishment Clause, Walz v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), but state efforts to ensure 
that public resources are used only for nonsectarian ends 
should not in themselves serve to invalidate an otherwise 
valid statute. The State requires sectarian organizations to 
cooperate on a whole range of matters without thereby ad-
vancing religion or giving the impression that the govern-
ment endorses religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, -- U. S., at 
--(dissenting opinion of REHNQUIST, J.) (noting that State 
educational agencies impose myriad curriculum, attendance, 
certificance, fire, and safety regulations on sectarian 
schools). If a statute lacks a purpose or effect of advancing 
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or endorsing religion, I would not invalidate it merely be-
cause it requires some ongoing cooperation between Church 
and State or some state supervision to ensure that state 
funds do not advance religion. 
III 
Today's ruling does not spell the end of the Title I program 
of remedial education for disadvantaged children. Children 
attending public schools may still obtain the benefits of the 
program. Impoverished children who attend parochial 
schools may also continue to benefit from Title I programs 
offered off the premises of their schools-possibly in portable 
classrooms just over the edge of school property. The only 
disadvantaged children who lose under the Court's holding 
are those in cities where it is not economically and logistically 
feasible to provide public facilities for remedial education ad-
jacent to the parochial school. But this subset is significant, 
for it includes more than 20,000 New York City schoolchil-
dren and uncounted others elsewhere in the country. 
For these children, the Court's decision is tragic. The 
Court deprives them of a program that offers a meaningful 
chance at success in life, and it does so on the untenable the-
ory that public schoolteachers (most of whom are of different 
faiths than their students) are likely to start teaching religion 
merely because they have walked across the threshold of a 
parochial school. I reject this theory and the analysis in 
Meek v. Pittenger on which it is based. I cannot close my 
eyes to the fact that, over almost two decades, New York's 
public schoolteachers have helped thousands of impoverished 
parochial schoolchildren to overcome educational disad-
vantages without once attempting to inculcate religion. 
Their praiseworthy efforts have not eroded and do not 
threaten the religious liberty assured by the Establishment 
Clause. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals 
should be reversed. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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Aguilar v. Felton 
Secretary, United States Department of Education v. 
Felton 
Chancellor of the Board of Education v. Felton 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
Under the guise of protecting Americans from the evils of an 
Established Church such as those of the Eighteenth Century and 
earlier times, today's decision will deny countless schoolchil-
dren desperately needed remedial teaching services funded under 
Title I. The program at issue covers remedial reading, reading 
skills, remedial mathematics, English as a second language, and 
assistance for children needing special help in the learning 
process. The "remedial reading" portion of this program, for 
example, reaches children who suffer from dyslexia, a disease 
known to be difficult to diagnose and treat. Many of these chil-
dren now will not receive the special training they need, simply 
because their parents desire that they attend religiously affili-
ated schools. 
What is disconcerting about the result reached today is 
that, in the face of the human cost entailed by this decision, 
the Court does not even attempt to identify any threat to reli-
gious liberty posed by the operation of Title I. I share JUSTICE 
WHITE's concern that the Court's obsession with the criteria 
identified in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1971), has led to 
results that are "contrary to the long-range interests of the 
country," post, at 2. As I wrote in Wallace v. Jaffree, u.s. 
__ , -- (1985) (dissenting opinion), "our responsibility is not 
to apply tidy formulas by rote; our duty is to determine whether 
Page 2 
the statute or practice at issue is a step towaro establishing a 
state religion." Federal programs designed to prevent a genera-
tion of children from growing up without being able to read ef-
fectively are not remotely steps in that direction. It borders 
on paranoia to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Bish-
op of Rome lurking behind programs that are just as vital to the 
nation's schoolchildren as textbooks, see generally Board of Edu-
cation v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236 (1968), transportation to and from 
school, see generally Everson v. Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1 
(1947), and school nursing services. 
On the merits of this case, I disse·1t for the reasons stated 
in my separate opinion in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 (1975). 
We have frequently recognized that some interaction between 
church and state is unavoidable, and that an attempt to eliminate 
all contact between the two would be both futile and undesirable. 
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
u.s. 306, 312 (195'2), stated: 
"The First Amendment ••• does not say that in every and all 
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State . 
•.. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each 
other --hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly." 
The Court today fails to demonstrate how the interaction occa-
sioned by the program at issue presents any threat to the values 
underlying the Establishment Clause. 
I cannot join in striking down a program that, in the words 
of the Court of Appeals, "has done so much good and little, if 
any, detectable harm." 739 F.2d 48, 72 (CA2 1984). The notion 
that denying these services to students in religious schools is a 
neutral act to protect us from an Established Church has no sup-
Page 3 
port in logic, experience, or history. Rather than showing the 
neutrality the Court boasts of, it exhibits nothing less than 
hostility toward religion and the children who attend church-
sponsored schools. 
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Church and State Again 
Attorney General Edwin Meese and the Secretary of Education, william Bennett, bave blasted Unseeml 
the Supreme Court for four recent Y 
decisions upholding the riaid separa-· responses to. 4 
tion of church and state. Maybe they 
Et~ J.::U~ ~on~ Court rulings 
Mr. Bennett said be found it bard to 
understadd the court's "fastidious 
.dladaln for rellgiOil." state. In all four cases, the court went · 
Mr. Meese complained tbat the against the Reagan Administration's 
First Amendment, wblch the court advice and the two officials were un-
wu interpreting, was ,intended only derstandably upset by the results; 
''to problbit reUgious tyranny, not to but tbat doesn't justify ignoring the 
undermine religion generally." real danger cited by Justice Powell. 
But the court didn't "undermine" This Administration, in fact, seems 
religion or show "fastidious disdain\' continually entangled in volatile 
for it. In two of the cases, it ruled un- church-state issues. Conservative 
constitutional certain forms oC tax fundamentalists, many talking of a 
IIUbsidies for parochial schools; in the "Christian nation," participated 
other two it found <tbat the First heavily in the re-election of the Presi-
Ameodment's ban on an "establlsb- dent. Mr. Reagan himself appeared 
ment ,of religion" bad been violated to be making a religious appeal in a 
by a Connecticut law giving workers political campaign when be sug-
a right to a weekly Sabbath day off, gested at a prayer breakfast tbat 
and by an Alabama law providing for those without religion might also be 
a moment of "vollmtary prayer" in without a "sense of moral obliga-
the public schools. tion." 
Justice Powell, concurring in one of The Administration has relent-
the ~I cases, pointed to lessly pushed for a constitutional 
·what be believed was a "considerable amendment permitting organized 
risk of continuing political strife" prayer in the schools; and had sup. 
over state aid to religious schools. ported with open enthusiasm all the 
"The risk of political divisiveness" state statutes and programs the Su-
that might "strain the political sys- preme Court ruled unconstitutional in 
~·"be wrote, was an "additional" the four disputed cases. 
l'8asOII. for strict adherence to the con- Mr. Meese told the American Bar 
r.tltutional separatioli of church and Association tbat the Supreme Court, 
state. in those four decisions, had Jll&de 
Mr. Meese and ,Mr. Bennett risked "policy choices" rather than basing 
stirring up just tbat ldDd of strife and ·tts rulings on constitutional princi-
divisiveness by 8fiUlnl tbat the court . pies. That's a peculiar charge against 
bad ruled against reUaion rather tban a court six of whose nine justices 
for the separation · of c:hurch and , were appointed as strfct construction-
ists by Presidents Nixon, Ford and 
Reagan;,it's also unseemly. Differing 
with a ruling is one tblng; for an At-
torney General to characterize the · 
Supreme Court a:s acting politically 
rather than judicially is quite an-
, other. 
Justice Rebnqulst, predictably dis-
senting down the line, took another 
tack. 1be court, be wrote in the Ala-
bama case, was ignoring the intent of 
the framers of the Bill of Rights, 
wbich was only to prevent one reli-
gion from being preferred over an-
other - not to require neutrality be-
tween religion and what the Justice 
called "irreUgion." 
But it's not easy to determine two 
centuries later what the framers' pre-
cise purpose was, or its limits. Jus-
tice Rebnqulst himself complained 
tbat the records of debate on the reli-
gion clause of the First Amendment 
in the House of Representatives 
"does not seem .particularly illumi-
nating." And anyway, to hold a 
present~y court to the narrow bls-
torical standard of 18th-century in-
tent - even if indisputably estab-
lished -would be to put the Constitu-
tion in a straitjacket. 
As Justice' Sandra Day O'Connor 
pointed out, for instance, there were 
no public schools when the First 
Amendment was written. How could 
the framers bilve had specific intent 
toward sometblng that didn't exist? 
And even if those who wrote the First 
Amendment did have equality among 
religious sects primarily in mind, 
that doesn't and shouldn't mean tbat 
their obvious larger intent - to guar-
antee religious Uberty- can't be in-
terpreted today to pl'Otect "irreli-
gion" too. 0 ; 
', 
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July 17, 1985 
David 0. Maxwell 
Chairman of the Board and 
Chief Executive Officer 
Justice Lewis Powell 
550 N Street, sw 
Washington, DC 20024 




l { FannieMae 
I have never known whether it was proper to comment 
on the decisions of the Supreme Court from a 
personal standpoint, but if not, I hope you will 
forgive me for writing to express my gratitude 
for your position in the recent cases involving 
the separation of church and state in this country. 
I have always felt that religion should be a 
private affair, lest we risk the consequences 
of that divisiveness and strife of which you 
wrote so eloquently in your opinion. 
Joan joins me in sending warmest regards to you 
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2. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 
ante, p. __ , holding that the aid to parochial schools 
involved there violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. I write to emphasize additional reasons 
why precedents of this Court require us to invalidate 
these two educational programs that concededly have "done 
so much good and little, if any, detectable harm." Felton 
v. Secretary, United States Department of Education, 739 
F. 2d 48, 72 (CA2 1984) • The Court has previously 
recognized the inimitable value that parochial schools can 
provide: 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from . their 
sectarian purpose, have provided an educational 
' ; 
I'·' I 
alternative for millions of young Americans; 
they often afford wholesome competition with our 
public schools; and in some States they relieve 
substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, 
moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating 
education of the highest quality for all 
children within its boundaries, whatever school 
their parents have chosen for them." 
3. 
- 1 
~ing Wolman v. Walter, 
concurring in part, 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting 
concurring 
in par~ . 
Regrettably, however, the Title I and Grand Rapids 
~ 
programs do not survive ) OtH' stril't'je~ 
Establishment Clause scrutin~ 
74!~"'" ~.h., ~ Ca..-{.~4... 
I agree with the Court that in this case the 
Establishment Clause is violated because there is too 
great a risk of government entanglement in the 
administration of the religious schools; the same is true 
in Ball, ante. As beneficial as the Title I program 
appears to be in accomplishing its secular goal of 
4. 
supplementing the education of deprived children, its 
elaborate structure, the participation of public school 
teachers, and the government surveillance required to 
ensure that public funds are used only for secular 
purposes inevitably present a serious risk of excessive 
entanglement. Our cases have noted that "' [t] he State 
must be certain, given the Religio~ Clauses, that 
subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.'" Meek v. 
421 u.s. 349, 371 (1975) (emphasis added ~ 
quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 619 (197l) r. 
This is true whether the subsidized teachers are religious 
school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers 
teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at 
the parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the 
unanimous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of 
5. 
our cases. He correctly observed that the structure of 
the Title I program required the active and extensive 
nd- if 
surveillance wlH:-etr the City has provided, and) "under Meek, 
this very surveillance constitutes excessive entanglement 
even if it has succeeded in preventing the fostering of 
religion." 739 F.2d, at 66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the 
additional risk of political entanglement stemming from 
the aid to religion at issue here. I do not suggest that 
at this point in our history the Title I program or 
similar parochial aid plans could result in the 
establishment of a state religion. There likewise is 
o"' IJ ? '?J([c 
small chance that these programs wf!? result in sig ~cant 
religious or denominational control over our democratic 
~) oct-




(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, 
there remains a significant risk of continuing political 
strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious 
schools and the proper allocation of limited amounts. of (" 
governmental resources. As this Court has repeatedly 
recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there 
will be competition and strife among them and others to 
gain, maintain, or increase the financial support of 
government. ~., Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 796-797 (1973): Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
supra, 403 u.s., at 623. In states such as New York 
~ 
that have large and varied sectarian populations, it is a 
""" c~~~ 





decision to aid parochial schools. 
private schools, are under increasing financial pressure 
to meet real and perceived needs. Thus, any proposal to 
extend direct governmental aid to parochial schools ~ 
"C.:s-4_; 
is likely to spark political disagreement from taxpayers 
who support the public schools, as well as from non-
recipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed funds 
are being diverted from them. In short, aid to parochial 
schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to 
"that kind and degree of government involvement in 
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead 
to strife and frequently strain a political system to the 
breaking point." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 






opinion does not discuss it at length, see ante, at 12, 
the potential for such divisiveness is a strong additional 
reason for holding that the Title I and Grand Rapids 
programs are invalid on entanglement grounds. 
The Title I program at issue in this case also would be 
invalid under the "effects" prong 
As has been ~ Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra. 1 
discussed~~te, at 18-23, with respect to the 
'\ 
Grand Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New 
York by the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of 
the parochial schools by relieving those schools of the 
1 Nothing that I say here should be construed as 
suggesting that a court inevitably must determine whether 
all three prongs of the Lemon test have been violated. 
See,~., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 
u.s. 756, 794 (1973}. I discuss an additional infirmity 
of the programs at issue in these cases only to emphasize 
why even a beneficial program may be invalid because of 
the way it is structured. 
9. 
1'·' 
duty to provide the remedial and supplemental education 
their children require. This is not the type of "indirect 
and incidental effect beneficial to [the] religious 
institutions" that we suggested in Nyquist would survive 
Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 u.s., at 775. Rather, 
by directly assuming part of the parochial schools' 
Ctl ? 
education ./ function, the effect of the Title I aid is 
"inevitably • • to subsidize and advance the religious 
mission of [the] sectarian schools," id., at 779-780, 
even though the program provides that only secular 
subjects will be taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 
the secular education these schools provide goes "'hand in 
\Y 
han{ with the religious mission that is the reason for 
the schools' existence. 421 u.s., at 366) lu:ting Lemon 




Because of the predominantly religious nature of the 
schools, the substantial aid provided by the Title I 
program "inescapably results in the direct and substantial 
advancement of religious activity " v. Pittenger, 
supra, at 366. 
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments 
are placed by the interaction of the "effects" and 
entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions 
~ ~- require governments extending aid to parochial schools to 
~ :tu..._ ..__.,. _..,c,a~ 
;__ . LJ. /._, .A.-- tread an · extremely narrow line between being certain ..JI.sJ--rv ~ K""I .ff...t. o...:ol- /\ 
~ ~r- f.!J-IW._'V~i~ ovp-n·~ ~ .,/~ ~t-n.,._J.o~ ~1'-.----_, 
• ~ SQC{:i lar and Hot religiotl~ goals are being fo~teree;:y aAd 
~~ • I. ___ v.ly'b...,.._J AJ- ' 1 :J... ~ ) 
w~ L~b~, ., _ 
--/ lavoiding excessive entanglement. 
J ~ -t-'1~--~­
Nonetheless, the Court 
/-.c) ~- ... 
It~
has never foreclosed the possibility that some types of 
~ -- aid to parochial schools could be valid under 
~r~f ~ a.i-
~~ Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Alle~~~~- ==:; 
~~-~~ -y ~~~~~4.J 
the 
~- J ~9r?s~ . 
~ c:::::~  -- -- ..J.- "--~ ~~-_J -
a..-' --~ ----------~ a...._ 
J 




~198 3 ~  at 306;? . Our cases have upheld 
evenhanded secular assistance to both parochial and public 
school children in some areas. ~·, id. (tax deductions 
for educational expenses): Board of Education v. Allen, 
392 u.s. 236 ( 1968) (provision of secular textbooks) : 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1 (194 7) 
(reimbursements for bus fare to school). I do not read 
the Court's opinion as precluding these types of indirect 
aid to parochial schools. In the cases cited, the 
assistance programs made funds available equally to public 
and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The 
constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated 
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to 
be administered in significant part by public school 
teachers within parochial schools--resulting in both the 
· .. 
12. 
advancement of religion and forbidden entanglement. If, 
for example, Congress could fa hi on an evenhanded 
~ ~- financial assistance program to both 








of Titl \ -:;.;;;d i' 
be administered by the schools themselve~ ~cause its 
t.--~~~~~ · ~~ 7 
/\ benefits cGu lsv~ rom secular purpos:s J we ' 
would be presented with a different question. 
~  
~ 4 4 J~ I join the opinions and judgments of the ~ourt. 
~~~ .. ~? 
~t·~   .~ U_z_ 
~ 9 r ;7"1~1~1-~ ~ 
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'•. 
2. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 
ante, p. __ , holding that the aid to parochial schools 
involved there violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. I write to emphasize additional reasons 
why precedents of this Court require us to invalidate 
these two educational programs that concededly have "done 
so much good and little, if any, detectable harm." Felton 
v. Secretary, United States Department of Education, 739 
F. 2d 48, 72 (CA2 1984) • The Court has previously 
recognized the inimitable value that parochial schools can 
provide: 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their 





alternative for millions of young Americans; 
they often afford wholesome competition with our 
public schools; and in some States they relieve 
substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, 
moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating 
education of the highest quality for all 
children within its boundaries, whatever school 
their parents have chosen for them." 
3. 
Mueller v. Allen, u.s. __ , (1983) (quoting Wolman 
v. Walter, 433 u.s. 229, 262 (1977) (POWELL, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part)). Regrettably, however, the Title 
I and Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny 
required by our Establishment Clause cases. 
I agree with the Court that in this case the 
Establishment Clause is violated because there is too 
great a risk of government entanglement in the 
administration of the religious schools; the same is true 
in Ball, ante. As beneficial as the Title I program 





supplementing the education of deprived children, its 
elaborate structure, the participation of public school 
teachers, and the government surveillance required to 
ensure that public funds are used only for secular 
purposes inevitably present a serious risk of excessive 
entanglement. Our cases have noted that "• [t] he State 
must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that 
subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.'" Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349, 371 (1975) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 619 (1971)). 
This is true whether the subsidized teachers are religious 
school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers 
teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at 
the parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the 





our cases. He correctly observed that the structure of 
the Title I program required the active and extensive 
surveillance that the City has provided, and, "under Meek, 
this very surveillance constitutes excessive entanglement 
even if it has succeeded in preventing the fostering of 
religion." 739 F.2d, at 66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the 
additional risk of political entanglement stemming from 
the aid to religion at issue here. I do not suggest that 
at this point in our history the Title I program or 
similar parochial aid plans could result in the 
establishment of a state religion. There likewise is 
small chance that these programs would result in 
significant religious or denominational control over our 
democratic processes. See Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 263 
6. 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, 
there remains a significant risk of continuing political 
strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious 
schools and the proper allocation of limited governmental 
resources. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, there 
is a likelihood whenever direct governmental aid is 
extended to some groups that there will be competition and 
strife among them and others to gain, maintain, or 
increase the financial support of government. ~., 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 
796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 u.s., at 
623. In states such as New York that have large and 
varied sectarian populations, one can be assured that 
politics will enter into any state decision to aid 
7. 
parochial schools. Public schools, as well as private 
schools, are under increasing f inane ial pressure to meet 
real and perceived needs. Thus, any proposal to extend 
direct governmental aid to parochial schools alone is 
likely to spark political disagreement from taxpayers who 
support the public schools, as well as from non-recipient 
sectarian groups, who may fear that needed funds are being 
diverted from them. In short, aid to parochial schools of 
the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that kind and 
degree of government involvement in religious life that, 
as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and 
frequently strain a political system to the breaking 
point." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 694 (1970) 
(opinion of Harlan, J.) • Although the Court's opinion 
does not discuss it at length, see ante, at 11, the 
8. 
potential for such divisiveness is a strong additional 
reason for holding that the Title I and Grand Rapids 
programs are invalid on entanglement grounds. 
The Title I program at issue in this case also would be 
invalid under the "effects" prong of the test adopted in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra. 1 As has been discussed 
thoroughly in Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the 
Grand Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New 
York by the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of 
the parochial schools by relieving those schools of the 
duty to provide the remedial and supplemental education 
their children require. This is not the type of "indirect 
and incidental effect beneficial to [the] religious 
institutions" that we suggested in Nyquist would survive 
Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 u.s., at 775. Rather, 
9. 
by directly assuming part of the parochial schools' 
education function, the effect of the Title I aid is 
.. inevitably . . to subsidize and advance the religious 
miss ion of [the) sec tar ian schools, n id., at 779-780, 
even though the program provides that only secular 
subjects will be taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 
the secular education these schools provide goes "'hand in 
hand'" with the religious mission that is the reason for 
the schools' existence. 421 u.s., at 366 (quoting Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.}}. 
Because of the predominantly religious nature of the 
schools, the substantial aid provided by the Title I 
program "inescapably results in the direct and substantial 
advancement of religious activity." Meek v. Pittenger, 




I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments 
are placed by the interaction of the "effects" and 
entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions 
require governments extending aid to parochial schools to 
tread an extremely narrow line between being certain that 
the "principal or primary effect" of the aid is not to 
advance religion, Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612, and 
avoiding excessive entanglement. Nonetheless, the Court 
has never foreclosed the poss ibi 1 i ty that some types of 
aid to parochial schools could be valid under the 
Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, supra, at 
Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular assistance to 
both parochial and public school children in some areas. 
~., id. (tax deductions for educational expenses); Board 
of Education v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236 (1968) (provision of 
I 
)'.' 
secular textbooks): Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
u.s. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to school). I 
do not read the Court's opinion as precluding these types 
of indirect aid to parochial schools. In the cases cited, 
the assistance programs made funds available equally to 
public and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The 
constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated 
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to 
be administered in significant part by public school 
teachers within parochial schools--resulting in both the 
advancement of religion and forbidden entanglement. If, 
for example, Congress could fashion an evenhanded 
financial assistance program to both public and private 
schools for the laudable purposes of Title I that could be 
administered in the private schools without governmental 
supervision, but in such a way as to prevent those schools 
from diverting the aid from secular purposes, we would be 
presented with a different question. 
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1Nothing that I say here should be construed as 
suggesting that a court inevitably must determine whether 
all three prongs of the Lemon test have been violated. 
See,~., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 
u.s. 756, 794 (1973). I discuss an additional infirmity 
of the programs at issue in these cases only to emphasize 
why even a beneficial program may be invalid because of 
the way it is structured • 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 
ante, p. __ , holding that the aid to parochial schools 
involved there violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. I write to emphasize additional reasons 
~~~c::..L~ffu-j~~fl£~ J-t-L-
j w~~~~~~~~~·~~ to invalidate these two eaucational 
programs that concededly "done so much good and 
little, if any, detectable harm." Felton v. Secretary, 
United States Department of Education, 739 F.2d 48, 72 
(CA2 1984) • 1 
a~ 
1 Nothing that I say here should b~ construed as 
suggesting that a court us inevitably ~rtermine whether 
all three prongs of the Lemon test h v been violated. 
See, ~., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 
u.s. 756, 794 (1973). I discuss ...-v~ese additional 
infirmi ti-~.PI"' of the programs at issue in these cases only 





I agree ~ that in this case the Establishment Clause is 
violated because there is too great a risk of government 
entanglement in the administration of the religious 
schools; the same is true in Ball, ante. As beneficial as 
the Title 1 programl\u~~s:1n~omplishing its J 
secular goal of supplementing the education of deprived ~ 
~ ~~4~;.. 
structure 1\ and 1: surveillance 
~
children, the elaborate 
required to ensure that public funds are used only for 
loU;~ 
secular purposes inevitably presents tee-~t a risk of 
,AI 
~~~ 





be must certain, given the Religious 
Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate 
,. 
religion.'" Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349, 371 (1975) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 
619 (1911)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers 
'• 
4. 
are religious school teachers, as in Lemon, public 
school teachers teaching secular subjects to par chial 
school children at the parochial schools. ~ Jud e 
) ~J;:1;1fen-'-~ ~7~~ 
Friendl~osse£ved, because of the structure of the Title I 
program, "there must be the active and extensive 
surveillance which the City has provided, and, under Meek, 
this very surveillance constitutes excessive entanglement 
even if it has succeeded in preventing the fostering of 
religion." 739 F.2d, at 66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the 
additional risk of political entanglement stemming from 
J ~ ?-1.-.-,/ ~1~ ft.. I 
the aid to religion at issue here.~t this point in our ~ 
similar parochial aid 
establishment of a state 
the Title I program, or 
~ 




chance that these programs will result in signficant 
religious or denominational control over our democratic 
processes. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U~S. 229, 263 (1977) 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, 
there remains a significant risk of continuing political 
strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious 
schools and the proper allocation of limited amounts of 
governmental resources. As this Court has repeatedly 
recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there 
will be competition and strife among them and others to 
gain > ~ 
47'-~ ~ t. 
maintain f\ t~ support of government. ~., 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 
796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 u.s., at 
6. 
623. In states such as New York that have large and 
varied sectarian populations, it is a virtual certainty 
that politics will enter into any state decision to aid 
parochial schools. Moreover, in these days of fiscal 
uncertainty, public schools, as well as private schools, 
are under increasing financial 
, ' 
1\r~e. Thus, any proposal to extend direct 
~~ 
governmental aid to parochial schools wi:U ~ "" likely to 
spark political disagreement from taxpayers who support 
the public schools, as well as from non-recipient 
sectarian groups, who may fear that needed funds are being 
diverted from them. In short, aid to parochial schools of 
the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that kind and 
degree of government involvement in religious life that, 
I ( l as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and 
... 
7. 
strain a political system to the breaking 
point." alz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 694 (1970) 
(opinion o~arlan, J. ) • The potential for such 





that the Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid. 
I wish to emph~size as well that he Title I program at 
in this case would also be invalid under the 
prong of the test set forth in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra. As has been thoroughly discussed in 
Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the Grand Rapids 
programs, the type of aid provided in New York by the 
Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of the 
parochial schools by relieving those schools of the duty 
to provide the remedial and supplemental education their 
children require. This is not the type of "indirect and 
8. 
incidental effect beneficial to [the) religious 
institutions" that we suggested in Nyquist would survive 
Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 u.s., at 775. Rather, 
by directly assuming part of the parochial schools' 
education function, the effect of the Title I aid is 
"inevitably . . to subsidize and advance the religious 
mission of [the) sec tar ian schools," id., at 779-780, 
even though the program provides that only secular 
subjects will be taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 
the secular education these schools provide goes "'hand in 
hand" with the religious mission that is the reason for 
the schools' existence. 421 u.s., at 366 (quoting Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.)}. 
Because of the predominantly religious nature of the 






program "inescapably results in the direct and substantial 
advancement of religious activity." Meek v. Pittenger, 
supra, at 366. 
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments 
are placed by the interaction of the "effects" and 
entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions 
require government aid to parochial schools to tread an 
'Q extremely narrow line between being certain religion is 
fostered and avoiding excessive entanglement. 
Nonetheless, the Court has never foreclosed the 
possibility that aid to parochial schools could be valid 
under the Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 
u.s. __ , (1983) [103 s.ct., at 3065). Our cases have 
upheld evenhanded secular assistance to both parochial and 
public school children in some areas. ~., id. (tax 
10. 
,I J 
deductions for educational expenses); Board of Education 
v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236 1968) (provision of secular 
textbooks); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1 
(1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to school). I do not 
~~ fy)J ~t 
read the Court's opinion as precluding '"icl-1 aid to 
parochial schools. }If Congress could fashion an 
evenhanded assistance program whose benefits could not be 
diverted from secular purposes, it might well be valid 
under the Establishment Clause. / 
""" 
/ 
The Court has previously recognized the inimitable 
value that parochial schools can provide: 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their 
sectarian purpose, have provided an educational 
alternative for millions of young Americans; 
they often afford wholesome competition with our 
public schools; and in some States they relieve 
substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, 
moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating 
education of the highest quality for all 
children within its boundaries, whatever school 
their parents have chosen for them." 
11. 
Mueller v. Allen, supra, at (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 
supra, at 262 (POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)). 
Regrettably, the Title 1 and Grand Rapids programs do not 
survive our necessarily stringent Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. 
1 join the opinions and judgments of the Court. 
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2. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
1 concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 
ante, p. __ , holding that the aid to parochial schools 
involved there violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. 1 write to emphasize additional reasons 
why we are constrained to invalidate these two educational 
programs that have concededly "done so much good and 
little, if any, detectable harm." Felton v. Secretary, 
United States Department of Education, 739 F.2d 48, 72 
(CA2 1984) • 1 
1 Nothing that 1 say here should be construed as 
suggesting that a court must inevitably determine whether 
all three prongs of the Lemon test have been violated. 
See, ~., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 
u.s. 756, 794 (1973). 1 discuss these additional 
infirmities of the programs at issue in these cases only 
to emphasize why such beneficial programs must be 
invalidated. 
the Establishment Clause is violated because there is too 
great a risk of government entanglement in 
L ---#\e. t;QJ))e. Is 4--u.e U-v ~, ~ ~ · 
.the 
) 
administration of the religious schools~ JL As beneficial as 
the Title I program undoubtedlY, is in accomplishing its 
secular goal of supplementing the education of deprived 
children, the elaborate structure and surveillance 
required to ensure that public funds are used only for 
secular purposes inevitably presents too great a risk of 
excessive entanglement. As we have repeatedly noted, 
••[t)he State must be certain, given the Religious 
Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate 
religion.•• Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349, 371 (1975) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 
619 (1971)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers 
4. 
are religious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public 
school teachers teaching secular subjects to parochial 
school children at the parochial schools. As Judge 
Friendly observed, because of the structure of the Title I 
program, "there must be the active and extensive 
surveillance which the City has provided, and, under Meek, 
this very surveillance constitutes excessive entanglement 
even if it has succeeded in preventing the fostering of 
religion." 739 F.2d, at 66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the 
additional risk of political entanglement stemming from 
the aid to religion at issue here. At this point in our 
history there is little risk that the Title I program, or 
similar parochial aid plans, will result in the 
establishment of a state religion; there is likewise small 
s. 
chance that these programs will result in signficant 
religious or denominational control over our democratic 
processes. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 u.s. 229, 263 (1977) 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, 
there remains a significant risk of continuing political 
strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious 
schools and the proper allocation of limited amounts of 
governmental resources. As this Court has repeatedly 
recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there 
will be competition and strife among them and others to 
gain or maintain the support of government. ~., 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 
796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 u.s., at 
6. 
623. In states such as New York that have large and 
varied sec tar ian populations, it is a virtual certainty 
that politics will enter into any state decision to aid 
parochial schools. Moreover, in these days of fiscal 
uncertainty, public schools, as well as private schools, 
are under increasing financial pressure to stay afloat and 
remain effective. Thus, any proposal to extend direct 
governmental aid to parochial schools will be likel'y to 
spark political disagreement from taxpayers who support 
the public schools, as well as from non-recipient 
sectarian groups, who may fear that needed funds are being 
diverted from them. In short, aid to parochial schools of 
the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that kind and 
degree of government involvement in religious life that, 
as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and 
7. 
frequently strain a political system to the breaking 
point." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 694 (1970) 
(opinion of Harlan, J.) • The potential for such 
divisiveness is a strong additional reason for holding 
that the Title 1 and Grand Rapids programs are invalid. 
1 wish to emphasize as well that the Title 1 program at 
issue in this case would also be invalid under the 
"effects" prong of the test set forth in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra. As has been thoroughly discussed in 
Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the Grand Rapids 
programs, the type of aid provided in New York by the 
Title 1 program amounts to a state subsidy of the 
• 
parochial schools by relieving those schools of the duty 
to pr,ovide the remedial and supplemental education their 
children require. This is not the type of "indirect and 
8. 
incidental effect beneficial to [the] religious 
institutions" that we suggested in Nyquist would survive 
Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 u.s., at 775. Rather, 
by directly assuming part of the parochial schools' 
education function, the effect of the Title I aid is 
"inevitably • • to subsidize and advance the religious 
mission of [the 1 sec tar ian schools," id., at 779-7 80, 
even though the program provides that only secular 
subjects will be taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 
the secular education these schools provide goes "'hand in 
hand" with the religious mission that is the reason for 
the schools' existence. 421 u.s., at 366 (quoting Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.)). 
Because of the predominantly religious nature of the 
schools, the substantial aid provided by the Title I 
9. 
program "inescapably results in the direct and substantial 
advancement of religious activity." Meek v. Pittenger, 
supra, at 366. 
1 recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments 
are placed by the interaction of the "effects" and 
entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions 
require government aid to parochial schools to tread an 
extremely narrow line between being certain religion is 
not fostered and avoiding excessive entanglement. 
Nonetheless, the Court has 
possibility thF parochial 
under the Establishment Clause. 
never foreclosed the 
schools could be valid 
Mueller v. Allen, 
~ l u.s._, 
~\~ upheld evenhanded secular assistance to both parochial and 
(1983) [103 s.ct., at 30651. Our cases have 
'r( %>' public school children in some areas. 
'\ ~ ., ) 
,' \) 
l~ 
~., id. (tax 
10. 
deductions fo r educational expenses) ~ Board of Education 
v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236 1968) (provision of secular 
textbooks)~ Everson v. Board of Education, 330 u.s. 1 
(194 7) (reimbursements for bus fare to school). I do not 
L~ ~~a...4Lo ) 
read the Court • s opinionA as holding that T'i t i e I i s 9-
. 
rf~a~cTt~ant11~yr--tnn~v~aTl~i~d~.--~t~~or --dnno~e~s~~iH~ precludJ[1all aid to 
parochial schools. If Congress could fashion an 
evenhanded assistance program whose benefits could not be 
diverted from secular purposes, it might well be valid 
under the Establishment Clause. 
The Court has previously recognized the inimitable 
value that parochial schools ca~ provide: 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their 
sectarian purpose, have provided an educational 
alternative for millions of young Americans~ 
they often afford wholesome competition with our 
public schools~ and in some States they relieve 
substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, 
moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating 
educat'ion· of the highest quality for all 
children within its boundaries, whatever school 
their parents have chosen for them." 
11. 
Mueller v. Allen, supra, at (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 
supra, at 262 (POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)). 
Regrettably, the Title 1 and Grand Rapids programs do not 
survive our necessarily stringent Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. 
1 join the opinions and judgments of the Court. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Jus tic~ White 
Justice Marshall 
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I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, ante, 
p. --, holding that the aid to parochial schools involved 
~ violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. I write to emphasize additional reasons why prece-
dents of this Court require us to invalidate these two educa-
tional programs that concededly have "done so much good 
and little, if any, detectable harm." Felton v. Secretary, ·'·<'4.-s. c L T:c-
United States Department of Education, 739 F. 2d ~48, 72 
(CA2 1984). The Court has previously recognized the T- ~~ 
itftble value that parochial schools CQil r de:  ~ 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian pur-
pose, have provided an educational alternative for mil-
2. 
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lions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome 
competition with our public schools; and in some States 
they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a 
legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest 
quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever 
school their parents have chosen for them." 
Mueller v. Allen,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (quoting Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) (POWELL, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dis-
senting in part)). Regrettably, however, the Title I and 
Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny required 
by our Establishment Clause cases. 
I agree with the Court that in this case the Establishment 
Clause is violated because there is too great a risk of govern-
ment entanglement in the administration of the religious 
schools; the same is true in Ball, ante. As beneficial as the 
Title I program appears to be in accomplishing its secular 
goal of supplementing the education of deprived children, its 
elaborate structure, the participation of public school teach-
ers, and the government surveillance required to ensure that 
public funds are used only for secular purposes inevitably 
present a serious risk of excessive entanglement. Our cases 
have noted that "'[t]he State must be certain, given the Reli-
gion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate reli-
gion."' Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 371 (1975) (empha-
sis added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 
(1971)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers are re-
ligious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers 
teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at the 
parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the unani-
mous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of our 
cases. He correctly observed that the structure of the Title 
I program required the active and extensive surveillance that 
. '. 
'I 
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the City has provided, and, "under Meek, this very surveil-
lance constitutes excessive entanglement even if it has suc-
ceeded in preventing the fostering of religion." 739 F. 2d, at 
66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the additional 
risk of political eat~emeat stemming from the aid to reli-
gion at issue here. do not suggest that at this point in our 
history the Title I program or similar parochial aid plans 
could result in the establishment of a state religion. There 
likewise is small chance that these programs would result in 
significant religious or denominational control over our demo-
cratic processes. See Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 263 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, there remains 
a significant risk of continuing political strife over the propri-
ety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation 
of limited governmental resources. As this Court has re-
peatedly recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there will 
be competition and strife among them and others to gain, 
maintain, or increase the financial support of government. 
E. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., 
at 623. In states such as New York that have large and var-
ied sectarian populations, one can be assured that politics will 
enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools. Public 
schools, as well as private schools, are under increasing fi-
nancial pressure to meet real and perceived needs. Thus, 
any proposal to extend direct governmental aid to parochial 
schools alone is likely to spark political disagreement from 
taxpayers who support the public schools, as well as from 
non-recipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed 
funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to paro-
chial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that 
kind and degree of government involvement in religious life 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-239-CONCUR 
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that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and fre-
quently strain a political system to the breaking point." 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion 
of Harlan, J.). Although the Court's opinion does not dis-
cuss it at length, see ante, at 11, the potential for such divi-
siveness is a strong additional reason for holding that the 
Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entangle-
ment grounds. . 
The Title I program at issue in this case also would be 
invalid under the "effects" prong of the test adopted in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra.* As has been discussed thor-
oughly in Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the Grand 
Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New York by 
the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of the paro-
chial schools by relieving those schools of the duty to provide 
the remedial and supplemental education their children re-
quire. This is not the type of "indirect and incidental effect 
beneficial to [the] religious institutions" that we suggested in 
Nyquist would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 
U. S., at 775. Rather, by directly assuming part of the pa-
rochial schools' education function, the effect of the Title I aid 
is "inevitably . . . to subsidize and advance the religious mis-
sion of [the] sectarian schools," id., at 779-780, even though 
the program provides that only secular subjects will be 
taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the secular educa-
tion these schools provide goes "'hand in hand'" with the reli-
gious mission that is the reason for ~the schools' existence. 
421 U. S., at 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.)). Because of the predominantly 
religious nature of the schools, the substantial aid provided 
*Nothing that I say here should be construed as suggesting that a court 
inevitably must determine whether all three prongs of the Lemon test have 
been violated. See, e. g. , Committee far Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 794 (1973). I discuss an additional infirmity of the pro-
grams at issue in these cases only to emphasize why even a beneficial pro-
gram may be invalid because of the way it is structured. 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-23~CONCUR 
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by the Title I program "inescapably results in the direct and 
substantial advancement of religious activity." Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 366. 
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are 
placed by the interaction of the "effects" and entanglement 
prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions require govern-
ments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an ex-
tremely narrow line between being certain that the "principal 
or primary effect" of the aid is not to advance religion, Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612, and avoiding excessive entangle-
ment. Nonetheless, the Court has never foreclosed the pos-
sibility that some types of aid to parochial schools could be 
valid under the Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 
supra, at --. Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular 
assistance to both parochial and public school children in 
some areas. E. g., id. (tax deductions for educational ex-
penses); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) 
(provision of secular textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to 
school). I do not read the Court's opinion as precluding 
these types of indirect aid to parochial schools. In the cases 
cited, the assistance programs made funds available equally 
to public and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The 
constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated 
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to be ad-
ministered in significant part by public school teachers within 
parochial schools-resulting in both the advancement of reli-
gion and forbidden entanglement. (g for example, Congress 
could fashion an evenhanded financial assistance program to 
both public and private schools for the laudable purposes of 
Title. I that could be administered in the private schools with-
out governmental supervision, but in such a way as to pre-
vent those schools from diverting the aid from secular pur-
poses, we would be presented with a different question] 
I join the opinions and judgments of the Court. 
,.-... 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
J usticye White 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, ante, 
p. --, holding that the aid to parochial schools involveQ..--~ ~ 
-.r----t~pe violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. I write to emphasize additional reasons why prece-
dents of this Court require us to invalidate these two educa-
tional programs that concededly have "done so much good 
and little, if any, detectable harm." Felton v. Secretary, 
United States Department of Education, 739 F . 2d 48, 72 
(CA2 1984). The Court has previously recognized the inim- ) j d~~ ~ 
itable value that parochial schools can provide: 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian pur-
pose, have provided an educational alternative for mil-
2 
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lions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome 
competition with our public schools; and in some States 
they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a 
legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest 
quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever 
school their parents have chosen for them." 
Mueller v. Allen,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (quoting Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) (POWELL, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dis-
senting in part)). Regrettably, however, the Title I and 
Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny required 
by our Establishment Clause cases. 
I agree with the Court that in this case the Establishment 
Clause is violated because there is too great a risk of govern-
ment entanglement in the administration of the religious 
schools; the same is true in Ball, ante. As beneficial as the 
Title I program appears to be in accomplishing its secular 
goal of supplementing the education of deprived children, its 
elaborate structure, the participation of public school teach-
ers, and the government surveillance required to ensure that 
public funds are used ~for secular purposes inevitably 
present a serious risk of excessive entanglement. Our cases 
have noted that "'[t]he State must be certain, given the Reli-
gion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate reli-
gion."' Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 371 (1975) (empha-
sis added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 
(1971)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers are re-
ligious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers 
teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at the 
parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the unani-
mous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of our 
cases. He correctly observed that the structure of the Title 
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the City has provided, and, "under Meek, this very surveil-
lance constitutes excessive entanglement even if it has suc-
ceeded in preventing the fostering of religion." 739 F. 2d, at 
66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the additional 
risk of political entanglement stemming from the aid to reli-
gion at issue here. I do not suggest that at this point in our 
history the Title I program or similar parochial aid plans 
could result in the establishment of a state religion. There 
likewise is small chance that these programs would result in 
significant religious or denominational control over our demo-
cratic processes. See Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 263 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, there remains 
a signjtieMt risk of continuing political strife over the propri-
ety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation 
of limited governmental resources. As this Court has re-
peatedly recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there will 
be competition and strife among them and others to gain, 
maintain, or increase the financial support of government. 
E. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., 
at 623. In states such as New York that have large and var- ~ ~ 
ied sectarian populations, one can be assured that politics will-..f --?~;;~ 
enter int~ state decision to aid parochial schools. Public _ ~ ~ 
schools, as well as private 1 chools, are under increasing fi- ) _ 
nancial pressure to meet real and perceived needs. Thus, ~ ~ .. 9 
any proposal to extend direct governmental aid to parochial "J c 
schools alone is likely to spark political disagreement from . t.vz.-t.( "' 
taxpayers who support the public schools, as well as from ~ t!J?(' _ 
non-recipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed ~k o 
funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to paro- t:_ ~ · / 
chial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that ~ j 
kind and degree of government involvement in religious life ~ ...e::.....f 
J:;S, 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-23~CONCUR 
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that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and fre-
quently strain a political system to the breaking point." 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion 
of Harlan, J.). Although the Court's opinion does not dis-
cuss it at length, see ante, at 11, the potential for such divi-
siveness is a strong additional reason for holding that the 
Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entangle-
ment grounds. . 
The Title I program at issue in this case also would be 
invalid under the "effects" prong of the test adopted in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra.* As has been discussed thor-
oughly in Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the Grand 
Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New York by 
the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of the paro-
chial schools by relieving those schools of the duty to provide 
the remedial and supplemental education their children re-
quire. This is not the type of "indirect and incidental effect 
beneficial to [the] religious institutions" that we suggested in 
Nyquist would survive Es~ablishment Clause scrutiny. 413 
U. S., at 775. Rather, by directly assuming part of the pa-
rochial schools' education function, the effect of the Title I aid 
is "inevitably ... to subsidize and advance the religious mis-
sion of [the] sectarian schools," id., at 779-780, even though 
the program provides that only secular subjects will be 
taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the secular educa-
tion these schools provide goes "'hand in hand'" with the reli-
gious mission that is the reason for ~the schools' existence. 
421 U. S., at 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.)). Because of the predominantly 
religious nature of the schools, the substantial aid provided 
*Nothing that I say here should be construed as suggesting that a court 
inevitably must determine whether all three prongs of the Lemon test have 
been violated. See, e. g., Committee jfYT' Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 794 (1973). I discuss an additional infirmity of the pro-
grams at issue in these cases only to emphasize why even a beneficial pro-
gram may be invalid because of the way it is structured. 
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by the Title I program "inescapably results in the direct and 
substantial advancement of religious activity." Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 366. 
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are 
placed by the interaction of the "effects" and entanglement 
prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions require govern-
ments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an ex-
tremely narrow line between being certain that the "principal 
or primary effect" of the aid is not to advance religion, Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612, and avoiding excessive entangle-
ment. Nonetheless, the Court has never foreclosed the pos-
sibility that some types of aid to parochial schools could be 
valid under the Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 
supra, at --. Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular 
assistance to both parochial and public school children in 
some areas. E. g., id. (tax deductions for educational ex-
penses); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) 
(provision of secular textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to 
school). I do not read the Court's opinion as precluding 
these types of indirect aid to parochial schools. In the cases 
cited, the assistance programs made funds available equally 
to public and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The 
constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated 
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to be ad-
ministered in significant part by public school teachers within 
parochial schools-resulting in both the advancement of reli-
, gion and forbidden entanglement. -If, fer e:xamplliol, .Co11g;r:ess 
eeald faamefl &fl eveflh6flded fi:ft8fteial a:s!istanee prog.r am to 
--9oth f)l:lblie ana f)Fivate sehools (Qp t:be laudabl9 f)l:H"p8888 8~ 
. ., .... ~ .... 
~· 
~~~~=E::wi:_ :'· 5~~; 
poses, we wottld be p1 esented with a eliffereat 'iaesti911 
I join the opinions and judgments of the Court. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, ante, 
p. --, holding that the aid to parochial schools involved 
LM.- .W.o~ c..ttses L--- --rr:-t violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. I write to emphasize additional reason~ why prece-
dents of this Court require us to invalidate these two educa-
tional programs that concededly have "done so much good 
and little, if any, detectable harm." Felton v. Secretary, 
United States Department of Education, 739 F. 2d 48, 72 1 t f, 
(CA2 19~). The Court has previously recognized the 41' =t~Hi:;:--t i M.plJr-rtMA rD e 
itaele value th~ parochial schoolS:eafl Jn•e·l'i:as : ;r t!J 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian pur-
pose, have provided an educational alternative for mil-
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lions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome 
competition with our public schools; and in some States 
they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a 
legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest 
quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever 
school their parents have chosen for them." 
Mueller v. Allen,- U.S.-,- (1983) (quoting Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) (POWELL, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dis-
senting in part)). Regrettably, however, the Title I and 
Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny required 
by our Establishment Clause cases. 
I agree with the Court that in this case the Establishment 
Clause is violated because there is too great a risk of govern-
ment entanglement in the administration of the religious 
schools; the same is true in Ball, ante. As beneficial as the 
Title I program appears to be in accomplishing its secular 
goal of supplementing the education of deprived children, its 
elaborate structure, the participation of public school teach-
ers, and the government surveillance required to ensure that 
public funds are used only for secular purposes inevitably 
present a serious risk of excessive entanglement. Our cases 
have noted that "'[t]he State must be certain, given the Reli-
gion Clauses, that subsidized teacher-s do not inculcate reli-
gion."' Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 371 (1975) (empha-
sis added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 
(1971)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers are re-
ligious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers 
teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at the 
parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the unani-
mous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of our 
cases. He correctly observed that the structure of the Title 
I program required the active and extensive surveillance that 
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the City has provided, and, "under Meek, this very surveil-
lance constitutes excessive entanglement even if it has suc-
ceeded in preventing the fostering of religion." 739 F. 2d, at 
66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the additional 
risk of political stemming from t e aid to reli-
gion at issue here. I do not suggest that at this point in our 
history the Title I program or similar parochial aid plans 
could result in the establishment of a state religion. There 
likewise is small chance that these programs would result in 
significant religious or denominational control over our demo-
cratic processes. See Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 263 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, there remains 
a significant risk of continuing political strife over the propri-
ety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper ·allocation 
of limited governmental resources. As this Court has re-
peatedly recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there will 
be competition and strife among them and others to gain, 
maintain, or increase the financial support of government. 
E. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., 
at 623. In states such as New York that have large and var-
ied sectarian populations, one can be assured that politics will 
enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools. Public 
schools, as well as private schools, are under increasing fi-
nancial pressure to meet real and perceived needs. Thus, 
any proposal to extend direct governmental aid to parochial 
schools alone is likely to spark political disagreement from 
taxpayers who support the public schools, as well as from 
non-recipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed 
funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to paro-
chial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that 
kind and degree of government involvement in religious life 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-239---CONCUR 
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that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and fre-
quently strain a political system to the breaking point." 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion 
of Harlan, J.). Although the Court's opinion does not dis-
cuss it at length, see ante, at 11, the potential for such divi-
siveness is a strong additional reason for holding that the 
Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entangle-
ment grounds. 
The Title I program at issue in this case also would be 
invalid under the "effects" prong of the test adopted in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra.* , As has been discussed thor-
oughly in Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the Grand 
Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New York by 
the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of the paro-
chial schools by relieving those schools of the duty to provide 
the remedial and supplemental education their children re-
quire. This is not the type of "indirect and incidental effect 
beneficial to [the] religious institutions" that we suggested in 
Nyquist would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 
U. S., at 775. Rather, by directly assuming part of the pa-
rochial schools' education function, the effect of the Title I aid 
is "inevitably . . . to subsidize and advance the religious mis-
sion of [the] sectarian schools," id., at 779-780, even though 
the program provides that only secular subjects will be 
taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the secular educa-
tion these schools provide goes "'hand in hand'" with the reli-
gious mission that is the reason for ~the schools' existence. 
421 U. S., at 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.)). Because of the predominantly 
religious nature of the schools, the substantial aid provided 
*Nothing that I say here should be construed as suggesting that a court 
inevitably must determine whether all three prongs of the Lemon test have 
been violated. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 794 (1973). I discuss an additional infirmity of the pro-
grams at issue in these cases only to emphasize why even a beneficial pro-
gram may be invalid because of the way it is structured. 
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by the Title I program "inescapably results in the direct and 
substantial advancement of religious activity." Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 366. 
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are 
placed by the interaction of the "effects" and entanglement 
prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions require govern-
ments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an ex-
tremely narrow line between being certain that the "principal 
or primary effect" of the aid is not to advance religion, Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612, and avoiding excessive entangle-
ment. Nonetheless, the Court has never foreclosed the pos-
sibility that some types of aid to parochial schools could be 
valid under the Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 
supra, at --. Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular 
assistance to both parochial and public school children in 
some areas. E. g., id. (tax deductions for educational ex-
penses); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) 
(provision of secular textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to 
school). I do not read the Court's opinion as precluding 
these types of indirect aid to parochial schools. In the cases 
cited, the assistance programs made funds available equally 
to public and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The 
constitutional defect in the Title t program, as indicated 
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to be ad-
ministered in significant part by public school teachers within 
parochial schools-resulting in both the advancement of reli-
gion and forbidden entanglement. If, for example, Congress 
could fashion evenhanded financial assistance f)F9gFalJ to 
both public an private schools '~~~~~~~~~~:_-< 
· that could be administered WI -
as to pre-
vent e aid from secular pur-
poses, we would be presented wi h a different question. 
I join the opinions and judgments of the Court. 
.. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice ,.White 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, ante, 
p. --, holding that the aid to parochial schools involved in 
those cases violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. I write to emphasize additional reasons why 
precedents of this Court require us to invalidate these two 
educational programs that concededly have "done so much 
good and little, if any, detectable harm." Felton v. Secre-
tary, United States Department of Education, 739 F. 2d 48, 
72 (CA2 1984). The Court has previously recognized the im-
portant role of parochial schools: 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian pur-
pose, have provided an educational alternative for mil-
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lions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome 
competition with our public schools; and in some States 
they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a 
legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest 
quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever 
school their parents have chosen for them." 
Mueller v. Allen,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (quoting Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) (POWELL, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dis-
senting in part)). Regrettably, however, the Title I and 
Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny required 
by our Establishment Clause cases. 
I agree with the Court that in this case the Establishment 
Clause is violated because there is too great a risk of govern-
ment entanglement in the administration of the religious 
schools; the same is true in Ball, ante. As beneficial as the 
Title I program appears to be _ in accomplishing its secular 
goal of supplementing the education of deprived children, its 
elaborate structure, the participation of public school teach-
ers, and the government surveillance required to ensure that 
public funds are used ~for secular purposes inevitably 
present a serious risk of excessive entanglement. Our cases 
have noted that "'[t]he State must be certain, given the Reli-
gion Clauses, that subsidized teacher~ do not inculcate reli-
gion."' Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 371 (1975) (empha-
sis added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 
(1971)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers are re-
ligious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers 
teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at the 
parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the unani-
mous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of our 
cases. He correctly observed that the structure of the Title 
I program required the active and extensive surveillance that 
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the City has provided, and, "under Meek, this very surveil-
lance constitutes excessive entanglement even if it has suc -
ceeded in preventing the fostering of religion." 739 F. 2d, at 
66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the additional 
risk of political divisiveness stemming from the aid to religion 
at issue here. I do not suggest that at this point in our his-
tory the Title I program or similar parochial aid plans could 
result in the establishment of a state religion. There like-
wise is small chance that these programs would result in sig-
nificant religious or denominational control over our demo-
cratic processes. See Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 263 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, there remains 
a risk of continuing political strife over the propri-
ety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation 
of limited governmental resources. As this Court has re-
peatedly recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there will 
be competition and strife among them and others to gain, 
maintain, or increase the financial support of government. 
E. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., 
at 623. In states such as New York that have large and var-
ied sectarian populations, one can be assured that politics will 
enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools. Public 
schools, as well as private schools, are under increasing fi-
nancial pressure to meet real and perceived needs. Thus, 
any proposal to extend direct governmental aid to parochial 
schools alone is likely to spark political disagreement from 
taxpayers who support the public schools, as well as from 
non-recipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed 
funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to paro-
chial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that 
kind and degree of government involvement in religious life 
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that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and fre-
quently strain a political system to the breaking point." 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion 
of Harlan, J.). Although the Court's opinion does not dis-
cuss it at length, see ante, at 11, the potential for such divi-
siveness is a strong additional reason for holding that the 
Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entangle-
ment grounds. 
The Title I program at issue in this case also would be 
invalid under the "effects" prong of the test adopted in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra.* As has been discussed thor-
oughly in Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the Grand 
Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New York by 
the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of the paro-
chial schools by relieving those schools of the duty to provide 
the remedial and supplemental education their children re-
quire. This is not the type of "indirect and incidental effect 
beneficial to [the] religious institutions" that we suggested in 
Nyquist would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 
U. S., at 775. Rather, by directly assuming part of the pa-
rochial schools' education function, the effect of the Title I aid 
is "inevitably . . . to subsidize and advance the religious mis-
sion of [the] sectarian schools," id., at 779-780, even though 
the program provides that only secular subjects will be 
taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the secular educa-
tion these schools provide goes "'hand in hand'" with the reli-
gious mission that is the reason for the schools' existence. 
421 U. S., at 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.)). Because of the predominantly 
religious nature of the schools, the substantial aid provided 
*Nothing that I say here should be construed as suggesting that a court 
inevitably must determine whether all three prongs of the Lemon test have 
been violated. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 794 (1973). I discuss an additional infirmity of the pro-
grams at issue in. these cases only to emphasize why even a beneficial pro-
gram may be invalid because of the way it is structured. 
I'·' 
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by the Title I program "inescapably results in the direct and 
substantial advancement of religious activity." Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 366. 
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are 
placed by the interaction of the "effects" and entanglement 
prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions require govern-
ments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an ex-
tremely narrow line between being certain that the "principal 
or primary effect" of the aid is not to advance religion, Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612, and avoiding excessive entangle-
ment. Nonetheless, the Court has never foreclosed the pos-
sibility that some types of aid to parochial schools could be 
valid under the Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 
supra, at --. Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular 
assistance to both parochial and public school children in 
some areas. E. g., id. (tax deductions for educational ex-
penses); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) 
(provision of secular textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to 
school). I do not read the Court's opinion as precluding 
these types of indirect aid to parochial schools. In the cases 
cited, the assistance programs made funds available equally 
to public and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The 
constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated 
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to be ad-
ministered in significant part by public school teachers within 
parochial schools-resulting in both tHe advancement of reli-
gion and forbidden entanglement. If, for example, Congress 
could fashion a program of evenhanded financial assistance to 
both public and private schools that could be administered, 
without governmental supervision in the private schools, so 
as to prevent the diversion of the aid from secular purposes, 
we would be presented with a different question. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, ante, 
p. --, holding that the aid to parochial schools involved in 
those cases violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. I write to emphasize additional reasons why 
precedents of this Court require us to invalidate these two 
educational programs that concededly have "done so much 
good and little, if any, detectable harm." Felton v. Secre-
tary, United States Department of Education, 739 F. 2d 48, 
72 (CA2 1984). The Court has previously recognized the im-
portant role of parochial schools: 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian pur-
pose, have provided an educational alternative for mil-
··' 
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lions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome 
competition with our public schools; and in some States 
they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a 
legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest 
quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever 
school their parents have chosen for them." 
Mueller v. Allen,- U.S.--,-- (1983) (quoting Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) (POWELL, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dis-
senting in part)). Regrettably, however, the Title I and 
Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny required 
by our Establishment Clause cases. 
I agree with the Court that in this case the Establishment 
Clause is violated because there is too great a risk of govern-
ment entanglement in the administration of the religious 
schools; the same is true in Ball, ante. As beneficial as the 
Title I program appears to be in accomplishing its secular 
goal of supplementing the education of deprived children, its 
elaborate structure, the participation of public school teach-
ers, and the government surveillance required to ensure that 
public funds are used only for secular purposes inevitably 
present a serious risk of excessive entanglement. Our cases 
have noted that "'[t]he State must be certain, given the Reli-
gion Clauses, that subsidized teacher~ do not inculcate reli-
gion."' Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 371 (1975) (empha-
sis added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 
(1971)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers are re-
ligious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers 
teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at the 
parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the unani-
mous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of our 
cases. He correctly observed that the structure of the Title 
I program reqUired the active and extensive surveillance that 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-239-CONCUR 




the City has provided, and, "under Meek, this very surveil-
lance constitutes excessive entanglement even if it has suc-
ceeded in preventing the fostering of religion." 739 F. 2d, at 
66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by the additional 
risk of political divisiveness stemming from the aid to religion 
at issue here. I do not suggest that at this point in our his-
tory the Title I program or similar parochial aid plans could 
result in the establishment of a state religion. There like-
wise is small chance that these programs would result in sig-
nificant religious or denominational control over our demo-
cratic processes. See Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 263 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, there remains 
a significant risk of continuing political strife over the propri-
ety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation 
of limited governmental resources. As this Court has re-
peatedly recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there will 
be competition and strife among them and others to gain, 
maintain, or increase the financial support of government. 
E. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., 
at 623. In states such as New York that have large and var-
ied sectarian populations, one can be assured that politics will 
enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools. Public 
schools, as well as private schools, are under increasing fi-
nancial pressure to meet real and perceived needs. Thus, 
any proposal to extend direct governmental aid to parochial 
schools alone is likely to spark political disagreement from 
taxpayers who support the public schools, as well as from 
non-recipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed 
funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to paro-
chial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that 
kind and degree of government involvement in religious life 
84-237, 84-238 & 84-239-CONCUR 
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that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and fre-
quently strain a political system to the breaking point." 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion 
of Harlan, J.). Although the Court's opinion does not dis-
cuss it at length, see ante, at 11, the potential for such divi-
siveness is a strong additional reason for holding that the 
Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entangle-
ment grounds. 
The Title I program at issue in this case also would be 
invalid under the "effects" prong of the test adopted in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra.* As has been discussed thor-
oughly in Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the Grand 
Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New York by 
the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of the paro-
chial schools by relieving those schools of the duty to provide 
the remedial and supplemental education their children re-
quire. This is not the type of "indirect and incidental effect 
beneficial to [the] religious institutions" that we suggested in 
Nyquist would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 
U. S., at 775.. Rather, by directly assuming part of the pa-
rochial schools' education function, the effect of the Title I aid 
is "inevitably ... to subsidize and advance the religious mis-
sion of [the] sectarian schools," id., at 779-780, even though 
the program provides that only secular subjects will be 
taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, the secular educa-
tion these schools provide goes "'hand in hand'" with the reli-
gious mission that is the reason for the schools' existence. 
421 U. S., at 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.)). Because of the predominantly 
religious nature of the schools, ~he substantial aid provided 
*Nothing that I say here should be construed as suggesting that a court 
inevitably must determine whether all three prongs of the Lemon test have 
been violated. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 794 (1973). I discuss an additional infirmity of the pro-
grams at issue in these cases only to emphasize why even a beneficial pro-
gram may be invalid because of the way it is structured. 
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by the Title I program "inescapably results in the direct and 
substantial advancement of religious activity." Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 366. 
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are 
placed by the interaction of the "effects" and entanglement 
prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions require govern-
ments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an ex-
tremely narrow line between being certain that the "principal 
or primary effect" of the aid is not to advance religion, Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612, and avoiding excessive entangle-
ment. Nonetheless, the Court has never foreclosed the pos-
sibility that some types of aid to parochial schools could be 
valid under the Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 
supra, at --. Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular 
assistance to both parochial and public school children in 
some areas. E. g., id. (tax deductions for educational ex-
penses); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) 
(provision of secular textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to 
school). I do not read the Court's opinion as precluding 
these types of indirect aid to parochial schools. In the cases 
cited, the assistance programs made funds available equally 
to public and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The 
constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated 
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to be ad-
ministered in significant part by public school teachers within 
parochial schools-resulting in both tHe advancement of reli-
gion and forbidden entanglement. If, for example, Congress 
could fashion a program of evenhanded financial assistance to 
both public and private schools that could be administered, 
without governmental supervision in the private schools, so 
as to prevent the diversion of the aid from secular purposes, 
we would be presented with a different question. 
I join the opinions and judgments of the Court. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in 
this case and in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, ante, 
p. --, holding that the aid to parochial schools involved in 
those cases violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. I write to emphasize additional reasons why 
precedents of this Court require us to invalidate these two 
educational programs that concededly have "done so much 
good and little, if any, detectable harm." Felton v. Secre-
tary, United States Department of Education, 739 F. 2d 48, 
72 (CA2 19~). The Court has previously recognized the im-
portant role of parochial schools: 
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian pur-
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lions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome 
competition with our public schools; and in some States 
they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the 
operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a 
legitimate interest in facilitating edu·cation of the highest 
quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever 
s.chool their parents have chosen for them." 
Mueller v. Allen,-- U. S. --, -- (1983) (quoting Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) (POWELL, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dis-
senting in part)). Regrettably, however, the Title I and 
Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny required 
by our Establishment Clause cases. 
I agree with the Court th~t in this case the Establishment 
Clause is violated because there is too great a risk of govern-
ment entanglement in the administration of the religious 
schools; the same is true in Ball, ante. As beneficial as the 
Title I program appears to be in accomplishing its secular 
goal of supplementing the education of deprived children, its 
elaborate structure, the participation of public school teach-
ers, and the government surveillance required to ensure that 
public funds are used for secular purposes inevitably present \ 
a serious risk of excessive entanglement. Our cases have l 
noted that "'[t]he State must be certain, given the Religion 
Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.'" 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 371 (1975) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 
(1971)). This is true whether the subsidized teachers are re-
ligious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers 
teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at the 
parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the unani-
mous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of our 
cases. He correctly observed that the structure of the Title 
I program required the active and extensive surveillance that 
,, , 
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the City has provided, and, "under Meek, this very surveil-
lance constitutes excessive entanglement even if it has suc-
ceeded in preventing the fostering of religion." 739 F. 2d, 
at 66. 
This risk of entanglement is compounded by 'the additional 
risk of political divisiveness stemming from the aid to religion 
at issJle here. I do not suggest that at this point in our his-
tory the Title I program or similar parochial aid plans could 
result in the establishment of a state religion. There like-
wise is small chance that these programs would result in sig-
nificant religious or denominational control over our demo-
cratic processes. See Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 263 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, there remains l 
a considerable risk of continuing political strife over the pro-
priety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper alloca-
tion of limited governmental resources. As this Court has 
repeatedly recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct 
governmental aid is extended to some groups that there will 
be competition and strife among them and others to gain, 
maintain, or increase the financial support of government. 
E . g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 796-797 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., 
at 623. In states such as New York that have large and var-
ied sectarian populations, one can be assured that politics will 
enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools. Public 
schools, as well as private schools, are under increasing fi-
nancial pressure to meet real and perceived needs. Thus, 
any proposal to extend direct governmental aid to parochial 
schools alone is likely to spark political disagreement from 
taxpayers who support the public schools, as well as from 
non-recipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed 
funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to paro-
chial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that 
kind and degree of government involvement in religious life 
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that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and fre-
quently strain a political system to the breaking point." 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion 
of Harlan, J.). Although the Court's opinion does not dis-
cuss it at length, see ante, at 11, the potential for such divi-
siveness is a strong additional reason for holding that the 
Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entangle-
ment ··grounds. 
The Title I ·program at issue in this case also would be 
invalid under the "effects" prong of the test adopted in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra.* As has been discussed thor-
oughly in Ball, ante, at 18-23, with respect to the Grand 
Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New York by 
the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of the paro-
chial schools by relieving those schools of the duty to provide 
the remedial and supplemental education their children re-
quire. This is not the type of "indirect and incidental effect 
beneficial to [the] religious institutions" that we suggested in 
Nyquist would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. 413 
U. 8., at 775. Rather, by directly assuming part of the pa-
rochial schools' education function, the effect of the Title I aid 
is "inevitably ... to subsidize and advance the religious mis-
sion of [the] sectarian schools," id., at 779-780, even though 
the program provides that only secular subjects will be 
taught. As in Meek v. Pittenger, .supra, the secular educa-
tion these schools provide goes" 'hand in hand'" with the reli-
gious mission that is the reason for the schools' existence. 
421 U. S., at 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.)). Because of the predominantly 
religious nature of the schools, the substantial aid provided 
*Nothing that I say here should be construed as suggesting that a court 
inevitably must determine whether all three prongs of the Lemon test have 
been violated. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 794 (1973). I discuss an additional infirmity of the pro-
grams at issue in these cases only to emphasize why even a beneficial pro-
gram may be invalid because of the way it is structured. 
·' I 
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by the Title I program "inescapably results in the direct and 
substantial advancement of religious activity." Meek v. 
Pittenger, supra, at 366. 
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are 
placed by the interaction of the "effects" and entanglement 
prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions require govern-
ments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an ex-
tremely narrow line between being certain that the "principal 
or primary effect" of the aid is not to advance religion, Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612, and avoiding excessive entangle-
ment. Nonetheless, the Court has never foreclosed the pos-
sibility that some types of aid to parochial schools could be 
valid under the Establishment Clause. Mueller v. Allen, 
supra, at --. Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular 
assistance to both parochial and public school children in 
some areas. E. g., id. (tax deductions for educational ex-
penses); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) 
(provision of secular textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (reimbursements for bus fare to 
school). I do not read the Court's opinion as precluding 
these types of indirect aid to parochial schools. In the cases 
cited, the assistance programs made funds available equally 
to public and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The 
constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated 
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to be ad-
ministered in significant part by public school teachers within 
parochial schools-resulting in both the advancement of reli-
gion and forbidden entanglement. If, for example, Congress 
could fashion a program of evenhanded financial assistance to 
both public and private schools that could be administered, 
without governmental supervision in the private schools, so 
as to prevent the diversion of the aid from secular purposes, 
we would be presented with a different question . . 
I join the opinions and judgments of the Court. 
